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John Cheever’s penultimate novel, Falconer, has received few detailed accounts of the logic of its
structure.  This  thesis  proposes  such  an  analysis  by  discussing  Cheever’s  use  of  religious  allegory
from a constructive-postmodernist perspective. Employing close reading, the narrative is examined
as  a  meaningful  exploration  of  suffering  and  salvation  in  the  contemporary  USA,  with  clearly
discernible extratextual concerns of the author.
The theoretical part of the thesis examines the concept of allegory at the structural level by
providing a coherent overview of the development of the trope from antiquity to postmodernism,
highlighting its most important phases and exemplifying the complex and contradictory nature of
allegory. The theoretical part also provides definitions of the pertinent terms of myth, allegory, and
psychomachia. Having reviewed postmodernism, it concludes with comparing and contrasting two
opposite postmodern approaches to allegory, namely, those of deconstructive and constructive
postmodernism, with the latter adopted as the theoretical perspective of this study due to its
viability in performing searches for meaning in the context of extreme meaning relativization. This
viability derives from the stance that, in contrast to deconstructive postmodernism, constructive
postmodernism considers the postmodern multiplicity of meaning not as an obstacle, but as an
additional tool in the epistemological and ontological search of a way to understand and live in the
real world.
The analytical part of the work provides a detailed analysis of the use of the allegories of Cain and
Abel and the Jewish Wanderings, which create the novel’s coherence on a meta-textual level. The
structure of the novel gradually unfolds as the two allegories are manipulated with the help of both
traditional tools of religious discourse, such as biblical typology and negative theology, and the
techniques of intertextuality and palimpsest, popular in postmodernism. The overlapping
development of the two allegories throughout the narrative negates their representation as rigid
biblical typological images. With the allegory of Cain and Abel, this is achieved via the numerous
role reversals of the protagonist and his victim, which makes an unambiguous attribution of the role
of Cain or Abel to either of them impossible due to the essential similarity of Cheever’s characters.
As a result, their foregrounded doppelgänger relationship leads to recasting their conflict not as
fratricide but as a psychomachia, i.e., an inner struggle of the protagonist’s psyche. With the
allegory of the Jewish Wanderings, the deeply engrained Old Testament identity-building rhetoric
of  the  United  States  as  a  Chosen  People  rewarded  with  an  attainment  of  their  Chosen  Land  is
negated by exposing the logic behind these typological images as tribal and pernicious to American
national identity. As a result, both allegories coalesce in creating a new, highly pessimistic
palimpsest typological image, where the American nation is portrayed as confined to eternal
aimless  wanderings  within  the  borders  of  the  Promised  Land  that  has  turned  into  a  prison.  The
societal concerns of the novel, which amount to the examination of the possibility of breaking out
of this spiritual prison, lie in the importance of the prophetic role the protagonist systematically
denies, which precludes the possibility of a positive societal change.
Reading this interpretation-resistant postmodern novel as a religious allegory from a constructive-
postmodernist perspective not only allows to clearly perceive its structural coherence as a national
allegory of confinement, but also highlights the viability of allegory as a suitable tool for the search
for meaning in the age of postmodernism, characterized by a notorious relativization of meaning
and, often, a consequent reluctance to engage in such search. Therefore, the same perspective can
be recommended for detailed analyses of postmodern American fiction that otherwise resists
coherent interpretation.
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Tiivistelmä – Abstract
Falconer on John Cheeverin toiseksi viimeinen romaani, jonka rakenteen yhtenäisyyttä on tutkittu
yksityiskohtaisesti vain muutaman kerran. Tämä tutkielma tarkastelee Cheeverin romaanin tapaa
käyttää uskonnollisia allegorioita konstruktiivisen postmodernismin näkökulmasta. Lähiluennon
avulla romaania tarkastellaan merkityksellisenä tutkielmana kärsimyksestä ja pelastuksesta, jossa
ovat mukana nyky-yhdysvaltalaisen kirjailijan ekstratekstuaaliset huolet.
Tutkielman teoriaosuus tarkastelee allegorian käsitettä rakennetasolla: se antaa johdonmukaisen
yleiskatsauksen troopin kehityksestä antiikista postmodernismiin korostaen sen tärkeimpiä vaiheita
ja havainnollistaen allegorian monimutkaista ja ristiriitaista luonnetta. Tässä osuudessa myös
määritellään asiaankuuluvat termit kuten myytti, allegoria ja psykomakia. Postmodernismin
käsitteen tarkastelun jälkeen teoriaosuus päättyy kahden vastakkaisen lähestymistavan allegoriaan,
eli konstruktiivisen ja dekonstruktiivisen postmodernismin lähestymistavan, keskinäiseen
vertailuun. Konstruktiivinen lähestymistapa on valittu tämän tutkimuksen teoreettiseksi
näkökulmaksi johtuen sen elinkykyisyydestä, kyvystä etsiä merkitystä äärimmäisen relativismin
kontekstissa. Tämä elinkykyisyys johtuu konstruktiivisen postmodernismin asenteesta, joka, toisin
kuin dekonstruktiivinen postmodernismi, käsittää postmodernin merkitysten monimuotoisuuden ei
niinkään esteenä, vaan lisätyökaluna epistemologisessa ja ontologisessa pyrkimyksessä ymmärtää
todellista maailmaa ja toimia siinä.
Tutkielman analyysiosuuden keskiössä on kahden allegorian, eli Kainin ja Abelin sekä juutalaisten
vaelluksen allegorian, yksityiskohtainen analyysi. Nämä molemmat luovat kertomuksen
yhtenäisyyttä metatekstin tasolla. Romaanin rakenne levittäytyy asteittain sitä mukaa kuin
molempia allegorioita manipuloidaan sekä traditionaalisten uskontodiskurssin työkalujen, kuten
raamatullisen typologian ja negatiivisen teologian, että postmodernismin aikana suosittujen
intertekstuaalisuuden ja palimpsestin avulla. Kahden allegorian limittäinen kehittyminen kariuttaa
niiden tulkinnan jäykkinä raamatullisina typoksina. Kainin ja Abelin allegorian kohdalla tämä
päämäärä saavutetaan lukuisten päähahmon ja hänen uhrinsa välisten roolinvaihtojen avulla.
Seurauksena on mahdottomuus yksiselitteisesti suoda jommankumman roolia kummallekaan
hahmolle, koska sekä keskushahmo että hänen veljensä ovat pohjimmiltaan samanlaisia. Tämän
epäselvyyden johdosta etualalle nostettu hahmojen kaksoisolentosuhde kyseenalaistaa heidän
konfliktinsa esittämistä veljesmurhana ja muuttaa sen psykomakiaksi, eli päähenkilön sisäiseksi
hengelliseksi taisteluksi. Juutalaisten vaelluksen allegorian kohdalla Yhdysvalloissa syvälle
omaksuttu vanhatestamentillinen identiteettiä rakentava retoriikka, joka tulkitsee amerikkalaiset
valituksi kansaksi ja Yhdysvallat heille palkintona annetuksi Luvatuksi maaksi, kariutuu
paljastamalla niiden typosten nurkkakuntaisen luonteen, joka turmelee kansallista identiteettiä.
Kertomuksen kehittyessä nämä kaksi allegoriaa yhdistyvät luodakseen uuden, erittäin pessimistisen
palimpsestisen typoksen, jossa Amerikan kansa on esitetty ikuisesti ja päämäärättömästi vaeltavana
heimona, joka on vangittu Luvattuun maahan kuin vankilaan. Romaanin yhteiskunnallinen
huolestuneisuus kohdistuu mahdollisuuteen murtautua ulos tästä hengellisestä vankilasta. Sitä
mahdollistava yhteiskunnallinen muutos on kytketty keskushahmon profeetan identiteettiin, jonka
hän aktiivisesti hylkää läpi koko teoksen, mikä estää positiivisen yhteiskunnallisen muutoksen
käynnistymisen.
Tämän rakenteellisesti vaikeasti tulkittavan romaanin yhtenäisyyttä on mahdollista hahmottaa
lukemalla sitä uskonnollisena allegoriana konstruktiivisen postmodernismin näkökulmasta. Tämä
lähestymistapa paljastaa kertomuksen rakenteelliseksi keskiöksi Yhdysvaltain kansallisen
vankeuden allegorian. Samalla se tuo esille allegorian troopin elinkykyisyyden sopivana
merkityksen etsinnän työkaluna postmodernismin aikana, jolloin surullisenkuuluisa relativismi
usein aiheuttaa vastahakoisuutta ryhtyä merkityksen etsimiseen. Tämä tutkimus osoittaa, että samaa
lähestymistapaa voi suositella vaikeasti tulkittavan amerikkalaisen postmodernin kirjallisuuden
yksityiskohtaiseen analyysiin.
Avainsanat – Keywords John Cheever, Falconer, uskonnollinen allegoria, Vanha testamentti, Kain ja
Abel, Juutalaisten vaellus, konstruktiivinen ja dekonstruktiivinen postmodernismi, rakenne,
yhtenäisyys, raamatullinen typologia, negatiivinen teologia, ekstratekstuaaliset huolet, kansallinen
allegoria.
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1. Introduction
Since its publication in 1977, Falconer, a postmodern novel by John Cheever, has received
only few detailed critical accounts of the logic of its structure, the gap I attempt to close.
To  achieve  this  goal,  I  will  examine Falconer as  a  postmodern  religious  allegory.  In  my
analysis I will adopt the perspective of constructive postmodernism by engaging in a
meaningful exploration of human suffering and salvation in the contemporary USA,
particularly concentrating on the extratextual concerns of this search, and employ both
traditional tools of religious discourse, such as biblical typology and negative theology, and
the use of intertextuality and palimpsest, both popular in postmodernism.
The religious allegory of Falconer will be examined at two levels: the formal and the
thematic. The first or structural level is the subject of the theoretical part, providing a
theoretical frame for the subsequent analytical part, which will discuss Cheever’s
allegorical use of two biblical narratives, namely, the story of Cain and Abel and that of the
Jewish Wanderings. The theoretical part provides an overview of the development of
allegory in literature and focuses on the terms and definitions necessary for the practical
analysis,  namely,  those  of  allegory,  myth,  and  psychomachia.  It  also  introduces  John
Bunyan’s The Pilgrim’s Progress as a prime example of a traditional religious allegory. The
approach I have chosen for the analysis is a close reading of the novel with a particularly
close examination of the narratological structures that employ religious allegory and
gradually emerge in the text to allow a much deeper understanding of the novel than the
2superficially optimistic narrative of individual escape of the protagonist. To achieve this
effect, Cheever uses several parts of the biblical narrative as a palimpsest. The resulting
allegorical reading contains a powerful critique of the destructive consequences for the
American  nation  of  the  habitual  use  of  the  identity-building  myths  of  the  Promised  Land
and the Chosen People. This deeply engrained mythology leads Americans to eternal
confinement to aimless, spiritless wanderings in a promised land that remains forever
unattainable.
To further illuminate my aim, I will next introduce the author, the novel, and its
critical reception. John Cheever (1912-1982) is a Massachusetts-born American author
(Bailey  3,  20)  with  a  solid  reputation  of  a  short-story  writer  due  to  his  long  association
with The New Yorker (Crowley 267). Falconer, his fourth and penultimate novel of 1977,
is less than 150 pages long (Collins 1-2; Crowley 269). It is divided in six unmarked,
untitled and unequal in length chapters without a clear thematic division. Each of them
examines the protagonist’s isolation at the level of both family and society. The linear plot
of Ezekiel Farragut’s imprisonment for fratricide is often interrupted with flashbacks,
letters and digressions depicting the minor characters’ lives, thus accentuating the
protagonist’s alienation. It is also intensified by his drug addiction, which is, however,
unbeknownst to him cured during his incarceration. As a sign of spiritual rebirth the
hopeless imprisonment ends with Farragut’s miraculous escape. Shortly before this
culmination another prisoner, his lover, also escapes in a most improbable manner during a
mock religious ceremony intended to simultaneously increase the publicity of the prison,
the clergy, the local governor, and the neighbouring business university. Such parallels
between the life events of different characters are abundant in the novel, constituting the
typical Cheeveresque story-building technique of “narrative parallelism” (Morace 507),
3which in Falconer is richly used to build the narratological structures that enable a
consistent allegorical reading of the novel, which I will demonstrate in my analysis.
The critical reception of Falconer can be divided into early, written immediately on
publication of the novel in 1977, and later criticism, produced after the onset of the 1980s.
Among the early reviews, generally positive, there are some strong voices claiming that
Cheever essentially remained a short-story writer and should adhere to this genre (Oates
147; Towers 151). Thus, Oates compares the novel’s episodic structure to a string of beads
and ultimately reduces Falconer to “a number of powerful passages” (147). In her view,
Cheever is by nature a short story writer and while in his finest short stories […] a
single surreal image is vividly developed, and draws that forward-motion called
‘plot’ irresistibly along with it, his novels flounder under the weight of too many
capricious, inspired, zany images. One comes away from Falconer amused or
bewildered or annoyed, recalling disparate scenes […] that compete with one
another rather than complement one another. (Oates 147)
Along similar lines, Towers contends that Cheever’s style, perfectly suited for short fiction,
is deficient in a novel, because it disperses the focus inherent to the genre among numerous
unnecessarily vivid events and characters, pointing out that in Falconer “[…] there is […]
an unresolved conflict between the explosive potential of the material and the very
‘brightness’  of  its  manipulation”  (151).  Towers  concludes  that  Cheever  has  not  yet
developed the mature style necessary for him to achieve in order to cope with more
demanding tasks of long fiction (151). In sum, both assessments cited above demonstrate
that many early critics blamed Falconer for the lack of structural coherence, in their
opinion, imperative in a novel (Johnson 154).
4There are two reasons behind the attitude expressed in the passage above. The first is
Cheever’s entrenched reputation as a New Yorker writer, which, due to the magazine’s fame
as the embodiment of the middle-class establishment, by definition entailed that he could
not become a serious novelist (Bailey 368-369, 662n; Meanor 14). The second reason arose
from the attempts to read Cheever’s novels as those by a “traditional writer” (Morace 502),
which restrictively and in advance reduced the expected novelistic techniques to a set of
such traditional-conservative means as verisimilitude, psychological realism, and
transparent structural coherence, which are inapplicable to Cheever’s work (Morace 502-
503). For example, Oates cites the novel’s two improbable prison escapes – that of
Farragut himself and his lover Jody – as examples of the author’s whimsical style that  is
justified in short fiction but “[…] undercuts and to some extent damages the more serious
intentions of the [novel-length] works” (147). Towers, in turn, blames Falconer for the
lack  of  realistic  detail  supporting  the  authorial  claims  that  Farragut  is  a  professor  and  a
drug addict (152). More importantly, he defines the novel’s ending as “a nimble cop-out,
for Farragut’s future – to say nothing of his continued freedom – is quite simply
unimaginable in view of what has been established about him” (Towers 152). This critique
is a clear evidence of Towers reading Falconer as a realist text.
Importantly, Towers’s contention that “Cheever seems perfectly aware of this
frivolity and half mocks it” shows him as shrewd enough to acknowledge that the novelist
is quite deliberate in clustering one improbability on top of another (152). However, the
critic is too restricted by his perspective to perceive the reason for this strategy.
Fortunately, other early critics abandon realism and, adopting an allegorical perspective,
acknowledge that Cheever’s technique is a metafictional strategy to, in Kelley’s words,
“mak[e] border raids on the very categories that have been presented as […] realism,
5mimesis, empiricism, and history” (Reinventing Allegory 2). For example, Davis dooms to
failure any serious attempt to read Falconer as realistic fiction and, instead, proposes to
approach the novel allegorically, as a tale of a hopeless heterosexual confinement suffered
by a generic male homosexual in the unequivocally binary-divided world (136-137).
Another instance of an allegorical reading, proposed by Didion, considers Falconer a
quintessential example of what all Cheever’s works are, namely, obsessive “[…]
allegorical variations on a single and profoundly unacceptable theme, that of ‘nostalgia,’ or
the particular melancholia induced by long absence from one’s country or home” (139).
This nostalgia is ‘unacceptable’ because it exposes the epitome of a ‘true’ American – a
white middle-class protestant1 – as having no home in a country claimed by his ancestors
generations ago (Didion 138, 139). The allegorical character of the novel is enhanced by
the fact that in Falconer Cheever  for  the  first  time  removes  the  actual  home  of  the
protagonist, which obviously translates this loss into the idea that home is located within
one’s spirit (Didion 139-140). Although Didion does not develop this line of reasoning
further, I suggest that Falconer is an allegorical exploration of the contradiction between
the spiritual homelessness of its characters and the identity-building mythology of the
United States, which is based on the idea of the WASP group having finally reached their
home, the Promised Land, rewarded with the opportunity to lead a bountiful life free of
existential qualms à la Farragut.
Later criticism offers another, more extended, successful example of a spiritual
allegorical interpretation of the novel, which requires the reader’s reconstruction of a
coherent moral structure of the narrative based on several religious clues (Johnson 154-
1 Although Farragut is an Episcopalian, as also was Cheever himself (Cheever 56-57; Bailey 28, 219-220),
Didion clearly projects what she perceives as Cheever’s own WASPish awareness of deep homelessness onto
the protagonist of Falconer (138). This projection attests that white Americans widely identify themselves as
a Protestant nation (Hughes 123-124).
6155). The case in point is Johnson’s 1981 allegorical reading of Falconer, which is close in
spirit to the constructive-postmodernist analyses of experimental narratives by Petrolle,
whose approach I will both illustrate and adopt in my thesis. According to Johnson,
A religious imagination […] controls the mood of Falconer; more important, it
determines the plot. This novel’s structure is moral: it defines right action and then
rewards it, claiming the romancer’s freedom to employ ‘miracles’ in its plotting.
The specific form of Falconer is a secularized version of the Christian pattern of
redemption: forgiveness of sins through conviction, repentance, and the receipt of
grace. (154)
As a result, the spiritual dimension of the narrative binds it together, providing the
structural coherence earlier and more traditionally-oriented critics could not perceive
(Johnson 154). Importantly, Cheever achieves this coherence by placing much of
responsibility for allegoresis with the reader, who has to actively interpret the religious
clues that are amply dropped by the author starting from the very beginning of the novel
(Johnson 154-155). However, although the proposed framework is religious, Johnson
concentrates on transcendental questions without overemphasizing the issue of literal belief
in God. Instead, he uses the religious framework to expose existential questions chasing
the protagonist and presents him as guilty of three transgressions of his responsibility as a
human being: an inability to love selflessly (156), a violation of his own integrity by his
addiction (158-159), and fratricide, the crime against fraternity (159). To earn forgiveness,
Farragut overcomes all the three by embracing selfless love, conquering his addiction, and
accepting fraternity, with every act of selfless caring both towards himself and his fellow-
convicts consequently rewarded by miracles of grace, culminating in his ultimate – and
intentionally unrealistic – escape (Johnson 158-162).
7However, considering Johnson’s argument convincing on the whole, particularly
concerning selfless love, I find his interpretation of the second and third transgressions of
responsibility, i.e., addiction and fratricide, problematic. Thus, the positive interpretation of
the hero’s cure from addiction is strongly compromised by the issue of agency, without
which responsibility is unthinkable. The compromising effect stems from the fact that the
protagonist is completely unaware of the placebo treatment that leads to his cure, which
provokes his open resentment of the outcome (Cheever 136). As for fraternity, the
protagonist  readily  embraces  it  on  a  personal  level  as  early  as  two  weeks  into  his
incarceration: “Of the twenty men in F, Farragut, at the end of two weeks, fell into a family
group that consisted of Chicken Number Two, Bumpo, the Stone, the Cuckold, Ransom
and Tennis” (Cheever 27). Since this moment, never once does the hero violate this
principle during his imprisonment, which problematizes the detection of significant moral
growth in this area. These issues suggest that Johnson’s allegorical reading is not
comprehensive, which results from his focus on the hero as an individual. This gap allows
me to propose another religious reading, which emphasizes the protagonist as a member of
society and, among other things, accounts for both the above-mentioned problems.
The only other critical account of Cheever’s oeuvre that appreciates the societal level
of the author’s religious representation is provided by Adams in 1985. Thus, exploring the
connection between adultery and religion in suburbia, Adams considers Cheever, along
with  John  Updike  and  Walker  Percy,  deeply  worried  over  the  lack  of  religious  agency  in
American suburban society (63, 68-69). For example, the question of suffering, taking the
form of the pervasive Suburban Sadness, remains perniciously unanswered and
unanswerable due to the characters’ sweeping avoidance of engaging in a meaningful
religious search that could provide a relief to their suffering, i.e., salvation in the form of,
8for  example,  “traditional  religion  [or]  the  family  unit  […]”  (Adams  69),  both  of  which
have a strong societal aspect. This attitude dilutes religion as a social institution to the
point where it becomes powerless as a tool for the search for meaning (Adams 57), leaving
in its absence a society suffering from “unconscious awareness of both religious and civic
concern […]” (Adams 54), the malaise that further reinforces the suffering. I argue that
similar extratextual concerns with suffering, salvation and agency occupy a central position
in Falconer, which both allows for and justifies my reading of the novel as a constructive-
postmodern religious allegory.
As has become clear from the critical reception reviewed above, almost all of the
interpretations of Falconer that I have studied so far, including the coherent allegorical
ones, concentrate on the story of Farragut as an individual. It seems that due to this
individualistically-oriented American approach the important aspect of Christianity as an
inherently  communal  religion  has  so  far  been  omitted  in  both  early  and  later  criticism of
Falconer as  a  (religious)  allegory.  To  fill  this  gap  I  propose  another,  constructive-
postmodernist perspective, which, as Johnson’s, is also religious, but concentrates on the
generic character of Farragut and, therefore, foregrounds the communal nature of the
allegories encoded in religious references and thereby raises them onto the level of national
allegories. This perspective allows to interpret the narrative as a critique of the American
identity-building, which is portrayed as destructive not only for an individual, but for the
community as a whole. This effect is achieved by using two age-old traditions of religious
discourse: biblical typology and negative theology. The former is represented by the
discourse of the American civil religion, i.e., the rigid typologically defined rhetoric of
American exceptionalism rooted in Puritanism and Protestantism (Madsen, “American
Allegory” 229). The latter approaches God – and the truth – by constantly negating them to
9reach for the understanding of what they are not (Petrolle 53). By opposing the two,
Cheever exposes American exceptionalism as inhumane and pernicious even to its
promoters. This is accomplished by exploring the allegory of the Jewish Wanderings, with
the  two  related  familiar  typological  allegories  of  the  Promised  Land  and  the  Chosen
People, exposed and criticized as tribal and, therefore, damaging American national
identity. In examining this damage, the constructive-postmodern allegorical reading of
Falconer concentrates on the questions of suffering and salvation in close relation to
extratextual concerns pertinent to the contemporary USA.
To outline my allegorical reading, I will begin with the analysis of the protagonist as
an ambiguous Cain and his brother’s doppelgänger. This ambiguity will introduce the
context of the Old Testament as a framework shaping the message of the novel. I will use
this  context  to  direct  my subsequent  analysis  of Falconer as a generic psychomachia not
unlike The Pilgrim’s Progress, with Farragut as ‘Everyman’ both defined and confined by
the Old Testament mythology ingrained in the American nation-building psychology,
particularly in the myth of the Jewish Wanderings. I will argue that the protagonist’s moral
growth pertaining to accepting his social responsibility is vital not only to his own personal
escape, but also to the metaphorical escape of the whole nation. I will demonstrate that, to
create this communally-oriented religious allegory, Cheever uses parts of the Old
Testament narrative as a palimpsest. I will also propose the alternative solution the author
prompts the reader to reconstruct in order to overcome this spiritual confinement of
national proportions.
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2. Allegory
It is not easy to define allegory. Its immediate, and obvious, aim is to trigger the process of
allegorical interpretation. While the former is a concept and the latter a practical
application, both are inseparable and problematic to define. The following chapter
examines the difficulties of defining and studying allegory, provides its definition based on
several modern literary dictionaries, focuses on the use of allegory in the classical
tradition, briefly reviews John Bunyan’s The Pilgrim’s Progress as  a  prime example  of  a
traditional religious allegory, and examines the attitude to and use of the trope in
postmodernism.
2.1. DifficultiesinDefiningandStudyingAllegory
In the first  chapter of the interdisciplinary study Interpretation and Allegory: Antiquity to
the Modern Period,  edited  by  Jon  Whitman,  the  first  attempt  to  give  a  “historical  and
conceptual framework for approaching interpretive allegory in the West” (Whitman,
Preface xi), Whitman examines three main difficulties in studying allegory. The first is the
over two thousand year span of allegory use, which has produced a vast amount of writing
pertinent to the subject. Therefore, “[t]o attempt a history of allegorical interpretation in the
West would almost be to attempt a history of Western cultural change itself” (Whitman, “A
Retrospective Forward” 5). Indeed, Whitman’s project draws on such branches of
11
humanities as “literature, religion, art, philosophy, and social history” (Preface xii). The
situation is further complicated by the fact that many of the early influential texts have
either been lost or have never been critically analysed (Whitman, “Retrospective” 5).
In Whitman’s view, the second difficulty is intrinsic to allegory itself:
Allegorical interpretation is not exactly a single ‘kind’ of interpretation. To engage
‘it’ seriously is to encounter not just a system of beliefs or a set of conceptual
‘norms’, but a series of critical negotiations. Acts of interpretive allegory are
transactions between fluctuating critical communities and formative texts. While
these transactions regularly draw upon shared interpretive methods, they are
situated in times and places, marked by tensions and polemics, that are specific to
each historical community and its developing canon. It thus produces very limited
results to try to outline the allegorization of a single text […] or to try to isolate a
single ‘form’ of interpretation […]. (“Retrospective” 5-6)
This difficulty is closely related to the first one. For example, the interpretation of the Old
Testament is central in the Jewish tradition, important but secondary to that of the New
Testament in the Christian, and partially misleading for the Muslims (Whitman,
“Retrospective” 6). This diversion is due to the fact that all three interpretive communities
differ geographically, in their languages, and in their interpretive traditions (Whitman,
“Retrospective” 5). To complicate the matters, all the three have developed for thousands
of years promoting their own agendas, and some have suffered irrevocable losses of key
theoretical texts (Whitman, “Retrospective” 5, 6).  Bearing these diachronic complications
in mind, Whitman’s second difficulty emphasizes the ideological problems which
inevitably arise in any given historical context when an allegorical text is produced or
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interpreted. Whitman highlights these historical/ideological agendas by giving an example
of allegorists denying each other the very tool they use themselves on purely ideological
grounds, as, for example, was the case in the polemic between the adherents of Christianity
and pagan religions in antiquity (“Retrospective” 6).
This example, clearly showing that allegory is seldom, if ever, a purely literary or
neutral undertaking, leads Whitman to the formulation of the third difficulty in studying
the trope, namely, the cautiousness with which the subject of allegorical interpretation has
been approached during the last centuries. This wariness is partially due to the influence of
“Reformation and Romantic arguments that ‘allegory’ violates the historical particularity
and imaginative integrity of texts” (Whitman, “Retrospective” 6). Later, during the
eighteenth century, allegory was rejected by philologists and historians who used
‘historical recovery’ as their scientific method and considered allegory “a procedure alien
to the principles of proper philology itself” (Whitman, “Retrospective” 6). Postromantic
approaches to historical recovery have continued to regard allegory as an ‘alien procedure’
(Whitman,  “Retrospective”  6).  These  reasons,  as  well  as  the  intrinsic  duality  of  the
concept, make it suspicious even today (Whitman, “Retrospective” 6).
However, in spite of the above-mentioned difficulties, Whitman does point out the
existence of the “shared interpretive methods” employed by different allegorists
(“Retrospective” 5). He also states that, despite the differences among scholars studying
allegory, they all  agree on one issue,  namely,  that  a division between the primary and the
secondary meaning is inherent to the trope (“Retrospective” 17). With this core feature in
mind, to gain a clearer modern understanding of allegory and its structure, I will next
examine several modern definitions of this concept in dictionaries of literary terms in order
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to tease out other features that are nowadays considered to constitute the concept of literary
allegory.
2.2. The Concept and Structure of Allegory
The first source, the fourth edition of The Penguin Dictionary of Literary Terms and
Literary Theory by John Anthony Cuddon, provides the following definition of allegory:
The term derives from Greek allƝgoria,  ‘speaking  otherwise’.  As  a  rule,  an
allegory is a story in verse or prose with a double meaning: a primary or surface
meaning; and a secondary or under-the-surface meaning. It is a story therefore,
that can be read, understood and interpreted at two levels (and in some cases at
three or four levels).  It  is  thus closely related to the fable and parable.  The form
may  be  literary  or  pictorial  (or  both,  as  in  emblem-books).  An  allegory  has  no
determinate length. (Cuddon 20)
Another dictionary, The Anthem Dictionary of Literary Terms and Theory by Paul
and Peter Auge, equates allegory with extended metaphor:
allegory (Greek, ‘speaking otherwise’)   An extended METAPHOR:  any  work  in
which the NARRATIVE contains some secondary, NON-FICTIONAL meaning. The
allegory's LITERAL sense is a VEHICLE for deeper abstract or political/historical
ideas. The IMAGES make it easier to comprehend complex meaning. [...]
PERSONIFICATION is often a give-way that allegorical meaning is present [...]. [...]
Allegories do not contain SYMBOLS: the difference here is that allegorical
IMAGES only make sense within their immediate FICTIONAL CONTEXT, and do
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not have existence outside of the STORY, as SYMBOLS do. Allegory contains clues
for its INTERPRETATION within itself, unlike PARABLES, FABLES and EXEMPLA,
where INTERPRETATION can only begin once the story is ended. (Auger and
Auger 9)
Amrita Sharma, the author of The Sterling Dictionary of Literary Terms (2005), also
treats allegory as an extended metaphor. Like Paul and Peter Auge, she identifies the aim to
which writers can employ allegory. However, while the Auges foreground the relation of
the trope to reality (abstract vs. concrete historical/political meaning), Sharma underlines
the importance of the moral/spiritual aspect of allegorical writing:
ALLEGORY A symbolic narrative. It is a figurative treatment of one subject under
the guise of another. An allegory, more specifically, is an extended metaphor and
when used in fiction, it means something more than what appears on the surface.
These extended meanings and hidden intentions of the author involve moral and
spiritual concepts which is more significant than the actual narrative itself.
(Sharma 12-13)
All  of  the  above  definitions  overlap  in  their  descriptions  of  the  most  important
features of allegory: its double meaning with its division into primary and secondary. The
differences between the rest of the features are complementary rather than contradictory:
they  do  not  preclude  each  other,  but  highlight  different  potentialities  of  this  complex
concept. Therefore, on the basis of the sources discussed it is possible to discern the
following features of allegory:
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1. The double meaning, composed of the primary (surface) and secondary (beyond-
the-surface), with the possibility of interpreting the latter at more than one level.
2. The secondary meaning is deeper than the primary meaning.
3. The secondary meaning can be abstract or it can point to a political or historical
reality.
4. The secondary meaning can convey the author’s hidden message concerning the
moral or spiritual aspects of the narrative.
5. Clues for allegorical interpretation are incorporated in the narrative.
6. The immediate narrative context is important for correct interpretation of
allegorical images.
7. Personification is a clear marker of allegorical meaning.
In illustrating their concept of allegory, all the above-mentioned authors refer to John
Bunyan’s The Pilgrim’s Progress as their first example, calling it the “best known”
(Cuddon 20; Auge and Auge 9) and “the most popular and famous” (Sharma 13) instance
of Western allegorical writing. Bunyan’s use of allegory will be reviewed in the next
section.
In sum, in this section I have demonstrated that allegory is a complex, multifaceted,
and, judging by the diversity of features foregrounded by different dictionary authors, to
some extent, a contradictory trope. It requires interpretation skills from the reader, who
must discern the allegorical meaning, which, in case of Sharma, is asserted to be more
important than the primary one. Such interpretation is the result of the perception of the
authorial intention lying at the foundation of an allegorical narrative, which means that the
trope presupposes at least some degree of reader responsibility for allegoresis.
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2.3. AllegoryandItsEarlyPhases
In this section I will outline the development of allegory in the classical tradition, that is, in
the  Greek  and  Roman  myth,  then  move  on  to  the  biblical  allegory  and  two  of  its
classifications, and finally give a prime example of literary religious allegory represented
by John Bunyan’s The Pilgrim’s Progress.
2.3.1. AllegoryinGreekandRomanMyth
John MacQueen, the author of the volume Allegory in the Critical Idiom series, begins his
discussion of allegory by pointing out that the rather non-literary roots of this concept must
have sprung from philosophy and, even to a greater degree, religion. However, the non-
disputable link between allegory and narrative can be easily seen in myth (MacQueen 1).
The author defines myth as
[…]  a  narrative  […]  or  a  series  of  narratives  which  serves  to  explain  those
universal facts which most intimately affect the believer, facts such as times,
seasons, crops, tribes, cities, nations, birth, marriage, death, moral laws, the sense
of inadequacy and failure and the sense of potential, both of which characterize
the greater kind of mankind. (1)
The explanation of these universal facts takes place through the interpretation of the
relevant part(s) of such narratives and, thus, it can be assumed that “from prehistoric times
onwards myth and interpretation went hand in hand” (MacQueen 1).
Examples of such interpretations are abundant in both Greek and Roman mythology.
The rape of Proserpine is a good illustration (MacQueen 1). This classical myth tells a
story  of  Proserpine,  whom  Dis,  against  her  will  but  with  the  agreement  of  her  father,
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Jupiter, carries from the surface of the earth, represented by Ceres, into the underworld.2
Due to Ceres’s grief and anger, all the plants die. Through the mediation of Jupiter, Dis and
Ceres reach a compromise: from now on, each year Proserpine spends about four months
in the underworld with her husband and two thirds of the year in the upper world with her
mother.  As  a  result,  the  pacified  Ceres  resumes  to  perform  her  duties  as  the  Goddess  of
earth and lets the plants grow again (MacQueen 1-2). This myth is an obvious allegorical
representation of the yearly cycle of vegetation growth, crucial for the survival of people
dependent on agricultural produce. The universal order is explained through the events
caused and experienced by the personified forces of nature, of which Dis, Ceres and
Proserpine can all be interpreted as the seeds and/or the earth (MacQueen 2), and Jupiter as
a higher power sanctioning the events and restoring the world order. The material
representation  of  the  corn  is  particularly  explicit  in  the  etymology  of  the  name  of  the
mother goddess: Ceres and Demeter used to mean ‘corn’ and ‘bread’ respectively
(MacQueen 2). These etymologies clearly show that personification is an important
component of the ancient myth. Cuddon defines this notion as follows: “The impersonation
or  embodiment  of  some  quality  or  abstraction;  the  attribution  of  human  qualities  to
inanimate objects […]” (661). Thus, Ceres, Proserpine, Dis, and Jupiter are all
embodiments of abstract concepts.
The above-given interpretation of the rape of Proserpine is by no means the only one
possible. On the contrary, discussing this tale, MacQueen states that mythical narrative
lends itself to multilevel allegorical interpretation. Thus, another reading of this myth is as
“an  allegory  of  human  immortality,  or  […]  rebirth;”  still  another  –  “redemption  of  the
human soul subject to death” through the action of another, in the case of Proserpine, her
2 The Greek and probably more widely known names of the corresponding deities are, respectively,
Persephone, Hades, Zeus, and Demeter (Lindemans online).
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mother Ceres. In this interpretation Dis represents death and Proserpine the human soul
(MacQueen 2). This property of allegory to be open to multi-layered interpretations was
deeply analysed by ancient scholars. For example, “the developed form and doctrine of
Graeco-Roman allegory” can be found in the work by the late Greek philosopher
Sallustius3 About the Gods and the World (MacQueen 14). In chapters III and IV, cited by
MacQueen (14-16), Sallustius discusses the nature of myth and gives the classification of
different levels of their allegorical interpretation. Chapter III deals with the intrinsic
difference between the apparent and hidden meanings, underlying the importance of the
latter (MacQueen 14-15). Chapter IV divides myths into five “species” (MacQueen 14-15),
which are listed in the table below.
Type of myth/allegory Meaning
1 theological abstract; “contemplate the very essence of the gods”
2 physical “express the activities of the gods in the world”
3 psychic “the activities of the Soul itself”
4 material believe “material objects actually to be Gods”
5 mixed (psychic + material) exhibiting features of both 3 and 4
Table 1. Graeco-Roman Doctrine of Allegory according to Sallustius (MacQueen 14-16)
Explaining the concept of the first type, where myths “use no bodily form but
contemplate  the  very  essence  of  the  Gods,”  Sallustius  illustrates  this  with  the  myth  of
Kronos devouring his children (qtd. in MacQueen 15). In the abstract sense, the God here
is understood as pure intellect, which “returns into itself” (MacQueen 15). The same myth
can be interpreted physically, as the philosopher supposes people before his time have
done, when they did not consider Kronos an impersonation of time (MacQueen 15). The
3 Sallustius lived in the time of and was probably close to Emperor Julian, C.E. 332-63 (MacQueen 15).
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third and fourth levels of interpretation can be demonstrated by using the earlier example
of Proserpine: the former, material level, interprets both Ceres and her daughter as
representations of corn, the whole myth thus focusing on the material gifts of the earth
(MacQueen 3, 1-2). The latter, psychic level for Sallustius is “the Soul’s acts of thought,”
which, “though they pass on to other objects, nevertheless remain within their begetters”
(qtd. in MacQueen 15). MacQueen considers the interpretation of the myth as the
redemption  of  the  human  soul  to  be  an  example  of  a  psychic  allegory,  where  feelings,
thoughts, and consequent actions of the characters are the object of interpretation (2-3).
Sallustius names five types of myth, but describes the material, or fourth type as the
last one. This could be understood to mean that the mixed type is not theoretically
important. Still, when further pointing out that mixed myths are very common, he gives
two  examples  of  this  kind:  that  of  the  Apple  of  Discord  and  the  story  of  the  Mother  of
Gods (Cybele) and Attis (16).4 However, following his analysis of the mixed features of
these myths, I have come to the conclusion that they do not appear to be more mixed than
that of Proserpine. Rather, the notion ‘mixed’ seems to reflect the already discussed
essential multilevel nature of mythic narrative. When Sallustius calls these two narratives
‘mixed,’ it probably merely means that he is, maybe unconsciously, analysing them at
several levels at once, due to the transparency of the allegories encoded in these narratives.
Indeed, assigning different types of myth to philosophers, poets, and religious initiators, he
pairs the first two groups with theological and psychic allegories respectively, and leaves
the mixed type to the last group, because “every initiation aims at uniting us with the world
and the Gods” (Sallustius qtd. in MacQueen 16). In other words, “the world” here can be
4 The Apple of Discord is a myth about the quarrel initiated by Eris, the Goddess of Discord, among
Aphrodite, Hera and Athena for the title of the fairest goddess, who should receive Eris’s golden apple
(“Judgement of Paris” online). The development of this strife has led to the Trojan War (“Judgement of Paris”
online). Attis was a vegetation god and Cybele’s consort, whom she out of jealousy drove to death via self-
castration, but who was then resurrected in the form of a tree (“Attis” online).
20
understood to mean the physical, material and psychic levels at once, and “the Gods,”
according to his previous allegorical interpretation of God as pure intellect (MacQueen
15),  –  the  theological,  or  purely  abstract  level.  The  unclear  status  of  the  fifth  type  of
allegory highlights the complexity of the concept, which has begun to puzzle thinkers since
the very time they started to reflect on the subject.
2.3.2. AllegoryintheBible
Since late antiquity and until the fourteenth century there was adopted and used a new
fourfold hermeneutic classification of allegory, the quadruplex sensus (Turner 71-72;
Minnis 232-234), particularly suitable for the multilevel interpretation of the Bible,
because it deeply concentrated on the spiritual meaning of religious texts. Cassian,5 a
prominent theologian of late antiquity, gives the following description of this classification:
…contemplative knowledge (of Scripture) is divided into two parts, namely, the
historical and the spiritual. But there are three kinds of spiritual knowledge, the
tropological, the allegorical and the anagogical… history embraces the knowledge
of things past and visible… but the allegorical contains what follows thereafter,
for the events of history are said to have prefigured the form of a mystery… the
anagogical sense ascends from [those] spiritual mysteries to even more sublime
and hidden secrets of heaven… [while] the tropological sense is the moral
teaching which has to do with the emendation of life… and so these four figures
interpenetrate… in one subject, so that one and the same Jerusalem may be
understood in four ways: historically,  it  is  the city of the Jews; allegorically,  it  is
5 Cassian’s approximate years of life are 360-435 (Chiovaro 205).
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the Church of Christ, anagogically, it is the city of God which is heaven…
tropologically, it is the human soul… (qtd. in Turner 72)
This period’s Christian classification of allegory can be summarized as follows:
Type of allegory Meaning
1 historical (literal) perceiving and interpreting events as if they were real
2 tropological pertaining to moral questions
3 allegorical foretelling later events
4 anagogical pertaining to spiritual questions
Table 2. The Quadruplex Sensus Classification of Allegory
Comparing this classification to the one by Sallustius, discussed earlier, it is possible to see
the following correspondences, which impart the continuity of the development of
allegory:
Sallustius’s allegory Christian Late Antiquity Allegory
1 physical historical (literal)
2 psychic tropological
3 – allegorical
4 theological anagogical
Table 3. The Classical Classification of Allegory in comparison to the Quadruplex Sensus
As is clear from Table 3, there is no direct correspondence only for Sallustius’s material
allegory (equating material objects with gods, MacQueen 15) and for the later Christian
prophetic allegorical meaning.
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The material allegory is described by Sallustius himself as unsuitable for educated
people (MacQueen 15), and therefore meaningful only as part of the diachronic
development of the notion, whereas the allegorical is a marker of the main difference
between classical and biblical allegory. The allegorical prophecies of the latter type that
abound in both the Old and New Testaments are indicative of the “[…] overwhelming
concern with the divinely operated movement of history which, more than anything else,
distinguished biblical from classical allegory […]” (MacQueen 29). This difference is due
to the Christians’ feeling of being part of the extremely important historical process of
building God’s kingdom, in which they considered themselves not only witnesses, but
active participators (MacQueen 26). Whereas classical allegory helped people to
comprehend and mentally control the yearly cycle of events by allowing for some distance
between these events and their partakers, any type of Christian allegory bound events and
participants together by providing the sense of utter relevance and immediacy, exceeding
those of “the latest political and military news” (MacQueen 26). The driving force behind
this acute sense of participation is reflected in Cassian’s theoretical frame by his overt
naming of the “emendation of life,” i.e., the targeted improvement of human existence, as
the goal of tropological allegoresis (qtd. in Turner 72).
With the development of the Christian exegesis its over-exalted engagement with the
spiritual led to numerous concerns of Christian scholars of authority about the ensuing
excessive ambiguity and multiplicity of interpretation (Minnis 248). For example, Nicholas
of Lyre (c. 1270-1340) wrote that the literal sense of Scripture was “greatly obscured”
because overzealous interpreters “have been inadequate in their treatment of the literal
sense, and have so multiplied the number of mystical [i.e. spiritual] senses, that the literal
sense  is  in  some  part  cut  off  and  suffocated  among  so  many  mystical  senses”  (qtd.  in
23
Minnis 248). However, although such authors proposed to concentrate on the literal sense
of interpretation, claiming that only this approach enables reliable scholastic speculation
(Minnis 231, 243-247), spiritual expositions still remained popular even among those same
scholars who criticized the prevalence of non-literal interpretations (Minnis 255). This
everlasting interest in the spiritual has lived long enough to lead some theorists of
postmodernism to claims that such pursuit of the spiritual abounds in postmodern
allegorical cultural texts (Petrolle 4-5, 14-15), which will be discussed in greater detail in
the section on postmodern allegory.
Illustrating the shift of focus from the spiritual to the literary, John MacQueen
proposes another classification of biblical allegory instrumental to my work. It comprises,
for example, narrative allegory, which, as the rape of Proserpine, contains a plot subject to
different levels of interpretation; figural allegory, with an animate or inanimate figure
embodying “certain physical and intellectual properties of the universe” without mythical
narrative attached to it; or alphabetic and numerical allegory, which concentrates on
interpreting letters and numbers in order to extract meaning from a religious text (18, 31-
37).  However,  out  of  his  list,  the  most  relevant  to  my  work  is  the  typological  allegory,
which, retaining the religious focus inherent in the trope, is
a New Testament exegetic method which treats events and figures of the Old
Testament as combining historical reality with prophetic meaning in terms of the
Gospels and the Christian dispensation. The Old Testament events are ‘types’,
figures, of events in the New Testament. (MacQueen 18)
In other words, the events described in the Old Testament foreshadow the events of the
New Testament and are to be used as allegorical instructions in proper religious behaviour
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with later Christians (MacQueen 19-20). For example, Saint Paul interprets the exodus of
the Israelites from Egypt as follows: Egypt represents life in sin, the Promised Land is the
coming kingdom of God, and the wilderness is a representation of the Christians’ struggle
for salvation (MacQueen 19; The Holy Bible: New King James Version, 1 Cor. 10.1-11).
Thus,  the  New  Testament  event  is  a  ‘seal’  (another  meaning  of  the  Greek  word  ‘type’),
which “has struck out a prophetic impression of itself in the pages of the Old Testament”
(MacQueen 20). That is, typological allegorical interpretation uses the Old Testament as a
prophecy to be fulfilled much later in the New Testament, with nothing but an allegorical
link connecting these two different currents of time.
Importantly, the disrupted temporal sequence in such interconnections of these two
scriptural texts obviously has no bearing on the human capacity for allegoresis (MacQueen
20), which essentially allows for the creation of complex interpretations combining events
that hark back and forward to different times. This temporal flexibility is widely used in
the most general kind of both New and Old Testament allegory – prophetic and situational,
of which typological allegory is a subgroup (MacQueen 23). Prophetic and situational
allegory is characterized by the importance of a situation and its prophetic meaning as
opposed to narrative, which is either absent or scarce and insignificant (MacQueen 23). For
example, it is the situation of Jonah’s three-day confinement in the whale’s belly, and not
the circumstances that led him into this predicament, that is important, because it
prophesies Christ’s death and resurrection in three days’ time (MacQueen 23): “For as
Jonah was three days and three nights in the belly of the great fish, so will the Son of Man
be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth” (New King James Version, Matt.
12:40). Such situational and prophetic allegories comprise the majority of the New
Testament parables, whose meaning, devoid of narrative and therefore simplified, is
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attended to only in so far as to illuminate some aspect of becoming of the kingdom of God
(MacQueen 23-26). Importantly, this becoming, as has been inferred earlier, can only occur
via the improvement of human existence, with Cassian providing a link between the theory
of Christian allegory and the real life of human beings through his “emendation of life” as
the point of tropological, or moral, interpretation (qtd. in Turner 72).
To close this section, I will highlight another important link in the development of
biblical allegory, namely, between the use of typological allegory as discussed above and
its later application in secular, but still religiously framed narratives of early American
colonizers. These stories, defined as a genre as captivity narratives, are autobiographies
written by Protestant captives of Native Americans and widely popular around the end of
the seventeenth century (Madsen, “American Allegory” 238). Unlike earlier typological
allegory that was used to validate events of the New Testament via asserting their
predestination in the Old Testament (Madsen, “American Allegory” 238), captivity
narratives resort to the same tool in quite different circumstances. Written under the
Protestant constraint of “a direct communication with God,” which essentially means the
impossibility of an ultimate reliable interpretation validated by Scripture (Madsen,
“American Allegory” 237), these narratives employ typological allegory to ponder and
personally ascertain the captives’ chances of salvation by examining episodes of their lives
as  typological  cues  to  weigh  the  odds  in  favour  of  their  soul  (Madsen,  “American
Allegory” 238, 239). This post-Reformation shift toward subjectivity with a full
understanding of its subversive influence on the exegetical reliability (Madsen, “American
Allegory” 238, 239) will later be echoed by the Romantic and postmodern anxiety over
agency, which will be discussed in the section on postmodern allegory. To conclude, the
important point to be made here is the clear continuity in the use of biblical typology in
26
American secular captivity narratives. I argue that the same typological allegory is
employed in Falconer,  a  postmodern  captivity  narrative,  which  I  will  examine  in  the
analytical part of my work. 
2.3.3. PrimeExampleofAllegory:JohnBunyan’sThePilgrim’sProgress
An example of literary Christian spiritual allegory is epitomized in The Pilgrim’s Progress
by John Bunyan, an autodidact and a post-Reformation prisoner, who is believed to have
written this major novel in incarceration, in 1676-1677 (Collmer 575-578, 580). First
published in 1678 (Dunan-Page 4), this “best-known allegory in the English Language” is
a transparent representation of life as a journey to be made by any faithful Christian person
(Cuddon 20), with the protagonist named simply and comprehensively, Christian (Bunyan
9). The purpose of this journey is Christian salvation (Cuddon 20). The book is full of
personifications  with  such  telling  names  as  Piety  and  Prudence,  Simple,  Sloth  and
Presumption (Bunyan 54, 57, 43), which are clearly abstract concepts and qualities to be
embraced or avoided by any believer in order to lead a decent Christian life. The journey
takes Christian through equally transparent allegorical topography: starting at his living
place,  the  City  of  Destruction,  he  travels  through,  to  name  a  few,  the  Hill  Difficulty,  the
Slough of Despond, the Delectable Mountings, the Valley of Death, the Vanity Fair, to the
final destination of the Celestial City, with the latter representing heaven and salvation
(Bunyan 10, 14, 47, 63, 71, 105, 193).
In  spite  of  the  transparency  of  the  overall  allegory,  Bunyan’s  work  is  a  complex
spiritual guide that requires routine habits of allegorical interpretation from a broad
readership. Although Bunyan’s readers were already quite skilled at reading both religious
and fictional allegorical texts (Pooley 85), the author still provides them with regular
interpretation help throughout the whole narrative. For example, at the beginning of the
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journey he introduces the character of Interpreter (Bunyan 31), who explains to Christian
the minutiae of the passage to the better world. His explanations are instructions in proper
Christian behaviour and comprise, for instance, allegorical interpretations of pictures,
personifications, the scene of water quenching fire, and a process of cleaning a room from
dust (Bunyan 31-36). This character also gives Christian a serious warning to beware false
guides and interpreters on the pilgrim’s way to the Celestial City (Bunyan 32). To further
point out the dangers of the journey, the Interpreter introduces Christian to the character
named simply Man, who is confined in an iron cage for the sin of despair,  demonstrating
the fate of those who waver in their faith (Bunyan 38-39). Thus, although the main allegory
of salvation is crystal clear, the author seems to take into account the complexity of the
instrument he is using, and the taxing spiritual work of the interpretation they are to
perform.
In other words, although Bunyan created a canonical religious allegory ostensibly
open to many readers throughout the times, he was quite aware of the fact of having
written a work subject to different interpretations. Indeed, as Pooley puts it, characterizing
the  time  of  writing  the  novel,  “[t]hat  there  is  a  real  world  beyond  this  one  is  a  more
common view in the late seventeenth century than now, but how one got there, and what
counted as reliable information about it, was more hotly disputed” (80).6 Trying to reduce
the unwanted interpretations, Bunyan constantly clarifies the (in his opinion) correct
allegorical meanings on behalf of the reader via authorial comments, direct or provided by
characters such as Interpreter. This “running commentary,” although not obligatory, but
nevertheless a “common feature” of allegorical texts (Pooley 81), is intended to guide the
6 Bunyan lived during the time of the English Revolution (English Civil Wars, 1640-1651, Commonwealth
period, 1649-1660) and Restoration, which began in 1660. This time was characterized by religious and
political upheavals, which triggered an extremely prolific religious literature by ordinary Puritans such as
Bunyan himself (Keeble 13; Ohlmeyer online; “United Kingdom: Commonwealth and Protectorate” online).
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reader in a certain direction chosen by the author. This function of the commentary is an
acknowledgement of the “shared” interpretation work between “readers and characters”
(Pooley 81). However, when applied to readers and writers, the very presence of such
clarifications implies that the balance in religious allegories such as Bunyan’s is skewed in
favour of the writer, who decides on and openly directs the reader towards legitimate
interpretations. Thus, the shared nature of allegoresis in traditional religious allegories is
significantly restricted by the authorial perception of the didactic meaning of the allegory.
There  are  two  more  features  of  Bunyan’s  novel  pertaining  to  my  work  that  I  will
discuss  next.  The  first  is  the  author’s  use  of  personification.  He  uses  this  trope  in
accordance with the first part of the already mentioned Cuddon’s definition, that is, as
“[t]he impersonation or embodiment of some quality or abstraction […]” (661). All the
personifications  appear  in  the  novel  either  to  help  Christian  or  to  divert  him  from  his
destination  (Pooley  89).  Their  purpose  is  so  transparent  and  so  devoid  are  they  of  any
individualized features of ‘realistic’ characters, that Pooley, after Vladimir Propp’s 1928
formalist folk-tale classification, defines such personifications as “functions” rather than
characters (89). Propp’s notion of function is formed by combining the character with
his/her action and dismissing the personal features of the resulting compound altogether
(Pooley 89). Such reductionist emphasis on function is skilfully used by Bunyan to
unambiguously direct both the protagonist and the readers toward the didactic
interpretation sanctioned by the author, which ensures the transparency of allegoresis. For
example, Christian’s encounter with Pliable, a person seemingly eager to share the
pilgrimage but discouraged by the first obstacle, the Slough of Despond, is merely a formal
religious discourse between the two pilgrims, with Pliable’s only ‘human’ feature being his
anger at the prospect of the difficulties of the journey (Bunyan 11-15). This episode ends
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with him leaving Christian and is crowned by the author’s comment:  “It  is  not enough to
be pliable” (Bunyan 15). Numerous other personifications in Bunyan’s work are also
impersonally functional and used to fulfil the authorial didactic purpose. This feature of
functional  personification  is  also  used  by  Cheever,  which  I  will  discuss  in  the  analytical
part of my work.
The second pertinent feature of The Pilgrim’s Progress that I want to focus on is the
frame metaphor of the novel. Pooley emphasizes that the protagonist, although frequently
represented as Everyman in critical literature,7 is nonetheless “an elect Christian,”
underlying that the honour of reaching heaven is restricted to the few chosen (86). To
support this view, it has been shown that the “overarching metaphor” for the novel is that
of the Exodus (the second book of the Old Testament) and the Promised Land (Pooley 86):
Twice in the First Part [i.e. The Pilgrim’s Progress] this Biblical book surfaces
explicitly: first, as Christian is deceived by Worldly Wiseman into taking the route
of Law rather than Grace, and is frightened by the lightning coming from Mount
Sinai; and again at the very end, when Christian and Faithful cross the river, not as
Moses crossed the Red Sea, but as the Israelites crossed the Jordan into the
Promised Land. (Pooley 86)
John  R.  Knott,  Jr.,  drawing  attention  to  Bunyan’s  numerous  references  to  the  Old
Testament, considers the myth of the Promised Land “the key to [Bunyan’s] conception of
The Pilgrim’s Progress and to the appeal of the work to its Puritan readers” (446). This is
due to the readership’s familiarity with the Old Testament’s “metaphor of the way” at two
levels: first, as a journey through the wilderness of life with the final salvation in the world
7 For example, Cuddon characterizes Christian as “represent[ing] Everyman” (20) and writes further that
“[t]he whole work is a simplified representation […] of the average man’s journey through the trials and
tribulations of life on his way to heaven” (21).
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after death, and second, as a spiritual road of self-development every believer has to take to
achieve the actualization of his/her spirituality by reaching the metaphorical Holy City
(Knott  445).  Bunyan  treats  both  senses  of  this  metaphor  in  terms  of  the  Old  Testament,
making “[t]he design of The Pilgrim’s Progress, and much of its force, [depend] upon the
figurative reading of the experience of the Israelites that Bunyan and countless other
Puritans learned from Hebrews” (Knott 445). For example, Christian’s rewards for his
spiritual development are described using “the Old Testament imagery of fertility,” which
abound in the “sensuous” representations of the gifts of Canaan (Knott 456). With the Old
Testament  imagery  so  deeply  rooted  in  the  mind  of  any  Puritan,  and  with  his/her
“obligation to be a critical and self-aware reader” (Keeble 15), this frame metaphor was
undoubtedly clear to any average person of the time schooled in reading and interpreting
religious texts. The use of the same technique in Falconer will be discussed in the
analytical part of this thesis.
To summarize, the concept of allegory was well-developed in antiquity, when it
became customary to consider the multi-layered hidden meanings more important than the
surface one. Particular emphasis was given to spiritual interpretations, which considerably
intensified with the onset of Christianity. This emphasis is an evident sign of continuity
between the classical and the Christian concepts of allegory, as has been demonstrated in
sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. The classical mythic narrative, which helped to position self in
relation to the world, in early Christianity developed into an acute perception of spiritual
events as immediately related to the real world, namely, the actual building of God’s
kingdom, with the link conceptualized in typological and tropological allegory, with the
latter’s task to inchoate the improvement of people’s life. The complex structure of early
allegory required well-developed interpretational skills as early as antiquity. However, due
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to the understanding of the trope’s inherent ambiguity, both classical and biblical allegory
has remained essentially didactic and, therefore, restricting reader responsibility by
providing interpretative guidelines even to readers competent in allegoresis. This
restrictiveness began to decrease after the Reformation due to the radical shift toward
subjectivity in interpretation, imbuing secular American captivity narratives, which
continued to employ typological allegory, with anxiety over their exegetical validity. This
anxiety found later development in Romantic and postmodern allegory as anxiety over
agency.
2.4. Allegory in Postmodern Writing
In  this  section  I  will  review  the  main  points  of  the  changing  attitude  to  allegory  in  the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries with a particular focus on Romanticism, then provide
an extended definition of postmodernism, including its two in many ways opposing
branches identified as deconstructive and constructive postmodernism, and conclude with
comparing and contrasting the two respective postmodern attitudes towards allegory. In
this section I will also define the term psychomachia, which will be used in my analysis of
Cheever’s Falconer.
2.4.1. AttitudetoAllegoryintheEighteenthandNineteenthCentury
In her introduction to Reinventing Allegory, an exploration of reasons for extraordinary
survival  ability  of  the  eponymous  trope,  Theresa  M.  Kelley  states  that  the  climate  of
modernity was “fundamentally hostile” towards allegory (2): “[e]vidently unnatural, made-
up and extravagant, allegory is an affront to the realist, empiricist bent of early modern and
modern English culture from the end of the sixteenth century to the present” (1). According
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to Kelley, this cultural shift had several causes. The first was the switch in philosophy from
Platonic realism to nominalism, which dismissed the Platonic ideal universals in favour of
names, or concepts (Kelley, Reinventing 1-2), thus abandoning the system of belief in the
“visible phenomena pointing to invisible forms” associated with allegorical writing in
antiquity (Whitman, “Present Perspectives: Antiquity to the Late Middle Ages” 46). The
second reason was the acute decrease of interest in mythological and biblical typological
allusions (Kelley, Reinventing 2). The third was the effect of the dwindling number of
readers adept at deciphering arcane allegories due to the disintegration of the system of
patronage, which used to guarantee a supply of such specialists (Kelley, Reinventing 2).
The last two reasons comprised the negative Protestant attitude towards complex
allegoresis and the politically-coloured favouring of verisimilitude and “plain style”8
(Kelley, Reinventing 2). The consequent derogatory attitude towards allegory became
widespread by the end of the seventeenth century, leading many literary theorists to believe
the trope to have become unviable (Kelley, Reinventing 1).
This attitude culminated in Romanticism, which not only criticized the abjected
trope, but “cast out allegory in the name of the symbol” altogether (Kelley, Reinventing 2).
This devaluation is largely due to the theoretical postulates of Goethe (1749-1832) and
Coleridge (1772-1834), both major contributors to Romantic literary theory and both
progenitors of the idea of the radical difference between allegory and symbol in favour of
the latter (Whitman, “Retrospective” 13; Copeland and Struck 9). According to Goethe,
“The allegorical differs from the symbolic in that what the latter designates indirectly, the
8 Kelley contends that negative attitude to allegory in the English tradition was partially formed by the trope’s
continuous use to slander numerous oppositional groups prior, during and after the upheavals of the English
Civil War (Reinventing 3).
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former designates directly” (qtd. in Copeland and Struck 9). The same idea is further
developed in The Stateman’s Manual:
Now an Allegory is but a translation of abstract notions into a picture-language
which is itself nothing but an abstraction from objects of the senses; the principal
being more worthless even than its phantom proxy, both alike unsubstantial and
the former shapeless to boot. On the other hand a Symbol … is characterized by a
translucence of the External through and in the Temporal. It always partakes of the
reality which it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself
as  a  living  part  in  that  Unity,  of  which  it  is  the  representative.
(Coleridge qtd. in Madsen, “American Allegory” 231)
As these quotations reveal, both authors value symbol well above allegory due to the
latter’s distance from its referent and the consequent vagueness of the resulting meaning.
Symbol, in contrast, is claimed to contain some essential substance indivisible from its
referent, which makes the meaning timeless and transparent. Therefore the process of
constructing allegorical meaning is considered mechanical, whereas that of the symbolic is
nothing less but organic (Copeland and Struck 9). However, de facto this division led to the
designation of at least the basic allegorical features to the symbol (Copeland and Struck 9),
which means that allegory continued to be used by those same Romantics who devalued it
so strongly.
As the passage above shows, Coleridge did forcibly disapprove of the vagueness of
allegory. For example, his words about the explanation of the allegorical meaning of a
famous medieval poem by its own author were that it had
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the very opposite quality that Snakes have – they come out of their Hole into open
view  at  the  sound  of  sweet  music,  while  the  allegoric  meaning  slinks  off  at  the
very first notes – and lurks in murkiest oblivion – and utter invisibility. (Coleridge
qtd. in Kelley, “Romanticism’s Errant Allegory” 219-220)
However, in spite of this strong (and allegorically expressed) stance, Coleridge was not
quite consistent in his treatment of allegory. Thus, he favoured Milton’s representation of
Death and Sin in Paradise Lost and wrote in 1818, two years after his allegory/symbol
distinction was made public,9 that
if the allegoric personage be strongly individualized so as to interest us, we cease
to think of it  as allegory – and if  it  does not interest  us,  it  had better be away. –
The dullest and most defective parts of Spenser are those in which we are
compelled to think of his agents as allegories – and how far the Sin and Death of
Milton are exceptions to this censure, is a delicate problem which I shall attempt
to solve in another lecture. (Coleridge qtd. in Kelley, “Romanticism” 219)
While never returning to this “delicate problem,” in another, earlier lecture, Coleridge
actually praised these same characters without calling them allegorical (Kelley,
“Romanticism” 219), a manoeuvre best described as pretending not to see an elephant in
the room. His ambivalence reflects a curious contradiction between Romantic theory and
its practice: the former devalues allegory as a literary device, while the latter not only
keeps using it (sometimes dubbed as symbol), but also allows an occasional approving nod
to some allegorical characters on not quite theoretical grounds. Indeed, character
individualization in order to whet the reader’s appetite lies in the field of practical authorial
9 Coleridge’s The Statesman’s Manual was published in 1816 (Madsen, “American Allegory” 230).
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skills, not his or her theoretical orientation regarding allegory. A retrospective explanation
of this Romantic contradiction will be provided in the section on postmodern allegory.
As stated earlier, despite the restrictions of their own theory, many Romantic authors
nevertheless continue to employ allegory, albeit implicitly (Kelley, “Romanticism” 222-
228). In doing so they abandon the trope’s earlier, transparent and didactic use as practiced
by Bunyan. For example, rejecting dry personified abstractions, they resort to allegorical
characters and motifs that involve humanized figures artfully referring to contemporary
historical events, which does renders them more attractive to the reader (Kelley,
“Romanticism” 222-223, 227-228). Demonstrating the continuity of the trope, this feature
of detailing and thus animating allegorical characters into life-like personalities will be
continually used in modern allegory, lending it particular force of impression (Kelley,
Reinventing 10). Utilizing this emotional force, this method of contemporary historical
reference in the era of Romanticism allows authors to coerce readers into scrutinizing and
revaluating sensitive political matters, such as absolute monarchy, peculation, political
satire, and the abolition of slavery (Kelley, “Romanticism” 222-223, 227-228). This shift in
usage, where realistically drawn allegorical characters are involved in exposing political
issues, is a consequence of the historical moment, in which allegory “is marked by a
history  that  is  one  part  figural  but  another  part  revolution  and  terror”  (Kelley,
“Romanticism” 228). This technique is also used in Falconer,  as  I  will  show  in  my
analysis of the novel.
Finally, the last but not the least feature of Romantic allegory pertinent to my work is
“a shift of emphasis from objective to subjective authority within the interpretive act”
(Madsen, “American Allegory” 231). This means that, unlike with earlier, much more
didactic allegory, both the right to and the responsibility for allegoresis in Romanticism is
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given to the reader. As discussed in section 2.3.2, triggered by the Reformation, this shift
has already led to individual responsibility for allegorical interpretation without a
possibility of the ultimate validation, exemplified in American captivity narratives.
Developing in the same direction, later American Romantic literature produces a distinctly
sceptical attitude to allegoresis, which manifests itself in the works of Herman Melville
and Nathaniel Hawthorne (Madsen, “American Allegory” 239). Thus, these writers
question the transcendental10 premise that poetic imagination is always benevolent
(Madsen, “American Allegory” 239). For example, the plot of Hawthorne’s Scarlet Letter
is based on the dark character of Roger Chillingworth, who possesses poetic imagination
that enables him to read allegorical signs, but uses his talent for revenge, torture, and slow
murder (Madsen, “American Allegory” 239). Contrasted with the futile interpretive efforts
of other characters of the novel, his ability becomes particularly sinister (Madsen,
“American Allegory” 239-240). Such representation of allegory is a good example of the
meta-textual polemic centring on the dangers of subjective allegoresis, exhibiting the shift
toward subjectivity as both an important and contradictory development of allegory in
Romanticism. Kelley summarizes the ethically motivated position of the eighteenth-
century opponents of this progression by highlighting their fear that “complex emblematic
texts  are  morally  unstable  guides  to  truth”  (Reinventing 77). In other words, those critics
were uncomfortable with delegating the responsibility for allegoresis to readers because
this shift entailed no guarantee of the readers’ understanding of the authorial message.
This argument against complex allegory sounds even more plausible in the
postmodern era of the loss of referents, and, not surprisingly, can still be clearly heard in
10 Transcendentalism is an American branch of Romantic thought, which peaked around the middle of the
eighteenth century (Madsen, “American Allegory” 229-230).
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reference to postmodern allegorical narratives (Petrolle 8, 13-14). However, read at a more
profound level, this discomfort is a marker of allegory’s deep engagement with agency.
According to Kelley, “[e]ighteenth-century anxiety on this point implicitly recognizes
allegory as a master fiction, coercive insofar as it may urge a specific view of moral or
theological truth,” which can easily be used to promote political agendas (Reinventing 91).
Thus, the ethical issue, recognized by some Romantic scholars as narrowly didactic, in fact
exposes allegory as a powerful tool of shaping readers’ minds (Kelley, Reinventing 91).
This highlights the problem of agency in cases of successful allegoresis, which can
permanently influence or even change opinions, thus causing serious ideological
reverberations (Kelley, Reinventing 91-92). This Romantic anxiety about the readers’
agency persisted and transformed into the postmodern contradictory attitude to the means
and  goals  of  the  postmodern  fiction,  which  I  will  examine  later.  This  shift  will  also
ensconce itself in the postmodern allegorical novel, which I will show in the analysis of
Falconer.
Moving on from Romanticism to the nineteenth-century realism (Cuddon 730), it is
important to remember that the roots of realism’s negative attitude to allegory date back
roughly to the middle of the seventeenth century and are essentially political in nature.
Thus,  the  first  major  component  behind  this  attitude  comprises  the  logical  rejection  of
allegory by both Protestants and early Puritans, who were supposed to understand the Bible
literally (Kelley, Reinventing 45-46). The second was the purported scientific turn of minds
toward “plain style” in speech, writing, and generally in reasoning, which manifested itself
openly in 1660s, when the newly founded Royal Society called for “plain speech” (Kelley,
Reinventing 51) in its “scientific and linguistic program” (Kelley, Reinventing 53).
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However, the actual impulse behind both these factors was allegory’s deep entanglement in
the period’s recent and contemporary politics. As Kelley puts it,
In the volatile mix of seventeenth-century English political and sectarian conflict,
slippages between the figural and the literal could be intoxicating and potentially
lethal insofar as savage verbal rhetoric might invite or echo real violence and
born-again Puritans might take the work literally, as Luther had urged them to do.
(Reinventing 46)
This potential for triggering real violence by figural means was widely capitalized on by all
politico-religious factions of the time, which either used allegory to promote their political
agendas or fiercely disparaged the trope because it was successfully used by their enemies
(Kelley, Reinventing 51). Therefore, the famous call for plain style does not reflect the
situation in the seventeenth century objectively. Instead, it highlights what Kelley calls “the
contested end point of a sustained cultural debate, with few fixed positions, about language
and figure” (Reinventing 51). In other words, the line of reasoning behind the rejection of
allegory in realism due to the spread of scientific rationale is, in effect, drawn on no steady
ground.
The core implication of the above-mentioned developments for the purported
rejection of allegory in realism is that, as in Romanticism, its repudiation is inconsequent
and, when used, the trope retains its notoriously contradictory nature. Thus, similarly to the
use  of  allegory  by  the  Romantics  in  spite  of  its  dismissal  in  favour  of  the  symbol,  the
nineteenth-century realism continues to employ the trope despite its alleged rejection in the
name of verisimilitude and realistic detail. According to Kelley, this happens in “the
peripheral vision of Victorian realist culture – that edge where realist values become
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blurred and allegory’s raids on the verisimilar occur” (Reinventing 218).  One  way  of
implementing this subversive practice is mimicry or colonization of realistic details
(Kelley, Reinventing 218). For example, such established realist authors as Dickens and
Thackeray use precise and excessively repetitive details to transform some characters into
inhumane living abstractions or to recast quite realistically presented worlds as grotesque,
exaggerated, and violently hostile to progress and rationality (Kelley, Reinventing 218).
This allegorically expressed hostility marks the growing scepticism of Victorian
writers towards liberal humanism and their consequent disappointment in the dominant
method of representation of the time (Kelley, Reinventing 218). Kelley argues that at this
moment allegory provides writers with a tool that both exposes realism’s representational
failure and is “an ideal principle that exceeds the realist character” (Reinventing 218). As I
understand the latter assertion, allegory is supreme in general because it lacks
representational restrictions inherent to realism, and in particular, being a manifestation of
the rising anxiety over agency, which dates back to Romanticism. This issue of agency
develops in realism so that “[a]llegory becomes a way of thinking about resistance to
identity, or what remains monstrous” (Tambling 86), thus subverting the (already
disintegrating) realist belief into the liberal subject (Kelley, Reinventing 238-239). A good
example of such subversive narrative is George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda, her last and quite
notorious novel with a double plot11 (Kelley, Reinventing 236-248). Its primary level
represents  a  “realist  vision  of  English  gentility  and  Jewish  poverty”  (Kelley, Reinventing
247), while the allegorical one is an idealistic search for and purported attainment of
spirituality enabled by the protagonist’s radical change of identity via accepting his
11 Internal contradictions between the two plots of the novel led many critics and readers to criticize Eliot for
the ultimate neutralization effect, where neither plot achieves the development possible for each only in the
absence of the other (Kelley, Reinventing 236-237).
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unexpectedly found Jewish heritage (Kelley, Reinventing 236-237, 242-244). Being an
established realist author, Eliot’s dissipation of the realist plot in favour of the allegorical
one  is  a  good illustration  of  the  gradual  rejection  of  realism by  some of  its  most  famous
adherents (Kelley, Reinventing 236, 237, 248). A similar coexistence of two conflicting
plots will be later traced in Falconer. As will be demonstrated in the section on postmodern
allegory and in the analysis of the novel, despite the perturbations of Romanticism and
realism,  the  continuous  postmodern  application  of  the  trope  proves  that  its  viability
exceeds its notoriety.
2.4.2. Postmodernism
It  is  not  easy  to  give  a  precise  definition  of  postmodernism.  Cuddon  defines  it  as  a
controversial term “refer[ing] to changes, developments and tendencies which have taken
place (and are taking place) in literature, art, music, architecture, philosophy, etc. since the
1940s or 1950s” (689). Although postmodernism is a reaction against modernism, their
temporal relation is complex: both develop at the same time in spite of the popular
impression prompted by the term’s prefix that postmodernism follows modernism, which,
in turn, is already over (Cuddon 690). Jean-François Lyotard, who is considered the chief
theorist of postmodernism (Hart 180), expands on this relationship: “A work can become
modern only if it is first postmodern. Postmodernism thus understood is not modernism at
its end but in the nascent state, and this state is constant” (“Answering the Question: What
is Postmodernism?” 79). That is, in Lyotard’s understanding, there is a perpetual
coexistence of modernism and postmodernism, in which the former goes through the phase
of  the  latter  by  bringing  some  new  cultural  trend  or  phenomenon,  which,  as  it  gets
established in the mainstream culture, becomes modernism proper. Postmodern features in
literature include, for example, experimental techniques such as “nouveue roman and the
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anti-novel,” “an eclectic approach,12 aleatory13 writing, parody and pastiche” (Cuddon
690). Postmodernism is also largely characterized by the intensive development of the
following three major critical approaches in literature in the 1970s: Marxism, feminism
and psychoanalysis, which led to extreme relativization in literary criticism (Cuddon 690).
Structuralism and deconstruction, which Cuddon calls “revolutionary theories in
philosophy and literary criticism,” are also significant markers of postmodernism (690).
Lyotard himself in his extremely influential work The Postmodern Condition: A
Report on Knowledge, first published in French in 1979 and in English in 1984, defines the
main feature of postmodernism as “incredulity towards metanarratives” (xxiv). A
metanarrative is a means of legitimation of the existing social order, which in
postmodernism becomes obsolete (Lyotard, Report xxiii-xxiv), with the result that “[t]he
narrative function is losing its functors, its great hero, its great dangers, its great voyages,
its great goal” (Lyotard, Report xxiv). This happens with the realization that the “language
games”14 (Lyotard, Report 15) involved in this legitimation are self-serving (Lyotard,
Report 23). In other words, the undertaken legitimation is illegitimatized even as it is being
performed via the medium of narrative itself; hence the loss of authority of the grand
established narrative patterns and their superseding by local narratives (Lyotard, Report 37,
60).
The ensuing question is formulated by the Marxist critic Fredric Jameson, another
major contributor to the interpretation of postmodernism (Petrolle 167), as follows: “[H]ow
to do without narrative by means of narrative itself?” (Jameson, Foreword xix).  Lyotard’s
12 That is, selective, borrowing from many sources (OED online, accessed May 6, 2014).
13 That is, haphazard, random (OED online, accessed April 29, 2014).
14 In his work Lyotard takes an analytical approach based on the then rapidly developing pragmatics, a branch
of linguistics that concerns itself with the “language games” he so emphasizes in The Postmodern Condition
(9-10).0
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answer pertaining to art and literature is that of turning to the sublime, which he defines,
after Kant, as “a strong and equivocal emotion [carrying] with it both pleasure and pain,”
where the pain causes the pleasure (“Answering” 77). This conflict arises when an
individual  is  confronted  with  a  work  of  art  that  is  aiming  at  representing  the
unrepresentable, which Lyotard names the task of modern art (“Answering” 77-78). Thus,
to prevent the public from being lulled into the narratively established cultural conformity,
postmodern art should create allusions to that which is impossible to see or describe,
thereby questioning the deceitful reality concocted with the help of the outdated grand
narratives (Lyotard, “Answering” 78-79).
The following words by Lyotard can be considered as having been spoken about the
general population, who, among other things, are consumers of art and culture: “[M]ost
people have lost the nostalgia for the lost narrative” (Report 41). This means that the
majority do not experience postmodernism as a negative phenomenon. More than that,
Lyotard optimistically and in an emancipatory manner affords them enough wisdom to
understand and perform their responsibility in deciphering the postmodern environment.
They can do it by using their own “linguistic practice and communicational interaction” for
knowledge legitimation (Report 41), i.e., by understanding the structure of the creation of
the grand narratives and, consequently, becoming immune to their messages. One way of
doing  so  is  to  follow  the  praised  yearning  for  the  unclear,  the  unattainable,  the
unrepresentable, that is, the sublime. Importantly, Lyotard’s focus on the sublime seems to
hark back to the already mentioned realism’s self-subversive employment of allegory to
represent the monstrous and the disintegration of the purportedly stable realist identity
(Tambling 86). This connection obviously marks the trope as suitable for the postmodern
representation of the sublime because it enables readers to expose and revaluate grand
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narratives. Interestingly, the failure to perform this extremely high responsibility of
discerning the established self-serving narrative patterns precipitates one’s reduction to
barbarity (Lyotard, Report 41). On the one hand, the trust in human capacity, implicit in
this statement, shows again how emancipatory Lyotard’s view of postmodernism is. On the
other hand, it establishes even more firmly the readers’ responsibility for deciphering their
narrative environment, initiated in Romanticism.
However, it would be naïve to expect every reader to conscientiously strive for the
perfect fulfilment of the demanding task of wading through grand narratives, which
requires not only good education, but also a strong penchant for independent thinking. This
implies a division of people into those who can understand or are interested in
understanding the mechanism of knowledge legitimation by grand narratives and those
who cannot and are not. Combined with the rather vague alternative of reaching out for the
sublime, this dichotomy seems to have given birth to two diametrically opposite
interpretations of postmodernism that pertain in academia to this day. Lyotard’s formalist
linguistic approach, which emphasizes the relativization of meaning, has led many
theorists to conclude that meaning is in principle unattainable in the age of relativization of
knowledge and cultural values, the approach sometimes called “deconstructive
postmodernism” (Petrolle 17). In contrast to this orientation, other scholars since the 1990s
work to advance “constructive postmodernism,” that is, “a concept in which the
epistemological cautions of poststructuralism become additional tools in the pursuit of
nonrelativistic knowledge” (Petrolle 17). Theorists of this kind claim that overzealous
focus on the relativization of meaning and knowledge entails no release from the
responsibility of further pursuing ontological and epistemological questions.
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For example, Martin Schiralli condenses the polemic between these two movements
within postmodernism as follows:
Wary of all  talk of grounding value or even meaning and knowledge in essential
foundations, the postmodern attitude regards human meanings as too fragile and
indeterminate to support any such inquiry. While the postmodern creative
imperative is to illustrate these fragilities and ambivalences, indeed, to tease and
play with them disruptively … the postmodern critical imperative is to challenge
the very conceptual frameworks within which it can make sense to ask such a
question as ‘What is the genuine source of value here?’ – let alone answer it
successfully. (qtd. in Petrolle 17)
Here Schiralli refers to and critically evaluates the consequences of the key postmodern
epistemological shift in meaning-making: whereas the pre-postmodern epistemology is
based on producing a single, occasionally disputed, but nevertheless shared meaning
imposed by the grand narratives currently in force, postmodernism overwhelms one with
the  multiplicity  of  constantly  shifting  (local)  meanings  with  no  other  guarantee  of  their
validity as the individual’s own choice based on his or her access to knowledge and
personal inference ability (Lyotard, Report 23, 37, 41, 43; Macey, “differance” 99;
Cuddon, “dissemination” 229). Nevertheless, constructive postmodernists contend that,
although meaning-making in postmodernism is much more difficult than ever before due to
the issues discussed above, the arduousness of the practical fulfilment of this individual
responsibility does not justify the capitulation before the claim of the universal
unattainability of meaning(s) (Petrolle 17).
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However, deconstructive postmodernism is still wide-spread and popular particularly
among critics (Petrolle 93, 162), and traces of retreating into its allure can be seen even in
such comparatively recent work as The Oxford Handbook of English Literature and
Theology (2007). Thus, in his article on postmodernism Kevin Hart analyses postmodern
novels by Salman Rushdie, Mary Metcalf, Jim Crace and Julian Barnes, but concludes by
saying that they only “participate in the postmodern without quite belonging to it” (185-
186). The reason Hart provides for this exclusion is that the authors impinge on the
territory  of  modernism,  which,  he  implies,  is  the  proper  domain  for  dealing  with  serious
matters (184), whereas “the standard equipment of postmodern writing – a subversion of
representation, a prizing of surfaces over depths, a disposition towards lightness rather than
seriousness, a love of the intertextual, a taste for the non-functional,” which are the
features characteristic of postmodernism proper, are employed by the above-mentioned
authors rather moderately, which also implicitly reduces their novels’ postmodern gradient
(185).
For example, according to Hart, Julian Barnes’s A History of the World in 10½
Chapters (1987) is postmodern in that it “treats Judaeo-Christianity as an archive of stories
that can be put together in new ways, without worrying about the whole,” i.e., employing
such features of postmodernism as pastiche, eclecticism and intertextuality (186). At the
same time, the novel is not properly postmodern “because [Barnes’s] conception of
religion as myth places him in the company of exemplary moderns […]” (Hart 186). Here
Hart refers to the modernist view of the myth as “part of its progressive continuity with the
Enlightenment” (Bell 44), that developed towards and well into the nineteenth century,
based on the critique of intended and unintended faults of the historical interpretation of
Christianity and the Bible, and the modernist understanding of myth as having a universal
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meaning that presents a coherent picture of the world, as well as a meta-understanding of
the concept of myth itself and the proposal of demythologization of the Scripture (Bell 13,
14, 43-44; Whitman, “Retrospective” 13). This critique of Barnes’s focus on matters
‘reserved’ for modernism exposes Hart as a proponent of the deconstructive-postmodernist
movement with a clear view that postmodern authors should not indulge in a search for
meaning at the modernist level of depth.
Importantly, the essential difference between constructive and deconstructive
postmodernism is political in nature. Thus, both the difficulties of meaning-making in
postmodern culture, ensuing from individual responsibility rooted in the lack of authority,
and the ways of overcoming them, were broadly identified as early as in Lyotard’s The
Postmodern Condition, with the author himself taking an implied emancipatory stance
characteristic of the later formulated constructive postmodernism (41). It can be suggested
that for literary scholars to focus on the former or the latter is a matter of personal choice,
because both pursuits demand an approximately equal amount of scholarship and energy,
which means that factors other than literary effort are involved in determining the
preference. At the same time the fundamental pursuit of postmodernism, identified as
exposing grand narratives (Lyotard, Report xxiv, 41, 43), can be characterized as highly
politically charged due to its indispensably subversive distrust and exposure of power
structures. In this light, deconstructive postmodernism with its focus on non-referentiality
and lack of depth is a perfect illustration of Michel Foucault’s idea of the Panopticon
power structure (200-203).
Foucault’s Panopticon metaphor describes a society where, due to surveillance
organized so as to appear perpetual, individuals become not only obedient servants of the
power structure, but also reinforce it by acquiring and perfecting the demanded behaviour
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until they themselves become agents of power, thus eliminating the border between the
power and its recipients (201). Having given up its evaluative and critical potential in
favour of the focus on nonreferentiality (Petrolle 11, 17-18), postmodernism in its
deconstructive creed is similarly rendered innocuous to the power via its incorporation into
the contemporary Panopticon-like political structure of consumer capitalism, thereby
exemplifying how a politically destabilizing factor has been tamed. This tamed version of
postmodernism does not go beyond the analysed text, and when addressing the text it
focuses on the textual structure of narratives, claiming that the ultimate conclusion to be
drawn from characteristically unstable postmodern meaning is that there is no meaning in
texts whatsoever (Petrolle 94, 96). A good example of this attitude is the earlier-mentioned
critique of Eliot’s employment of two overlapping and intertwined plots – realist and
allegorical – in Daniel Deronda (see section 2.4.1), the technique allegedly cancelling out
both (Kelley, Reinventing 236).
Fredric Jameson lends support to my contention that the main difference between the
two -isms’ is political by stating in 1983 that “postmodernism is closely related to the
emergence of […] late, consumer […] capitalism,” and proceeds to claim that “its many
formal features in many ways express the deeper logic of that particular social system”
(“Postmodernism and Consumer Society” 179). That is, postmodernism works to
dissociate individuals from an objective and critical perception of their reality, for example,
by the “transformation of reality into images [and] the fragmentation of time into a series
of perpetual presences” (“Postmodernism” 179) – both of which are features of
postmodernism. Based on this observation, Jameson compares postmodernism with
modernism to an obvious disadvantage of the former:
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There is some agreement that the older modernism functioned against its society
in ways that are variously described as critical, negative, contestatory, subversive,
oppositional and the like. Can anything of the sort be affirmed about
postmodernism and its social moment? (“Postmodernism” 179)
Although formally leaving the question open, Jameson’s implied answer is negative due to
his characterization of postmodernism as a movement that “replicates,” “reproduces,” and
“reinforces” consumer capitalism (“Postmodernism” 179), thus exhibiting this cultural
phenomenon as devoid of any socially-critical effort in sharp contrast with modernism’s
profoundly critical impulse.
In opposition to deconstructive postmodernism, constructive postmodernism, born at
approximately the same time as the above-mentioned question, avoids Jameson’s critique
by trying to answer it in the affirmative. This movement avoids the impasse of
nonreferentiality by employing the characteristically postmodern multiplicity of meaning
to  make  sense  of  the  world.  Instead  of  “lamenting  […] the  losses  of  epistemological  and
ontological solid ground” (Petrolle 18), scholars and authors of this ardent minority refuse
to replicate reality, but deconstruct it in order to look for and (re)construct valid concepts
of truth and value (Petrolle 18, 14), a project impossible from the deconstructivist point of
view. In doing so, constructive postmodernism remains an essentially modernist endeavour
that continues its search for truth in changed circumstances, that is, during “an
epistemological crisis,” a phrase used by Petrolle as a synonym for postmodernism (2). It is
not surprising that the strategies for this search have also changed “in an intellectual
context in which truth, reality, and meaning are not only problematic – they are suspect”
(Petrolle 9). In spite of these difficulties and unlike deconstructive postmodernism, this
revised movement defies Jameson’s critique by vigorously engaging itself with such
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extratextual concerns as “human suffering,” “salvation” (Petrolle 94) and “the moral and
ethical value of reading the world” (Petrolle 102), which clearly echo Cassian’s
“emendation of life” (qtd. in Turner 72), pertaining to tropology and discussed in section
2.3.2. Petrolle’s intentionally religious cast of this list does not diminish the political
dimension  of  such  endeavours,  because  a  deep  exploration  of  each  of  them  will
immediately expose the structure of modern consumer society as inhumane, which Petrolle
does demonstrate in her allegorical analyses of several postmodern narratives, showing, for
example, how they expose the modern “[…] social structures [as] savaged by centuries of
imperialism, racism, and capitalism” (Petrolle 158).
Not surprisingly, the polarity of the two branches of postmodernism described above
has further led to a markedly different understanding of the function of allegory in
postmodern writing, which I will examine next, comparing and contrasting the two
approaches. In doing so I will particularly focus on the understanding proposed by Jean
Ellen Petrolle in her work Religion without Belief because  it  is  instrumental  to  my
subsequent analysis of Cheever’s novel. In this work Petrolle convincingly justifies the
constructive-postmodernist stance by analysing the ways of meaning-making in several
postmodern narratives that deeply engage in ontological and epistemological questions.
Later I will use her methodological approach to propose a coherent constructive-
postmodern allegorical reading of Cheever’s Falconer.
2.4.3. PostmodernAllegory:TwoOppositeApproaches
The first approach to allegory, engendered by deconstructive postmodernism, stems from
Lyotard’s focus on formal linguistic features of narratives expressed in his The Postmodern
Condition (Report 9-10;  Petrolle  2).  It  has  been  developed  by  Paul  de  Man,  who  in  his
Allegories of Reading defines allegory as “a habit of reading” and “a feature of all
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language and discourse” (Petrolle 8). Justifying the latter claim when commenting on
Nietzsche’s views on rhetoric, de Man agrees with the philosopher’s declaration that “the
necessary subversion of truth by rhetoric [is] a distinctive feature of all language”
(Allegories 110). Correcting and clarifying Nietzsche’s view, he further specifies that, due
to its symbolic nature, all language is figural (De Man, Allegories 111). Unfortunately,
after the initial flaw of substituting the truth for its imperfect representations by a multitude
of rhetorical tropes, the figural use of language has brought its users away from the ideal
state of “proper order” to the point where truth has become unattainable (De Man,
Allegories 113). It is via this line of reasoning that de Man enforced a rigid anti-allegorical
stance, which has become pervasive in postmodern literary theory and to this day continues
to limit our understanding of the trope’s representational resources (Petrolle 36; Tambling
139).
Another drawback of understanding allegory as a discourse feature is illustrated by
Northrop  Frye’s  famous  remark,  stating  that  “[…]  all  commentary  is  allegorical
interpretation […]” (89). For Frye, “[c]ommentary thus looks at literature as, in its formal
phase,  a  potential  allegory  of  events  or  ideas”  (89).  In  other  words,  as  a  consequence  of
this nature of critical discourse, all critical activity is an inevitable allegorization of its
objects (Frye 89). These quotes demonstrate how the discourse-oriented approach has led
to an overgeneralized use of the trope, ironically, an observation Frye himself makes on the
next page, regretting that “[…] the term allegory is very loosely employed for a great
variety of literary phenomena” (90). Such practice precludes the perception of any
narrative as non-allegorical and, consequently, renders the trope useless for theoretical
purposes (Petrolle 8; De Man, Allegories 116; Kelley, Reinventing 8). Thus, the
deconstructive-postmodernist approach to allegory as a discourse feature directs scholars’
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attention so as to either dismiss it altogether as useless for meaningful scientific inquiry or
to overemphasize the formal features of the trope while dismissing others, namely, those
enabling meaningful examination of human nature, human condition, and providing
alternatives to the latter in case it is unsatisfactory (Petrolle 118, 128).
In contrast to deconstructive postmodernism’s rigorously hostile attitude to allegory,
constructive postmodernism provides an alternative to the resigned stance of the former
regarding the potential of allegory. Namely, this relatively young approach focuses on
meaning-making  as  the  ultimate  goal  of  both  reading  and  writing,  which  is  essentially
religious in nature and often achieved specifically by employing postmodern allegory
(Petrolle 7). Importantly, religion here is perceived not as a set of dogmas, but as a “public
inquiry into the meaning of symbolic discourses” (Wallace qtd. in Petrolle 7), which
clearly entails that religious inquiry is absolutely possible without institutional religion
(Petrolle 5, 19). Thus, the alternative to the deconstructive postmodernism’s denial of
meaning is a positive attitude towards the existence of same and confidence in the
possibility of its attainment via “close reading with the purpose of interpretation,” for
which postmodern allegory is extremely appropriate (Petrolle 7). Starting from the premise
that “truth and religion do not cease to exist in postmodern fiction, but have simply ceased
to be unproblematic” (Petrolle 4), constructive postmodernists focus on methods, not
problems, of the conveyance of the allegorical meaning, thereby emphasizing the positive
content of postmodern narratives (Petrolle 12, 11). According to Petrolle, this positive
content centres around such intrinsically religious issues as theology, cosmology, and
salvation, which postmodern allegory systematically attempts to understand (14-15). Thus,
instead of hiding behind the claim of nonreferentiality, these scholars and authors continue
the long pre-postmodern religious tradition of allegorical search for contemporary sources
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of power, inquiries into the human nature, personal identity, and ways to avoid suffering
(Petrolle 14-15).
Obviously, to conduct such investigations it is imperative to engage oneself with
extratextual concerns, which is another point of difference between the two approaches.
Understandably, deconstructive postmodernism emphatically denies the usefulness of such
endeavours, staying within the text despite the price of proclaiming it meaningless
(Petrolle 96). In contrast to this position, constructive postmodernism views allegory as a
suitable means of making extratextual references to what is simply put by Petrolle as “the
everyday world of men and women,” thereby making narratives meaningful and attractive
to readers (96). More than that, constructive postmodernism exposes the deconstructive
habit of pretending that there is no real world beyond the text as naïve and dangerous
(Petrolle 96). A good example is Peter Greenaway’s 1982 film A Draughtsman’s Contract,
an allegorical narrative where the male protagonist is murdered because he “refuse[d] even
to try to read the signs, or […] successfully position [himself] in a semiotic economy with
political dimensions” (Petrolle 98). As a consequence of his self-assured patriarchal denial
of any political motivation to women, the draughtsman refused to read the foreboding signs
virtually  thrown  at  him  by  the  two  female  protagonists,  who,  as  a  result,  successfully
secured the right to a large property by acquiring a male heir and expediently disposing by
proxy of the biological father to avoid justifiable questions regarding fatherhood (Petrolle
96-98). As this film illustrates, active engagement with extratextual content makes
postmodern  allegory  suitable  to  express  political  concerns,  which,  in  turn,  from  the
constructive-postmodernist point of view makes allegory a viable means of political
critique and meaningful search for social alternatives (Petrolle 55).
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The above-mentioned virtual self-destruction of the male protagonist of A
Draughtsman’s Contract as a result of his interpretative blindness illustrates another
difference between the two approaches to allegory, namely, that of the reader responsibility
(Petrolle 96-98). Thus, with its emphasis on non-referentiality and unattainability of
meaning, deconstructive postmodernism clearly implies that there is no need for readerly
effort whatsoever, which legitimately limits one’s interpretive activity to that of enjoying
the narratives’ notorious playfulness and lack of depth (Petrolle 3). This implication is
indirectly corroborated by the deconstructive-postmodernist critique of the absence of a
single readily accessible meaning in postmodern allegories, which automatically entails
that the responsibility for allegoresis is a didactic task of the author, not interpretative of
the reader (Petrolle 94). In contrast to this position, constructive postmodernism
emphasizes the importance and complexity of the readerly exegetical work required by
postmodern allegoresis (Petrolle 90, 93, 120). This development, abnegated by
deconstructive postmodernism, continues the shift of responsibility to the reader that
originated in Romanticism (Madsen, “American Allegory” 231), which shows the trope’s
consistent development in the era of postmodernism. However, this responsibility, being
extremely onerous, causes a typically postmodern “anxiety over signs” (Petrolle 94), which
“[…] haunts postmodern allegorical characters, dramatizing the urgency of wanting to
know and not knowing, and illustrating the difficulties of interpretation, in particular the
difficulty of verifying one’s interpretations without recourse to some absolute authority”
(Petrolle 94-95). This implicit lament over the absence of reliable grand narratives leads
deconstructive postmodernists onto the path of least resistance, where they refuse to face
this anxiety by sweepingly declaring all interpretive activity useless.
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Thus, it is the opposite ways of coping with anxiety over signs that have shaped such
different attitudes to allegory. Indeed, deconstructive postmodernism passively capitulates
in the face of indeterminacy induced by multiple meanings, which causes a pervasive sense
of  loss  and  futility  of  all  interpretative  effort  (Petrolle  1-2,  17,  49,  94).  In  contrast,
constructive postmodernism, which was born in the 1990s as a reaction to the
deconstructive-postmodernist sense of impotency and futility of an allegedly impossible
task, accepts the complexity caused by the “multivalency” of allegorical meanings
(Petrolle 94) and appropriates this complexity as one of its tools in processing a
multifarious world (Petrolle 17-18, 92). For example, Madsen elucidates the suitability of
allegory as a timeless, flexible, and versatile exegetical tool in the following statement:
Allegory comes into its own during periods of uncertainty regarding the nature of
communication, the reliability of language and the authenticity of culturally
important texts because allegory is, above all, focused on the complexities and
difficulties inherent in the activity of interpretation. (Allegory in America 4)
In her polemic with deconstructive postmodernism, Petrolle further defends the suitability
of postmodern allegory:
Naturally, [the] climate of multiplicity complicates interpretation, but to construe
this multiplicity as indeterminacy is imprecise: it seems more accurate to say that
the multiplicity and the simultaneity of reference, rather than indeterminacy of
reference, constitute the essence of allegory. This multiplicity of reference allows
postmodern allegory, […] in its very form, to have at its thematic center both the
act of interpretation, which focuses attention on the perception and production of
meaning, and speculation about specific sources of value and meaning. (92-93)
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To put succinctly, when not perceived as a meaningless exercise yielding no result,
postmodern allegory is quite capable of both questioning and producing meaning (Petrolle
93). Importantly, the intrinsic belief in the existence of “value and meaning” (Petrolle 93)
countermands the self-induced deconstructive-postmodernist frustration with and
exhaustion over the proclaimed nonreferentiality. Indeed, the trend of the postmodern
narrative to end in medias res15 reinforces this positive attitude by highlighting that it is not
the final (didactic) goal that is important, but the process of the search for meaning per se,
because it enables personal and social growth (Petrolle 95, 147, 159-160). In other words,
it is not the signs that one needs to be anxious about, but such extratextual and ultimately
social aspects as one’s progress as a human being, one’s understanding of how the world
works, and one’s readiness to look for and embrace alternatives when its workings are
unsatisfactory (Petrolle 102, 60, 153).
It is useful to change perspective and consider anxiety over signs as the other side of
anxiety over agency. After all, given the established trend of transferring the exegetical
responsibility to the reader (Kelley, Reinventing 91), it is the interpreting agent who is duly
worried over his or her interpretation. Agent anxiety, as I mentioned earlier, stems from
Romanticism (Kelley, Reinventing 91;  see  also  section  2.4.1),  which,  as  a  reaction  to
modernity and rationalism, anticipated concerns related to the role of agency that have
aggravated in postmodernism:
[…] modernist and postmodernist theorists of human behaviour illustrate social
sources of power that influence individual becoming and destiny to an
overwhelming degree […] tend[ing] to present the human will as significantly
curtailed by social dynamics of power. Whether because of early childhood
15 That is, “into the midst of affairs, into the middle of a narrative” (OED online, accessed July 24, 2014.).
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experiences, class struggle, patriarchy, colonialism, or in Foucault’s case, simply,
power, twentieth-century social constructivists attribute behaviour to forces
beyond human control. (Petrolle 24-25)
Thus, anxiety over agency forcefully resurfaces in postmodernism as a consequence of the
deterministic attitude toward human nature, which reinforces the crisis induced by the
dismissal of spirituality, thereby leading many to accept the existence of a more or less
rational higher power to fill the created void (Petrolle 25). This across-the-board rejection
of agency as a constitutive human trait and a trustworthy shaper of human experience
explains why such already discussed extratextual concerns as the search for identity,
understanding of the world, and correcting the impaired social structures have been so
resolutely banished from the deconstructive-postmodernist sphere of interest. However,
constructive postmodernism claims that the importance of agency persistently re-emerges
in the phenomena of popular culture ranging from New Ageism to the fear of and belief in
technology (Petrolle 25). More than that, this longing is exposed as pervasive, when it is
thoroughly exploited by companies marketing a fantasy of executing customers’ free will
via selling them products ‘specifically’ designed for their needs (Petrolle 25). Therefore,
unlike its unwilling progenitor, constructive postmodernism advocates the need to fulfil
this wide-spread yearning and overtly reclaim agency as a viable foundation of humanity
(Petrolle 38-39).
This recovery is possible with the help of postmodern allegory, which, according to
Petrolle and contrary to the deconstructive-postmodernist stance, is to a considerable
degree similar to its classic, medieval, and Renaissance predecessors (Petrolle 17, 43).
Influenced by deconstructive postmodernism, “[c]ontemporary commentary about allegory
tends to focus on how allegory problematizes meaning while ignoring or underplaying how
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allegory conveys meaning” (Petrolle 12; emphasis original). This line of reasoning is based
on the premise of nonreferentiality, which entails that postmodern allegory rests upon
textual indeterminacy and, therefore, resists interpretation (Petrolle 11-12). However, while
necessary for a full formal representation of the trope, this approach one-sidedly ignores
the continuity of allegory’s development as a carrier, examiner, and creator of meaning
(Petrolle 12, 93). All these functions used to be the key task of pre-postmodern allegory,
which searched for answers to ontological and epistemological questions within the frames
of institutional religion (Petrolle 4).
In spite of the modern loss of trust in institutional religion, postmodern allegorical
discourse continues to engage in questions of theology, cosmology, and salvation (Petrolle
5). However, postmodern religious thought has transformed in a secular culture so that
even postmodern definitions of the religious are given in non-religious terms, such as the
already presented understanding of religious reading as a “public inquiry into the meaning
of symbolic discourses” (Wallace qtd. in Petrolle 7), which clearly requires exegetical
work (Petrolle 7). Another good example is a definition of religious thought as “a cultural
activity that deals with sustaining the boundaries between the islands of meaning socially
established as real, commonsense, and rational, and the areas beyond the boundary that are
considered dream, fantasy, aberrant, and insane” (Berger qtd. in Petrolle 6). Still other
definition equates the religious with the real: “[T]he holy is associated with the foundations
of reality, the deep-down, unshakeable structures of existence, the beginnings, the natural,
the ‘really real’” (White qtd. in Petrolle 89).  The first two definitions highlight the pro-
active social dimension of the constructive-postmodern understanding of the religious; the
third focuses on the existence and importance of unearthing the real at the time of
uncertainty. To fuse the three, religious thought is a “public” “cultural activity” that aims at
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a critical understanding of the process of meaning-making via interpreting “symbolic
discourses” in reference to the existing reality. Contrary to the deconstructive-
postmodernist stance suggesting that ultimate claims to meaning are impossible, within this
approach it is not only possible, but even imperative to examine and construct meaning
that is religiously acceptable via determining what is religiously unacceptable.
This specifically constructive-postmodernist effort to resacralize the world by
providing it with viable meaning often manifests itself through postmodern allegory, which
as a trope is particularly well-suited for religious thinking due to its long history of
performing religious inquiries (Petrolle 7, 161). Petrolle lists the following rhetorical
strategies that have been used for this purpose as constitutive features of allegory since
antiquity: “dream-vision, episodic structure, battle or progress, intertextuality,
personification, and the quest for spiritual/religious gnosis” (7). These ancient strategies
are still viable, though they operate in an unstable, postmodern context and, therefore, do
not provide ultimate didactic truths but instead “enact the ontological uncertainty” that is at
the heart of postmodern narratives (Petrolle 7-8). I would slightly modify this list by
adding that, although the last strategy, the quest, can certainly be used by itself, it is,
nevertheless, the most important one because it simultaneously formulates the purpose of
any religiously-read postmodern allegory. All these strategies are used by Cheever in
Falconer, which I will demonstrate with some of them later.
The spiritual investigations performed by postmodern allegories are often based on
deconstruction, which, in turn, as a mode of inquiry is rooted in the tradition of negative
theology, which highlights another connection between pre- and postmodern religious
allegory (Petrolle 53-54). Petrolle defines negative theology as a mystical Judeo-Christian
tradition dating back to the Middle Ages that “[…] apprehend[s] the divine by
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understanding and naming what the divine is not, systematically stripping away all
metaphors, language, imagery, and constructs that reify the divine” (Petrolle 53). This path,
with  its  emphasis  on  the  unknown,  resembles  postmodernism’s  distrust  of  the  ability  of
human thought and language to analyse and comprehend the transcendent (Petrolle 53).
Importantly, negative theologians did not aim at the unveiling of the ultimate truth, but
only strived for it, acknowledging both the impossibility of a full understanding of God’s
nature and the meaningfulness of its approximation (Petrolle 54). This cognitive practice is
extremely close to that of postmodern deconstruction, which also aims at comprehending
the incomprehensible by way of untrustingly removing layers of language to contemplate
the remaining kernels of meaning with equal suspicion (Petrolle 54-55, 61-62; Caputo xix-
xx). Interestingly, both deconstructive and constructive postmodernists practice
deconstruction, but, whereas the former, hampered by the nonreferentiality premise, do it
one-sidedly by interpreting the revealed multivalency of meaning as reciprocally negating,
the latter movement continues the negative theological tradition of the meaningful
approximation of the ultimate truth by employing postmodern allegory as a suitable carrier,
examiner, and producer of multivalent meanings (Petrolle 62-64, 93).
The last but not the least point of disagreement between deconstructive and
constructive postmodernism regarding allegory I want to concentrate on is their different
understanding of temporality. The former is based on the theories of allegory by Walter
Benjamin and Paul de Man, who was highly influenced by Benjamin’s work (Tambling
109, 129). Benjamin’s The Origin of German Tragic Drama, published in German in 1928
and as an English translation in 1977, criticizes the Romantic valorisation of symbol over
allegory, stating that the organicism and timeless nature attributed to the former caused the
neglect of history by constructing an ideal world and, therefore, vitiated the usefulness of
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symbol for understanding the real historical processes (Tambling 110, 116). In contrast to
this,
[…]  in  allegory  the  observer  is  confronted  with  the facies hippocratica [death’s
head] of history as a petrified primordial landscape. Everything about history that
from the very beginning has been untimely, sorrowful, unsuccessful, is expressed
in a face – or rather in a death’s head. (Benjamin qtd. in Tambling 116)
In  other  words,  it  is  not  symbol,  but  allegory  that  is  a  superior  trope  because  it  allows
glimpses of history, albeit as temporally delayed fragments of events. While symbolism
implies and promotes the existence of ‘natural’ values, thus serving ideology, allegory
exposes history as “a petrified primordial landscape” (Benjamin qtd. in Tambling 116),
thereby questioning the idea of history as progressive development (Tambling 116-117;
Kelley, Reinventing 252). Thus, for Benjamin, history has nothing to do with its official
idealistic version, but, instead, is fragmented, decaying, and condemned to death, which
ultimately allows to read it not as something ‘natural,’ but as something other, i.e.,
allegorically (Tambling 117-118).
Although  Benjamin  reversed  the  significance  of  the  Romantic  opposition
symbol/allegory,  he  was  far  from  idealizing  the  latter.  Having  built  his  understanding  on
the analysis of German Baroque drama, he pointed out the trope’s preoccupation with
death in the historical context of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), and therefrom
extended the observed nature of fragmentation and decay to modern allegory in general,
thereby capturing its post-seventeenth-century development as discontinuous, transient,
lacking definite existence, and displacing the idea of history as a coherent narrative
(Tambling 110, 122; Kelley, Reinventing 251-252). Benjamin’s famous aphorism,
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“[a]llegories are, in the realm of thoughts, what ruins are in the realm of things” (Benjamin
qtd. in Tambling 119), highlights not only the intrinsically fragmentary nature of thought,
but  also  the  impossibility  of  reaching  the  ultimate  truth  when  reading  the  world  that  is
itself unstable and perpetually out of a unifying grasp of the former idealized set of
interpretation guidelines, turned ruins (Kelley, Reinventing 252).
To describe the means of resisting this unattainability Benjamin proposes the notion
of “constellation” (qtd. in Tambling 121). A constellation is a process of combining
unrelated fragments into meaningful wholes even as stars are chosen and combined into
‘meaningful’ images that are absolutely arbitrary but, nonetheless, help in navigating one’s
way (Tambling 121). Understandably, such arrangement of fragments into an allusive
coherence to imbue them with provisional meaning will never be absolutely ‘correct,’
hence the unattainability of a full understanding. However, under the constraint of the
falsity of ‘natural’ ideology, such interpretations can help to make sense of the world.
According to Tambling, “[t]he creation of a meaningful constellation is the same as the
creation of allegory,” which means that coherent allegories can be produced by readers via
interpreting  the  incoherent  fragments  left  as  clues  by  an  author,  which  implicitly  defines
postmodern allegory (121). Followers of Benjamin have identified the problem with such
exegetical freedom, namely, that “[such] allegory can neither begin from a fixed position
nor end with one” (Tambling 126), which implies that the cost of allegory is the inevitable
loss of the transcendent, which, in turn, has led to the emphasis on allegory’s problems
with creating meaning at the cost of its means of creating same (Tambling 128; Petrolle
12).
As has been already mentioned, the most influential theorist who has adopted the
position of the unattainability of the referent is Paul de Man (Petrolle 8, 11-12). Influenced
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by Benjamin’s ideas, in his essay “The Rhetoric of Temporality” de Man also criticizes the
Romantic opposition of symbol to allegory (Tambling 129-130; De Man, “Rhetoric” 188).
However, moving away from Benjamin’s historical perspective, he interprets this
distinction differently and identifies the symbolic ambiguities of Romanticism as “[…]
ambivalences derived from an illusionary priority of a subject that had, in fact, to borrow
from the outside world a temporal stability which it lacked within itself” (De Man,
“Rhetoric” 200). In other words, the Romantic symbol is an ambiguous concept arising
from futile efforts to create a stable identity, which has been linked with the ideas of
timelessness and totality, in an attempt to overcome Romanticism’s anxiety over agency.
Therefore, the “temporal stability” attributed to the Romantic symbol (De Man, Rhetoric
200) was a psychological defence of the self against the loss of identity (De Man, Rhetoric
200, 207-208).
In contrast, allegory is always fixed in time by its obligatory reference to another
sign, which, as its temporal antecedent, accentuates the trope’s distance from its referent:
Whereas the symbol postulates the possibility of identity or identification,
allegory  designates  primarily  a  distance  in  relation  to  its  own  origin,  and,
renouncing the nostalgia and the desire to coincide, it establishes its language in
the void of this temporal difference. (De Man, “Rhetoric” 207)
By speaking in the void, allegory, as was correctly felt by the Romantics, eschews the
possibility of self-identification by producing nothing but an endless row of self-repetitive
tropes – or signs – that can never reach the original meaning (De Man, “Rhetoric” 207;
Tambling 131). Therefore, this method of reference does nothing but foreground the
distance between the signifier and the signified, which makes the trope useless when taken
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out of the linguistic context and put into an empirical one (De Man, “Rhetoric” 222, 226).
In this respect, even the attribute of temporality that de Man denies to symbol but ascribes
to allegory is negative, or false:
[…] allegory exists entirely in an ideal time that is never here and now but always
a past or an endless future […] as a successive mode capable of engendering
duration  as  the  illusion  of  continuity  that  it  knows  to  be  illusionary.  (De  Man,
“Rhetoric” 226)
The resulting “authentic experience of temporality” (De Man, “Rhetoric” 226) is also false
because it is not based on the real experience, but is induced by the false impression of
narrativity, i.e., an illusory succession of coherent events, created by negative temporality
(De Man, “Rhetoric” 225, 226). In contrast to Benjamin’s constellation mechanism, de
Man clearly denies any possibility of meaning-making with the help of allegory
whatsoever.
As has become clear from the above, both Benjamin and de Man regard allegory as
unsuitable for creating meaning. The former defines it historically as incapable of
producing anything but disparate fragments of meaning, underlying its ultimate
unattainability. The latter interprets allegory in psychological and purely linguistic terms,
coming to the same conclusion, but, in addition, denying the trope any empirical dimension
and, therefore, negating its applicability to meaning-making in the real world. Interestingly,
not only constructive postmodernism holds the opposite stance, but some of de Man’s
followers disagree with this understanding of allegory. For example, Kelley, whom Petrolle
considers one of de Man’s creed (Petrolle 13, 163), criticizes him for ignoring empirical
context, or what she calls “particulars,” stating that their intertwining with abstractions
64
plays a major role in defining allegory’s force of impact (Kelley, Reinventing 10). She
further contends that de Man’s “‘rhetoric of temporality’ […] does not include asking how
[allegory] might change over time to register variable pressures on its figural speech,”
thereby underlying both the importance of the abnegated extratextual context, which she
seems to understand under the “variable pressures” of historical time (Reinventing 10), and
the fact of the continuing development of the trope (Reinventing 10-11). Ironically, having
denied this development, both Benjamin and de Man exhibit in their work an “unrelenting
critical desire for a lost or alien referent,” thereby revealing their own dissatisfaction with
the proclaimed loss (Kelley, Reinventing 10).
As is easy to anticipate, constructive postmodernism interprets temporality inherent
in allegory differently. Concentrating on the religious roots of the trope, this approach
foregrounds its timeless nature, arguing that allegory always has and continues to perform
“the cultural work that is religious and polemical in nature” (Petrolle 14). In contrast with
the deconstructive-postmodernist focus on the post-seventeenth-century disintegration,
constructive postmodernism regards contemporary religious allegory as continuous with its
older counterparts in their search for the transcendent – an attitude that has been pervasive
until after the 1960s, that is, until the wide spreading of postmodern ideas (Petrolle 8-9, 14-
15). This position understands allegory “as a conflation of writing, myth and religion,”
which has specifically evolved to answer the inevitable ontological and epistemological
questions that arise when human beings search for their place in the world (Petrolle 9). The
problem with this search in the era of postmodernism is that any meaning is understood as
essentially constructed, which leads to its automatic devaluation (Petrolle 106): “[o]nce
meaning is revealed in all its artificiality and contingency, it loses its consolatory power”
(Petrolle 107). Whereas deconstructive postmodernism chooses to stop looking, blocked by
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the proclaimed fragmentation and disintegration, constructive postmodernism continues
the search, arguing that questions pertinent to human existence are timeless, and to cease
looking for answers amounts to relinquishing meaning itself (Petrolle 106). When the
former movement deconstructs everything to declare the absence of any meaning, its
younger version moves a step further in that, having exposed particular ideas as specious
constructs, it creates new meaningful frameworks that suggest viable solutions to improve
human condition (Petrolle 120, 148), thereby practicing the centuries-old idea of the
“emendation of life” formulated by Cassian (Cassian qtd. in Turner 72).
An explicit example of a constructive-postmodernist understanding of temporality is
provided by Nina Menkes, who in her 1996 film The Bloody Child: An Interior of Violence
employs allegory as an expansive device that encompasses long periods of time and large
areas of space (Petrolle 108-120). Instead of supplying clear references to these
dimensions, the director intentionally obscures the spatiotemporal context of her narrative,
which enables her to explore the nature of violence on a universal scale that extends to
include the whole of humankind and its socioeconomic formations (Petrolle 118, 108-120).
According to Petrolle, “[t]his expansiveness is [an] ancient feature of allegory: it seeks the
universal in the particular, attempting to describe the nature of things as broadly and
largely as possible” (Petrolle 118). This traditional feature of religious allegory allows
Menkes to critique the military- and violence-driven organization of Western society, based
on the principles of capitalism and imperialism, by exposing its destructiveness not only to
the non-Western societies, but also to itself (Petrolle 118-120).
To close this section, I will focus in some detail on an illustration of a constructive-
postmodernist interpretation of a postmodern narrative, namely, Petrolle’s analysis of the
1965 novel Miss MacIntosh, My Darling by the feminist experimental author Marguerite
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Young (Petrolle 51-52, 74-88). The critical response Young’s only novel received on
publication varied from praise as a work of genius to accusations of being a ceaseless
incongruous babble, with both sides in agreement on the narrative’s lack of coherence,
including supportive attempts to read the text as écriture féminine (Petrolle 75, 76).
However, according to Petrolle, neither supporters nor critics have tried to view the novel
through the prism of allegory “as a central critical concept”, which is the only way to
supply the missed coherence (75). More specifically, the text should be read as a modern
psychomachia (Petrolle 75). Psychomachia, or psychomachy, etymologically means “soul
battle” (Petrolle 56) and is an ancient form of allegory that dates back to Greek antiquity
(Petrolle 55-56).  Psychomachia is a conflict either between the soul and the body or within
the soul, which, after a struggle, leads to the protagonist’s ultimate liberation, with the
driving forces behind the battle, which are also explored in the narrative, often appearing
as personified abstractions (Petrolle 55-56; Cuddon 710; Fletcher 22-26). Petrolle argues
that, when read allegorically,
[…] Miss MacIntosh, My Darling becomes a carefully structured psychomachia
that […] juxtaposes seemingly opposing cognitive faculties and worldviews,
analyses the strengths and weaknesses of each, and attempts to negotiate or
maintain a tension between them, contemplating the potential of each for
contributing to spiritual fulfilment […] When the novel’s allegorical structure is
appreciated, it ceases to be a confounding, if exciting, formal oddity, and becomes
a carefully ordered, baroque philosophical meditation in the form of a
psychomachia. (76)
In  other  words,  all  the  chief  elements  of  a  psychomachia  present  in Miss MacIntosh –  a
spiritual conflict, an exploration of its driving forces, and guidelines for a spiritual
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resolution – provide this elusive experimental novel with a solid structural framework,
which, in turn, lends the narrative its coherence.
Petrolle interprets Young’s psychomachia as Vera Cartwheel’s (the female
protagonist) inner conflict between two opposite epistemological systems of approaching
reality, with the heroine’s name, which paraphrases as “cartwheeling truth,” an epitome of
the vicissitudes of this battle,  from the start  hinting at  its  never-ending character (Petrolle
77-80). Vera starts her life under the auspices of the exaggeratedly irrational approach,
allegorized in the character of her mother, a perpetually hallucinating opium-addict
(Petrolle 77-78). The second epistemology, fundamentally rational and commonsense, is
introduced into the protagonist’s life by her nurse, Miss MacIntosh, who, being a
personification of common sense, sees it as her mission to relieve her charge’s mind of all
the traces of irrationality, such as dreams and illusions (Petrolle 77-79). After Miss
MacIntosh’s disappearance, possibly after her suicide, the nurse’s rationality is greatly
missed by the heroine, who, no more able to see clearly the boundary between reality and
fantasy, starts on a quest of finding her nurse, i.e., of finding the balance Vera once thought
she possessed, but which in reality turns out to be merely a feeling lent to her by Miss
MacIntosh, and, therefore, ironically, also an illusion (Petrolle 77-81).
The spiritual resolution proposed by Young is not a choice between one of the two
epistemologies, as some of her critics proposed, but their synthesis, which is achieved via a
laborious work of overcoming the essentially dualistic, i.e., contrastive mode of thinking,
engendered in Western culture (Petrolle 76, 80-81). To achieve this purpose, the novel
deconstructs the fantasy/reality opposition by exposing both the mother’s and the nurse’s
one-sided perception of the world as lacking, and their binary logic as inadequate (Petrolle
81).  As a result,
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[…] the opposition portrayed by Miss MacIntosh and Catherine Cartwheel works,
ironically, to erase opposition, transcend binarism, and gesture […] toward a form
of  cognition  and  understanding  of  reality  that  is  radically  unitary.  The  quest  for
unity, which Miss MacIntosh shares with classical, medieval, and Renaissance
allegory, constitutes the fundamental religious longing at the heart of allegory
(Petrolle 81-82).
It is in this quest for unity, religious in nature, that the meaning of human personal search
lies, and, according to Petrolle’s reading of Young’s novel, this process should not end with
the postmodern realization of the ultimate inadequacy of all representation (81). That is
why Vera begins her quest not before her fading realization that the place of comfort is
somewhere between her mother and her nurse, but after this epiphany (Petrolle 83). The
message of this succession is that the inquiry should not focus on reaching specific
ultimate goals, as is customary to expect in Western culture (Petrolle 84). Instead, it should
proceed with and despite the pre-knowledge of the final unattainment, the precondition of
negative theology that Young seems to employ in her novel as a mode of deconstruction
(Petrolle 84-85). Thus, by deconstructing the binary opposition, the protagonist never
reaches a full understanding of the suggested unitary cognition, but seems to perceive it
non-verbally, and only occasionally (Petrolle 83, 84-85). This suggestion of a non-binary
thinking paradigm after the deconstruction of both poles of the Western opposition
comprises the “positive content” of postmodern allegory that is inherent to it (Petrolle 11,
87). The similar version of deconstruction followed by a suggested reconstructed solution
will also be traced in Falconer,  which  I  will  analyse  using  Petrolle’s  methodology  as
illustrated in her analysis of Young’s novel.
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To conclude, the ambiguity of allegory brought into focus in the era of Romanticism
has persisted up to this day, with the trope’s development adding to its problematic
character. Thus, since Romanticism, allegory has become less transparent, which has led to
the ultimate placement of the responsibility for allegoresis with the reader. To complicate
the matters, since realism, the trope, by turning to the sublime, has been used to question
the concepts of liberal subject and stable identity. Both these developments were firmly
established in postmodernism, with its emphasis on the loss of referent, lack of knowledge-
validating authority, and concomitant multiplicity of meaning. As it developed,
postmodernism bifurcated into a deconstructive and constructive branch, which seem to be
politically motivated and mainly differ in their attitude towards the existence and
attainment of nonrelativistic knowledge. Whereas the former denies such a possibility, the
latter considers the multiplicity of meaning an additional tool in the epistemological and
ontological search of a way to understand and live in the real world. The two branches of
postmodernism engendered two opposite approaches to allegory, with the
deconstructivists, who reject the connection between the text and the world, considering
the trope useless and unviable, and the constructivists using allegorical narrative not only
to actively ponder the problems of human existence, but also to suggest solutions to the
latter with the ultimate goal of making the world better. It is the constructive approach to
allegory that I will use in my analysis of Cheever’s Falconer.
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3. Constructive-PostmodernistReadingoftheAllegoriesofCain
andAbelandtheJewishWanderings
In the following constructive-postmodernist analysis of Falconer I will argue that Cheever
creates his overarching religious allegory by resorting to the traditional techniques of
biblical typology and negative theology, and two well-known techniques popular in
postmodernism, namely, those of doppelgänger and intertextuality. Employing typological
allegory, the author continues the tradition of the use of biblical typology in American
secular captivity narratives (see section 2.3.2). In doing so he uses the myths of Cain and
Abel  and  the  Jewish  Wanderings  as  familiar  types  of  Christian  discourse  to  ponder  the
religious questions of suffering and salvation in contemporary America. However, to
negate the familiar mythological types, the author employs another tradition of religious
discourse, namely, the technique of negative theology (see section 2.4.3), which allows
him  to  deconstruct  these  rigid  typological  icons  of  the  American  version  of  Christianity
and thereby expose them as unreliable and essentially tribal.
In employing the doppelgänger and intertextuality the author uses parts of the Bible
as a palimpsest to provide a coherent link with the historical context of contemporary
readers. Consequently, they are prompted to revaluate their environment, i.e., the realities
of the contemporary United States and its culture. The device of the doppelgänger will be
analysed in section 3.1, exposing the ambiguity of the myth of Cain and Abel in Cheever’s
narrative. To some extent, this section will also concentrate on the concept of palimpsest,
which pertains to the creation of the ambiguity of the myth of Cain and Abel by evoking
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the  context  of  the  Old  Testament  as  a  framework  for  the  whole  novel.  In  section  3.2
palimpsest will be employed much more substantially, where pertinent parts of the biblical
narrative will be analysed as a scaffolding for creating an allegorical meta-narrative that
criticizes the foundation of the USA national identity. The overall achieved effect of the
emerging palimpsest structure of Cheever’s narrative is that of employing the myths of
Cain and Abel and the Jewish Wanderings to expose two formative myths of American
identity – those of the Promised Land and the Chosen People – as unsound and pernicious
to the formation of national identity. As is typical in a postmodern novel, the responsibility
for identifying and interpreting the function of the doppelgängers and the Biblical narrative
is placed with the reader.
3.1. The Allegory of Cain and Abel
I  start  with  the  allegory  of  Cain  and  Abel  due  to  its  initial  transparency  to  the  reader  –
indeed, the very mention of the protagonist’s crime at the beginning of the novel, fratricide
(Cheever 9), supplies the obvious archetypal metaphor for the unfolding narrative. This
metaphor is a clear example of biblical typological allegory, where any fratricide is
automatically defined as Cain, the embodiment of evil, and his victim as Abel, the epitome
of good. However,  this is  the only unambiguous ploy of the author.  Further in the text in
his  use  of  the  myth  of  Cain  and  Abel,  Cheever  skilfully  clouds  its  straightforward
interpretation by more than once reversing the roles of this supposedly oppositional pair.
Thus, to compromise the opposition, the author portrays the characters of Farragut and his
brother as a pair of doppelgängers. The ultimate result of this technique is that the two
would-be opposing personalities – those of an innocent brother and his killer – converge
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into a single psyche that is unable to bear its own contradictions and resolves this conflict
by an allegorical suicide. Thereby the ambiguously rendered allegory of Cain and Abel
turns typology into a psychomachia, i.e., the psychological struggle of the protagonist
within himself in order to understand the world and justify his place and his actions in it.
The development of this allegory in the novel serves as an introduction into an even more
ambiguous labyrinth of the generically aimless wanderings of the narrative’s numerous
characters, which I will analyse in the next section as the allegory of the Jewish
Wanderings.
Before developing my argument I will provide a definition of doppelgänger. Craig
White defines this term as a widespread “literary archetype of a character who meets his or
her apparent double, with plot developments following,” noting that doppelgänger is
sometimes referred to as the “evil twin,” and citing Edgar Allan Poe’s 1839 Romantic short
story  “William  Wilson”  as  one  of  the  famous  examples  of  such  character  splits  (White
online). The rather uncommon variation of doppelgänger in Poe’s story represents the evil
twin as the protagonist and the double as his better part, the hero’s suppressed conscience,
with the only difference from the first self that of a whispering voice (Poe 277-283; Miller
155).  Such  reversal  is  also  employed  and  raised  onto  a  higher  level  by  Cheever,  who
obscures both the protagonist and his victim so that it becomes impossible to separate the
two into a worse and better half, which also points to the allegorical nature of the struggle
that ends in partial self-destruction.
The conflict between the rivalling parts of the self, brought into prominence by the
Romantics (Miller 155, 166), logically relates the notion of the doppelgänger to
psychomachia. For example, Fletcher, who considers doppelgänger plots a subset of
“[s]ymmetrical plot structures,” states that the latter “abound throughout literature
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wherever struggles of any radical kind occur” (184), into which he, as I infer, apparently
includes psychomachia, which, as a battle within the soul, is an archetype of such struggle.
Firmly oriented towards exegesis by the German Romantics, antithetically divided
doppelgängers “[...] allow for the simultaneous unfolding of more than one plot of similar
form, and this has an inevitable allegorical effect” (Fletcher 185). This means that readers
can consider multiple homogeneous plots with double characters as signs of underlying
allegorical meanings. This technique, engendered in Romanticism, is skilfully used by
Cheever  to  create  a  religious  allegory  in  the  form  of  a  psychomachia,  where  the
protagonist’s double is employed to reify his inner conflict.
To achieve this purpose, throughout the narrative Cheever makes the seemingly
straightforward  allegory  of  Cain  and  Abel  ambiguous  in  several  ways.  Farragut’s  crime,
fratricide, is mentioned on the very first page of the novel (Cheever 9), which immediately
labels him as Cain, which, in turn, automatically accords his brother the role of Abel. Thus,
within the typological allegory, the protagonist represents the archetypal evil, while his
brother by extension should be the embodiment of the archetypal good. This assumption
continues to be valid for almost forty pages – nearly a third of the novel’s length – and is
seemingly reinforced when the reader learns the victim’s first name, Eben (Cheever 39).
This shortened version of Ebenezer suggests support to the most obvious interpretation
both  due  to  its  phonetic  similarity  with  the  name  Abel  and  to  the  meaning  of  the  name
Ebenezer in the Hebrew Bible. In Hebrew ’eben means “stone” and ‘ezer “help”
(Carpenter and Comfort 181). Ebenezer is the name of the stone set and named by the
prophet Samuel to honour one of the Jewish victories over the Philistines, the archenemies
of  the  ancient  Jews  (Carpenter  and  Comfort  181;  Strawn et  al.  373).  Thus,  this  “stone  of
help” symbolizes the mutual commitment of God and his Chosen People (Carpenter and
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Comfort 181). The symbolic meaning of a stone is further developed in the New
Testament, where it is used
to  assure  Christians  that  Jesus  Christ  is  the  stone  rejected  by  men  which  has
become the chief cornerstone of his people (Mark 12:1-11; Acts 4:11; I Pet. 2:4-
8).  Christ  is  the  New  Testament  “Ebenezer,”  or  “stone  of  help”.  He  is  the
cornerstone ([…] I Pet.  2:6;  Isa 28:16) who makes us “living stones” along with
Him  as  He  builds  the  new  living  Temple  of  God  (I  Pet.  2:4-8).  Paul  recognized
Christ as the spiritual rock that the faithful Israelites and Christians drink from for
their new life (I Cor. 10:4). (Carpenter and Comfort 181)
Thus, based on his name’s meaning and religious significance, not only can Eben be
interpreted as an epitome of goodness impersonated in Abel and easily generalized into a
model Christian, but even be perceived as the rejected Jesus himself.
However, this interpretation becomes problematic even before the reader learns the
victim’s name, which is given immediately after the description of Eben’s attempt to kill
his brother by luring him to swim in a place full of sharks during the dangerous turn of the
tide (Cheever 39). Shortly after the name is revealed the novel presents a description of
another murder attempt, where Eben pushes the hero out of the window onto an iron fence
“cast to look like spears” (Cheever 41). Thus, Farragut’s fratricide is preceded by his
brother’s  two  attempts  at  the  same,  so  that  the  dead  brother  does  not  fit  the  image  of  a
meek Abel or a peace-loving Christ any longer either. More than that, with the obvious
reference to the spear, which plays a part in the death of Jesus, who was pierced by a
Roman guard after the crucifixion, Eben’s role is reversed to that of a pagan worshipper
who rejects and kills the true God. In contrast, Farragut never confronts his brother with
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the attempted murders, thus possibly exhibiting the Christian trait of forgiveness. However,
throughout the novel the protagonist does not suit the image of Abel or Christ or a good
Christian either because of his crime and the lack of repentance, which is deferred to the
very end of the story. Only then, in addition to the escape as a religious reward for having
learned to love (Johnson 161-162), the author drops another strong clue of the spiritual
improvement of the protagonist, which causes one more role reversal: “[…] trying to judge
what  his  weight  would  be  in  stones,  he  put  a  man’s  weight  into  the  shroud  so  that  they
would feed stones to the fire” (Cheever 150). When Farragut places large stones in his
burial sack, he thereby at the close of the narrative allegorically assumes the positive role
of the doppelgänger pair due to the above-mentioned Christian symbolic meaning of a
stone.
My interpretation of the protagonist as a Christ-like figure at the end of the narrative
is supported by Johnson, who points out two more arguments in its favour, namely, the
razor wounds sustained by Farragut as he cuts his way out of Chicken Number Two’s
shroud and the simultaneous allegorical resurrection from the dead (160). Interpreting both
the lacerations and the resurrection as self-evidently positive, Johnson compares the hero’s
wounds to Christ’s stigmata and the wounds of Jacob, who, struggling with an angel,  has
won God’s blessing (160). Jacob’s blessing corresponds to Farragut’s ultimate gift of
escape both from prison and symbolic death (Johnson 160). However, this reasoning is
valid but not comprehensive because the same details within the frame of the allegory of
Cain and Abel can be interpreted negatively. Thus, both the escape and the wounds
received by the convicted fratricide easily correspond to God’s punishment of Cain by
cursing him, which amounts to marking him as a murderer doomed to becoming “[a]
fugitive and a vagabond” (Gen. 4:11-12), i.e., an eternal wanderer. This interpretation is
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supported by the events immediately following the escape, which portray Farragut exactly
as a wanderer (Cheever 150-153), the theme that will be developed in the next section.
This ultimate role reversal between Cain and Abel occurs after the escape and, therefore,
compromises the optimistic analysis by Johnson and urges the reader to look for other
interpretive possibilities.
Going back to Eben, his earlier-mentioned ambiguity as a positive character and a
‘perfect victim’ draws particular attention to his full name and triggers a closer
examination of the biblical events related to it, thus serving as a pointer to the underlying
allegorical framework of the novel. Ebenezer, the above-mentioned eponymous stone,
commemorated a Jewish victory over the Philistines, one of the tribes which claimed the
Land  of  Canaan  for  their  own  (“Philistine”  online).  This  sets  the  scene  in  the  Promised
Land and is an obvious allegorical reference to the history of the United States, where the
Philistines represent either a rival group of colonizers or the indigenous peoples. Crucially,
by resorting to Hebrew biblical imagery, Cheever triggers in the readers’ minds the
awakening of the whole vast context of the Old Testament. The latter, so well-known to the
white English population for hundreds of years that it allowed Bunyan to use its imagery as
a framework metaphor for The Pilgrim’s Progress (Knott 445-446; see also section 2.3.3),
has also been used as a scaffolding for the rhetoric of American exceptionalism (Hughes
20-29; Newcomb 51-56). Establishing this context as an allegorical background for the
novel, the author employs the intrinsic property of allegory that Petrolle calls
“expansiveness,” which can stretch in both spatial and temporal dimensions (Petrolle 118).
This  property  allows  Cheever  to  critically  examine  the  dominant  and  therefore  not  much
consciously thought of Old Testament rhetoric of the American society (Hughes 20-29, 43-
44; d’Errico xxii-xxiii). Namely, this intended background focuses the reader’s attention on
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the history of American colonization, which is seen not as an honourable endeavour but as
a lengthy military conflict in which Christianity was used in order to justify the occupation.
This, in turn, leads to the ethical re-examination of the notions of the Chosen People and
the  Promised  Land as  they  have  been  and  often  still  are  understood  in  the  United  States.
This covert redirection of readers’ attention from the superficially clear typological
allegory of Cain and Abel to the critical revaluation of the Old Testament rhetoric widely
used in the USA identity building will be examined in the next section in the analysis of
Cheever’s use of the allegory of the Jewish Wanderings.
As I have demonstrated in the theoretical analysis of allegory as a literary device, one
allegorical level of interpretation does not preclude the viability of another layer.
Therefore, alongside with the above-mentioned Old Testament allegory that is to be
examined later, the narrative line of Cain and Abel is still viable and continues to urge the
reader to locate differences between the protagonist and his brother, which is problematic.
To begin with, due to Eben’s attempted fratricides, both brothers are portrayed
simultaneously as each other’s killer and victim, which supports the argument about their
doppelgänger relationship. Other consistently amassing similarities further ensconce them
as doubles. Thus, the brothers share the same colonizer heritage (Cheever 47), both belong
to the upper class (Cheever 44-45), and look almost identical: “[…] they looked enough
like one another to be taken for twins” (Cheever 141). While Farragut is a college
professor and his brother a business executive, they are both wealthy: the hero, in his own
words, is “a taxpayer in the fifty percent bracket” (Cheever 55), and his brother is a charity
fund executive (Cheever 141) whose wife can afford enough expensive clothes to “rent
space in a warehouse” (Cheever 142). They both lead the same kind of meaningless life
where cocktail and dinner parties provide a monotonous background for similar marital
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problems. For example, Marcia’s furious frustration with her marriage, her one-time actual
‘abdication’ (Cheever 58) and ready dismissal of her husband after his imprisonment
(Cheever 16, 24) are paralleled by similar feelings of Eben’s wife, who begins to long for
divorce almost before her marriage, during which she routinely threatens to leave her
husband but, instead, drowns her frustration in tears (Cheever 142).
As a point of possible difference,  their  attitude to and relation with children are not
quite the same. Thus, the lives of Eben’s children, whose relationship with their father is
virtually non-existent, are tragic: his son is in prison for participating in a peace
demonstration and his daughter, crippled after three unsuccessful suicide attempts, is
determined to commit another one (Cheever 141-142). In contrast, Farragut seems to have
a good relationship with his son, of which the single-line letter Peter sends to his father in
jail  –  “I  love  you”  –  is  a  clear  proof  (Cheever  91).  However,  the  boy  is  probably  in  his
early teens16 and the potential problems may have not manifested themselves yet. If they
do, the protagonist’s probable reaction is likely to resemble his shunning of Eben’s
daughter. Indeed, the hero rejects his niece as easily as her father does: he tries to forget
both  her  passion  for  self-murder  and  her  two  letters  addressed  to  him  personally  and
explaining her reasons (Cheever 141-142). As a result, instead of forcing the protagonist to
open his eyes and see his country as the younger generation does, the letters bring him
even closer to his brother: they “had inspired in Farragut a love for the blessed paradigm,
the beauty of the establishment, the glory of organized society. Rachel [Eben’s daughter]
was an aberration and Farragut would sweep her under the rug as her father seemed to have
done” (Cheever 142).
16 Although there is no direct reference to Peter’s age in the novel, I base my evaluation on his being a
schoolchild old enough to attend a summer camp (Cheever 90).
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The brothers’ ways of escaping reality are also quite similar: both are addicted, Eben
to alcohol and Farragut to heroin (Cheever 36, 144), the only difference being the degree of
acceptance by society: while drinking is sanctioned, heroin is outlawed. However, even
this fuzzy boundary is further blurred when the reader learns that the protagonist was
introduced to addictive chemical substances by the state in his army years during World
War  II,  where  drug  stimulants  were  routinely  combined  with  alcohol  to  dull  the  soldiers’
minds:
The company medic had ordered gallons of a sticky yellow cough syrup and every
morning the ‘in’ group drank a glass of this and went into combat, drugged and at
peace with suffocation, suppuration and murder. This was followed by
Benzedrine, and Benzedrine and his beer ration got him through the war and back
to his own shores, his own home and wife. He went guiltlessly from Benzedrine to
heroin […]. (Cheever 36)
Thus, the coercive roots of the protagonist’s addiction, with its purpose of making him a
pliable  instrument of the warring state, somewhat alleviate his own fault as an addict and
thereby bring him on a par with his brother, whose excessive consumption of alcohol
allows him to forget his marital problems (Cheever 142-144). Actually, as an addict, Eben
is much less attractive because he manages to dull his perception of the warped world of
his daily existence, while Farragut, in spite of heroin, is still able to feel the deep
inadequacy of both his and his brother’s reality.
Despite the acute perception of this inadequacy at the level of feelings, for the
most of the novel the hero is too weak to confront it in himself and act to improve his life
by way of seeking true spirituality he seems to be longing for. Indeed, considering all the
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similarities between the brothers, Farragut’s words spoken to Eben almost immediately
before his murder sound truly hypocritical:
I don’t want to be your brother. I don’t want anyone on the street, anywhere in the
world, to say that I look like you. I’ll be any kind of freak or addict before I’ll be
mistaken for you. I’ll do anything before I’ll kiss a rug. (Cheever 144)
This hypocrisy looms particularly large when considered together with the immediately
preceding context that mentions the rug, namely, the already discussed metaphorical
‘sweeping under the rug’ that both Farragut and Eben employ to discard Rachel, the uncle
calling her an “aberration” (Cheever 142) and the father lightly downgrading his
daughter’s suicide attempts to “merely the nature of life” (Cheever 140). Thus, the family
heirloom both brothers “had learned to crawl on” (Cheever 142) becomes an allegorical
binding space they share irrespective of what they wish to be or seem, with Farragut only
marginally better in his refusal to kiss the rug, which Eben does willingly (Cheever 144).
Still, this bond is so unbearable to the hero that he finally – and irrevocably – breaks
it by fratricide. Thus, Farragut’s ultimate symbolic denial of his heritage and lifestyle,
which Eben fully embraces, culminates in his act of killing his brother and becomes an
allegorical representation of his inner conflict that marks a starting point of the novel’s
psychomachia. Murdering Eben, or, metaphorically, committing a psychological suicide is
a sign of a non-functional psyche trying to abscond one last time by killing the part of itself
that it refuses to accept or even acknowledge, not to mention confront. Eben, being his
brother’s doppelgänger, unwittingly provides Farragut with a mirror he is unable to ignore
any longer in spite of the addiction that prior to the murder used to help to dull his
perception.  Thus,  on  the  day  of  the  crime,  Eben  first  unknowingly  provokes  a  couple  of
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unsuccessful attempts to avoid seeing their essential sameness: “Farragut did not like to
look at his brother and he kept his eyes on the floor […] On the drive home Farragut sat as
far from his brother as possible” (Cheever 141). Nonetheless, this avoidance of eye contact
and physical proximity does not prevent the hero from finally confronting his brother’s –
and his own – lifestyle, which ends with the allegorical fratricide (Cheever 144).
As I have shown, in spite of the protagonist’s denial of Eben as his doppelgänger, the
brothers are similar enough to be reinterpreted not as the Old Testament typological Cain
and Abel, i.e., as diametrically opposite blood brothers, but as generic characters. Living
together and belonging to the same nation and sharing the same faith, which in the context
of the novel is Anglicanism (Cheever 56-57), they represent the spiritual brotherhood of
Christians, who should treat each other as if they were brothers and sisters. However, the
ambiguity of the allegory of Cain and Abel directs the reader towards the opposite, that is,
a society where even blood brothers cannot live according to the non-violent teachings of
Christ. Thus, here the function of this allegory is to expose the generic nature of violence
in the nation which considers itself Christian (Hughes 1-2) and whose God is called the
“Prince of Peace” (Hughes 45).  This,  in turn,  raises the question of what it  means to be a
good Christian in the USA, making the whole concept of American Christianity
ambiguous, which I will discuss in the next section.
To further expose the ambiguity of Farragut as representing Cain and to support the
interpretations recounted above, it is necessary to analyse his first name, Ezekiel, which is
revealed as late as page 56. It is of Hebrew origin and means “God is strong” (de Jonge 5).
Ezekiel was a Jewish prophet who in 597 BCE fallowed his people into Babylonian
captivity after the second conquest of Jerusalem (Carpenter and Comfort 91; Levin 184).
There he wrote his apocalyptic prophecies (de Jonge 2). The God of Israel charged the
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prophet with the task of being a “spiritual watchman” of his people (Carpenter and
Comfort  204).   He  was  to  warn  both  the  good and  the  wicked  of  the  consequences  their
forsaking of God would cause (Carpenter and Comfort 204). Ezekiel was personally
responsible for performing his duties:
If he did not faithfully warn others as God had charged him to do, they would die
in their sin. The watchman would then be responsible for a grave sin of omission
and rebellion against the word of the Lord and their deaths would be charged to
him […] He would be guilty of their failures (Ezek. 33:2-6). When Israel’s
watchmen were blind, the nation itself suffered (Isa. 56:10). (Carpenter and
Comfort 204)
The use of this name evokes the biblical narrative, which triggers the palimpsest effect of
the emerging metatext, where Farragut is marked as a contemporary prophet. His
occupation, college professor, which was criticized for the lack of realistic detail (Towers
152), bears the same task: purposefully schematically drawn and, therefore, similar to
Propp’s function (see section 2.3.3), this aspect of the main character is a personified
generic trait of a prophet, who, to be able to perform his duties of being his nation’s
conscience, has to be a literate man, an intellectual, a teacher. Even the state itself sees him
as such: “You are a professor and the education of the young – of all those who seek
learning – is your vocation,” which is an unequivocal characterization given to the hero
during the tribunal on his arrival at Falconer (Cheever 13).
However,  the  same  tribunal  accuses  him  of  violently  avoiding  the  duty  of  his
vocation: “[…] as a professor, distinguished by the responsibilities of intellectual and
moral leadership, you have chosen to commit the heinous crime of fratricide while under
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the influence of dangerous drugs” (Cheever 13). Indeed, the only time the protagonist tries
to perform his prophetic duty is when he, as it seems, for the first time asks Eben why he
leads a spiritless, miserable life without trying to change anything, a question that is at the
same time addressed to himself: “So with his wife sobbing in the kitchen and his poor
daughter crazy and his son in jail, Farragut asked: ‘Eben, why do you live like this?’”
(Cheever 144). In response, his brother kisses the rug on the floor, thus worshipping the
god of money and material possessions, which eventually leads to the fratricide because
the prophet recognizes himself in the sinner. As a matter of fact, Farragut, in the already
recounted episode two pages earlier in the narrative, when confronted with his niece’s
letters, does not kiss the metaphorical rug, but comes quite close to his brother’s act, if only
mentally, by his panegyric to “the blessed paradigm, the beauty of the establishment, the
glory of organized society,” which are to save him from the younger generation and their
aberrant ideas (Cheever 142). In other words, he is essentially as opposed to radical
societal changes as his brother, but in fear of acknowledging this fact. As a result, the
protagonist kills not out of jealousy to his brother, as was the case with Cain, but out of a
self-contradicting fear both to be and not to be like him.
The murder of his doppelgänger exposes the degree of Farragut’s fear of accepting
his prophetic role. Indeed, with the only exception of confronting Eben, not only does the
hero  avoid  asking  awkward  questions  to  his  fellow-citizens,  but  is  unable  to  answer  the
same kinds of questions posed to him by two other characters, Tiny the warden and
Chicken Number Two, a cellblock companion: “Farragut, Farragut, […] why is you an
addict?” (Cheever 43) and “Why did you kill your brother, Zeke?” (Cheever 139). At this
moment these two characters assume the denied prophetic duties by asking Ezekiel
Farragut the questions reflecting the depth of the denial of his supposed calling.
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Importantly, these identity-exposing questions are placed near the beginning and at the
very end of the novel respectively, thereby framing the narrative and suggesting that the
reader look for the answers in the whole text, with no direct ones to be found. However, a
plausible interpretation is discernable if Farragut’s deed is viewed as the climax of a
psychomachia, namely, as the rejection of his prophetic identity.
My interpretation of Farragut as violently rejecting his prophetic duty considerably
differs from Johnson’s, who argues that, as a result of the hero’s taking responsibility for
fratricide, at the end of the narrative he is finally able to embrace fraternity, which is
rewarded with his miraculous escape (159). However, there are two problems with this
analysis. First, as already pointed out in the introduction, Farragut easily embraces
fraternity on a personal level after only two weeks of imprisonment (Cheever 27), which
challenges  the  amount  of  moral  growth  attributed  to  him  by  Johnson  at  the  end  of  the
narrative. Second, the hero’s rejection of his prophetic role logically entails his rejection of
fraternity on a societal level. Therefore, Johnson’s interpretation holds on a personal level
but cannot account for the hero when viewed as a part of society. My interpretation,
however, can provide such an account in the form of a psychological inner struggle. Thus,
on the one hand, as has been shown before, the protagonist is afraid of being likened to his
brother. On the other hand, he is incapable of voicing the reasons for this fear or living up
to the aspiration to be actually different, not to mention showing others their inadequacy.
The resulting inner conflict explains the degree of violence to Eben, who, perceiving
himself as quite similar to brother Zeke, rightfully dismisses the latter’s half-hearted
attempt to question his life (Cheever 144). Allegorically, it is not merely brothers, nor even
the schematic Cain and Abel any longer, but the two sides of Farragut’s conflicting identity
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which begin to resolve their inner struggle with one eliminating the other at the very
beginning of the story.
Exploring the conflict of the psyche further shows that spiritually Farragut is not
exactly his brother’s twin, which becomes clear after the examination of the ‘sins’ both
commit. According to the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, prophet Ezekiel accused
his people mostly of “[i]dolatry, unbelief, and formalism in religion” (McComb, ERE
X:7332). Although, similarly to his brother, the protagonist is guilty of all these, there is an
important difference in the identity of the ‘idol:’ in Eben’s and most of the other characters’
case it is obviously money, whereas Farragut replaces God with drugs:
Yesterday  was  the  age  of  anxiety,  the  age  of  the  fish,  and  today,  his  day,  his
morning, was the mysterious and adventurous age of the needle. His generation
was the generation of addiction. It was his school, his college, the flag under
which he marched into battle. The declaration of addiction was in every paper,
magazine and air-born voice. Addiction was the law of the prophets. (Cheever 36)
The unambiguously religious reference of the last sentence of this quote exposes Farragut
with his heroin addiction as a false prophet. Indeed, instead of warning and helping those
around  him  to  lead  a  spiritually  rightful  life,  he,  as  in  his  war  days,  prefers  to  join  their
ranks by drugging himself into the state of indifference toward both physical and mental
suffering (Cheever 36). It is by doing this that the protagonist refuses to assume his
prophetic  role.  Thereby,  he  is  more  guilty  than  his  brother,  who  is  an  ordinary  hypocrite
and sincere in his hypocrisy. Farragut, instead, defies God in that, being part of the
intellectual elite, he refuses to watch over and lead his nation. The latter, due to the
watchman’s irresponsibility, turns into “the living dead” (Cheever 26), “the next thing to
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dead” (Cheever 69), “worse than dead” (Cheever 118), or “[t]he dying” (Cheever 140), as
the hero, oblivious of his own complicity in the matter, repeatedly perceives or shares the
perceptions of his fellow-convicts and fellow-citizens but fails to read these allegorical
signs and, consequently, to grasp the reason for his own incarceration.
Within the frame of the allegory of Cain and Abel, this refusal leads to the personal
self-destruction of the hero both at the literal level, through the imprisonment for the crime
of fratricide, which he is certain will end with his death (Cheever 10), and at the allegorical
one, via his metaphorical suicide by killing his doppelgänger. Another, also pessimistic
interpretation of the consequences for the protagonist marked as Cain by the final role
reversal is God’s verdict of the eternal wanderings. The latter illustrates Cheever’s use of
typology  as  palimpsest  particularly  well:  although  the  typological  allegory  of  Cain  and
Abel has been deconstructed and the protagonist’s role as Cain substantially blurred, the
final role reversal reinstates the typological image without its disambiguation but now
foregrounding its prophetic force (as stated earlier, typological allegory is a subgroup of
prophetic and situational allegory; MacQueen 23; see also section 2.3.2). Thus, at the end
of the narrative, the protagonist is seen as an ambiguous Cain who is unambiguously
doomed to eternal wanderings.
The Farragut/Eben doppelgänger pair continues the American Romantic tradition
exemplified in the already mentioned “William Wilson” by Poe, but with several
postmodern developments. To remind, the eponymous hero of Poe’s story meets and, filled
with  fear,  is  chased  by  his  double  during  his  school  years  and  beyond,  with  the  latter
constantly interfering with Wilson’s heinous plans, which leads to the culmination of their
final  encounter  as  adults,  when the  protagonist  stabs  his  ‘twin’  only  to  realize  that,  when
trying to escape, he has murdered himself (Poe 277-292). This rather uncommon variation
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of a doppelgänger represents the ‘evil twin’ as the protagonist and the double as his better
part, his suppressed conscience, with the only differences from his master being a
whispering voice (Poe 282; Miller 155) and a lack of fear of his double. According to
Miller, the doppelgänger in general and Poe’s story in particular epitomize an outcast’s
desire to escape, which is his or her only fate (154). As exemplified in the ending of
“William Wilson,” this fate is understood by the Romantics as inevitably tragic, denying
the desire “to depart, yet live,” voiced in another of Poe’s escape stories17 (qtd. in Miller
163). In other words, because such inner struggle is both unavoidable and self-destructive,
the outcome of the ensuing inner conflict is predetermined as pessimistic, unless one
understands that the binary division of human nature into doubles should be transcended
by accepting both warring parts as a unity (Miller 163, 166).
Setting the author apart from the Romantics, Cheever’s acceptance of this unity is
intrinsic to his employment of the doppelgänger device, which is often operative when he
writes about brothers. Thus, Crowley states that it is common that “[…] Cheever portrays
brothers, in allegorical conflict, whose apparent differences are shown to conceal
underlying affinities: the dark Puritanical brother (in, say, “Goodbye, My Brother”) proves
to be the doppelgänger of the light-seeking narrator” (Crowley 271; emphasis original).
The Farragut pair falls comfortably into this division, with the hero representing the
propensity for the light and Eben, I must qualify, being not the dark, but the conceited
Puritanical brother. However, unlike Poe’s story, where the doppelgängers are
unambiguously antithetical, with a clear-cut distribution of good and evil between the two,
Cheever’s novel contrives doubles that do not fit the stereotypical doppelgänger model. A
series of reversals outlined earlier considerably adds to the task of reader responsibility by
17 “The Unparalleled Adventure of One Hans Pfaall,” published in 1835 (Miller 163).
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making it impossible to conclude with certainty who of the two brothers is ‘the evil twin.’
In addition to this, unlike “William Wilson,” Falconer does not end but starts with a (self)-
murder. Thus, what constitutes the final culmination of the former narrative is merely the
starting  point  of  the  latter,  which  excludes  the  antagonism  of  the  doubles  per  se  as  the
focus of the narrative. This provides readers with both a hint and an impetus to search for a
deeper meaning of what the final encounter of this atypical doppelgänger couple
represents, namely, a partially ‘posthumous’ psychomachia of the protagonist. Thus, the
tragic fate of an escapee as experienced by the Romantics (Miller 163) is transformed into
an effective if unwilling postmodern self-search, which, although impossible unless some
part of the protagonist’s psyche is sacrificed, nevertheless culminates in the ultimate escape
of the hero, at least from physical incarceration. Typical of postmodernism, the
discernment of all the subtleties of the doppelgänger as used in Falconer, including the
ambiguity of the hero’s escape, is fully left to the readers’ will and skill.
This postmodern ambiguity of the escape also links Cheever to the American
Romantic tradition. Representing the hero as rejecting his prophetic duty and failing to
recognize or acknowledge his complicity in the nation’s incarceration, the author continues
the development of the transcendental sceptical allegory represented by Hawthorne and
Melville, who stripped the trope of its benign character (Madsen, “American Allegory”
239). Farragut, by remaining blind to his failure at the societal level, also compromises the
possibility of benign imagination within the reality of the narrative. His position is the
reverse  of  that  of  Hawthorne’s  Chillingworth  of The Scarlet Letter. Whereas the latter
possesses enough poetic imagination to read allegorical signs and evilly manipulate his
environment (Madsen, “American Allegory” 239), the former deliberately blocks his
imagination from reading the signs of his complicity in the state of his nation and, worse,
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from considering his participation in its improvement. This malevolent aspect of allegory
in Falconer encourages a sceptical allegorical reading of the protagonist’s escape, which I
consider only partially successful, i.e., achieved at the personal but not communal level.
Therefore, the outcome of the psychomachia, which transcends the novel’s boundaries,
also gravitates toward a sceptical interpretation rather than the optimistic one proposed by
Johnson. This unpeaceful coexistence of two nearly opposite interpretations within one
novel resembles that of Eliot’s mutually contradicting plots in Daniel Deronda (see section
2.4.1). However, both the multivalent character of allegory and the ultimate
inconclusiveness of the search for meaning in postmodernism enable such parallel
allegoresis, where the personal success of approaching Christ by learning “to love the
unworthy” (Johnson 156) can be considered the first step towards mastering the next level,
that of accepting social responsibility.
To conclude this section, the initially unambiguous typological allegory of Cain and
Abel is used in Falconer for three primary goals. First, its negation, resulting in gradually
expanding ambiguity, is employed to focus the reader on the hero’s psychomachia, which
begins  with  the  allegorical  suicide  and  unfolds  throughout  the  narrative.  Second,  it  is  a
means  of  communicating  the  broader  message  of  the  novel  by  introducing  the  Old
Testament as a frame of reference in the critical allegorical representation of the
contemporary USA society. Third, the final role reversal back to Cain, representing the
protagonist as an eternal wanderer due to God’s punishment, enhances the simultaneously
developed allegory of the Jewish Wanderings as essentially pessimistic. As a result, instead
of concentrating on the literal context of secular punishment for a stereotypical and,
therefore, nearly meaningless crime, the reader is continuously led to compare the traits
and acts of several biblical personas with those of the novel’s characters. This creates a
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palimpsest link between the events in Ancient Israel and in the history of the USA and,
thereby, accords a new meaning to the latter, particularly regarding the notions of the
Promised  Land  and  the  Chosen  People.  These  two  are  explored  with  the  help  of  the
allegory of the Jewish Wanderings, which I will analyse next.
3.2. The Allegory of the Jewish Wanderings
In the previous section I have already discussed the allegory of the Jewish Wanderings
when examining the meaning of the protagonist’s first name, Ezekiel, and his brother’s,
Ebenezer. To recapitulate, through the hero’s association with the prophet Ezekiel and his
brother’s with the setting of the eponymous stone to commemorate a Jewish victory over
the Philistines, the narrative is given another allegorical plane, that of the biblical saga of
ancient Jews, the Chosen People of the jealous God of Israel, and their occupation of
Canaan, their Promised Land. The biblical narrative describing this period is used as a
palimpsest and provides the novel with a coherent structure. The mechanism and impact of
this strategy are similar to those of Johnson’s allegorical reading of Falconer as a narrative
of salvation through the acceptance of responsibility, which affords the novel a clear
structure and explains the improbable escape of the hero as intentionally allegorical,
symbolizing his reward for moral growth (Johnson 154-155; see also Introduction).
Similarly, by scattering throughout the narrative seemingly obscure references to the Old
Testament, Cheever gradually creates an articulate meta-dialogue between the biblical
events, the rhetoric of American exceptionalism, and the spiritual impasse of the
contemporary America, although, as a gained Promised Land, it is supposed to thrive in
every respect. Within the frame of the allegory of the Jewish Wanderings the author creates
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this discourse by scrutinizing two familiar biblical types, the typological allegories of the
Promised Land and the Chosen People, and gradually negating them to the point where
their rigid tribal character becomes exposed as pernicious to American national identity.
Due to the postmodern character of the novel, all the allegorical references are subtle and
provided with no authorial commentary, which, for the most part, leaves the discernment of
the structure and message of the narrative – the palimpsest use of parts of the Old
Testament as a scaffolding for the critique of the foundation of the national identity of the
United States – to reader responsibility.
Before  starting  the  discussion,  I  will  outline  the  logic  and  the  progression  of  this
section.  The  former  is  defined,  first,  by  the  complexity  of  the  employed  palimpsest
allegory, which involves referencing both other texts and historical events to highlight the
functioning of this trope. Second, the logic is governed by the necessity to translate the
complex, essentially non-linear multi-source and multilayered allegory of a postmodern
novel into an accessible linear structure of expository writing. I have attempted to
overcome both these difficulties by presenting a detailed and coherent account of my
interpretation of both Cheever’s narrative and the pertinent parts of biblical and, when
necessary, other related religious discourse. Due to reader responsibility, the resulting
linear succession of the discussed elements is by necessity personal and, therefore,
arbitrary, representing my own constructed constellation of images (Tambling 121) guiding
me through the process of allegoresis.
The resulting progression will start with the explanation of the terms intertextuality
and palimpsest. Then I will discuss the American typological versions of the myths of the
Promised Land and the Chosen People, inseparable from the biblical narrative of the
Jewish Wanderings, as restrictively tribal. This will be followed by a discussion of the
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allegory of the Jewish Wanderings as an exploration of suffering in the contemporary USA
by  way  of  deconstructing  these  tribal  typologies.  To  a  large  extent,  this  aim  will  be
achieved  by  analyzing  the  palimpsest  contribution  of  the  Book of  Numbers  to  Cheever’s
narrative, which highlights the consequences of the deliberate truncation of Christianity in
the  USA,  ultimately  leading  to  the  spiritual  death  of  the  nation.  Next  I  will  support  my
interpretation by a detailed discussion of the numerous wanderings in Falconer as  the
Jewish Wanderings representing a generic regressive movement of all Americans, who are
confined to eternal wandering within a country which their fixation on tribal typology has
turned  into  an  allegorical  prison.  To  support  this  reading,  I  will  resort  to  the  popular
typological  allegory  of  America  as  the  City  on  a  Hill,  which  strongly  contributes  to
creating the palimpsest allegory of the novel. This contribution is achieved by negating the
optimistic rhetoric of this metaphor by highlighting such organization principles of the
prison-state of Falconer as segregation, hypocrisy, and violence. I will conclude with the
exploration of the cause-and-effect connection between violence, agency, and
incarceration, and outline the solution suggested by Cheever for overcoming the generic
suffering portrayed in his novel as pervasive in the contemporary United States.
To begin the discussion, I will clarify the method employed in creating this
allegorical metatext by defining the terms intertextuality and palimpsest. Petrolle considers
intertextuality one of the rhetorical strategies used by allegory since antiquity (7). Cuddon
defines this notion as follows:
[Intertextuality is a] term coined by Julia Kristeva in 1966 to denote the
interdependence of literary texts […] with all those that have gone before [them].
[…] intertextuality denotes a transposition of one or several sign systems into
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another or others […] so that meanings in one kind of discourse are overlaid with
meanings from another kind of discourse. (424)
Kristeva, who was writing on Bakhtin at the time, due to his ideas on language as an
organizing and reproducing mechanism of a class-structured society, allotted intertextuality
a strong sociopolitical dimension, which was subsequently lost in formalist interpretations
(Haberer 57). Throughout postmodernism intertextuality has developed into a controversial
notion with no single accepted definition (Haberer 57). However, it is possible to tease out
the following two main features of intertextuality:  first,  regarding any text as a mosaic of
previous texts that simultaneously alters their meaning, with the resulting intertext
perceived synchronically (Haberer 58, 63); and, second, reader responsibility in creating
meaning with the ultimate elusiveness of the latter (Haberer 58), triggering the effect of
loss – “of meaning, of control and identity” (Haberer 66). This effect is caused by the
sublime nature of intertextuality because, according to Haberer, “[i]t brings no light nor
any knowledge, but takes us to the edge of something obscure and incomprehensible” (66).
Thus, intertextuality has developed as a means of asking questions rather than answering
them (Haberer 61), and is characterized by the typically postmodern sense of loss rooted in
the indeterminacy of knowing (Haberer 66). However, this device can help human
inquiries into the nature of relationships between “man, language, and the real” (Haberer
61), thereby sharing its ontological and epistemological focus on “the true and the real”
with constructive-postmodern religious allegory (Petrolle 19).
Palimpsest, a notion closely related to intertextuality, is historically defined in the
Oxford English Dictionary as  follows:  “[a]  parchment  or  other  writing  surface  on  which
the  original  text  has  been  effaced  or  partially  erased,  and  then  overwritten  by  another;  a
manuscript in which later writing has been superimposed on earlier (effaced) writing”
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(online ed.). However, the metaphorical use of the term pertaining to literature, widely in
use since the middle of the nineteenth century, is due to the effect unmentioned in the given
definition, i.e., to the subsequent reappearance on the vellum of the traces of the previously
erased text(s), leading to the simultaneous coexistence of both/several narratives on the
same parchment (Dillon 243, 244). Embracing this simultaneity, palimpsest is nowadays
understood in literary and cultural studies as “an involuted phenomenon where otherwise
unrelated texts are involved and entangled, intricately interwoven, interrupting and
inhabiting each other” (Dillon 245). In other words, this complex relationship describes the
resulting interplay between narratives from the present, past, and future, coexisting and
influencing each other. In the subsequent analysis I will argue that Cheever creates his
religious allegory by using parts of the Old Testament as a palimpsest, which connects the
biblical narrative to the historical context of contemporary readers. The goal of this
strategy  is  to  cast  two  formative  religious  myths  of  American  identity  –  those  of  the
Promised Land and the Chosen People – as unsound and pernicious to the formation of the
identity of the nation.
The typological myths of the Promised Land and the Chosen People, or rather, their
most belligerent and blood-thirsty Old Testament versions, are widely considered
formative for the USA identity (Hughes 20-29; Newcomb 51-56). Sanctioned by the
typological rhetoric of American exceptionalism (Madsen, “American Allegory” 238), they
presume that Americans, as Israel of the Old Testament, are God’s Chosen People who are
entitled to the Promised Land of the North American continent, their allegorical Canaan, to
take possession of which they are allowed to decimate the heathen tribes, any atrocity
justified by the ‘holy’ cause (Hughes 23-25, 27-28; Newcomb 51-52). However, this wide-
spread American interpretation of the ideas of the Chosen People and the Promised Land is
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extremely limited. Thus, instead of taking into account the historical development of these
concepts both in the Old and New Testament, which endorse bringing universal peace and
justice to any nation irrespective of its origin, Americans have adopted the restrictively
tribal typological understanding promoted in the Pentateuch18 (Hughes 25-27, 35-36). Such
truncated appropriation, as Hughes points out, “[…] today leads almost inevitably to
behavior  that  is  alien  to  the  universal  purposes  of  the  Christian  gospel  –  to  wars,  […] to
massacres,  to  ethnic  cleansings,  and  to  destruction  of  those  who  are  different  from  the
‘chosen people’” (27), examples of which can be easily found in the United States politics,
twenty first century included (28-29).
It  is  precisely  the  truncated  versions  of  these  two  myths  that  are  consistently  if
covertly challenged in Falconer by constructing a palimpsest meditation on the
consequences of their admittance into the heart of American national identity. This is
achieved by allegorically portraying Americans, who have ostensibly attained their
Promised Land, as universally unhappy eternal wanderers. In contrast to Didion, who has
identified the theme of the pervasive homelessness of Falconer’s characters but stopped at
placing the locus of home in a person’s psyche without a deep exploration of the reasons
behind the unhappiness (139, 140), Cheever examines these reasons by introducing the
allegory  of  the  Jewish  Wanderings  to  portray  the  American  way  of  life  as  an  incessant
spiritless circular motion that drugs human psyche and leads to personal degradation and
unhappiness. Such exploration of the sources of human suffering has been one of the goals
of religious allegory since antiquity (Petrolle 14-15, 43, 94). This perpetuation of focus
allows me to assume a constructive-postmodernist perspective in reading Falconer as  a
18 The Pentateuch is the collective name of the first five books of the Old Testament and the Hebrew Bible
(Hughes 28).
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religious allegory, where Cheever enquires into the suffering and salvation of his nation by
actively engaging himself with extratextual concerns of contemporary America. Due to the
postmodern character of the trope, the specific references that enable the reader to identify
the Jewish Wanderings as a pertinent narrative are introduced quite late in the novel and
are intentionally obscure, which makes them difficult to discern.
The first and most obvious of these references, the allusion to the Philistines of “the
south side” of Canaan occurs as late as the penultimate page of the novel (Cheever 152,
Hackett 202). In this episode, to be analysed in more detail later, a wandering stranger
urges the recently escaped hero to join him in his search for “[…] beautiful places on the
south side, places with views of the river” (Cheever 152). Another, even more obscure
reference is also introduced only toward the end of the narrative. This happens in a tragi-
comic episode where one of the prisoners, the Cuckold, tries to steal his fellow-convict’s
Bible by hiding it between his legs when the naked inmates are being examined for
venereal diseases (Cheever 109, 111). Chicken Number Two, who, as the thief claims, has
never read his Bible, nevertheless takes offence and vehemently accuses the culprit: “I
never heard, I never dreamed of anybody so low that he would steal from a man in prison a
Holy Bible given to him by his loving cousin” (Cheever 111). In his lamentation – “It
stinks […] He stuck my Bible up under his balls. Now it stinks. The Holy Scripture stinks
of  his  balls.  Genesis,  Exodus,  Leviticus,  Deuteronomy  stink”  (Cheever  111)  –  he
enumerates four of the five books of the Pentateuch, collectively also called the Torah
(Levin 17-18). This enumeration simultaneously overtly defames the mentioned parts of
the Old Testament in a separately repeated statement, whereas the fourth book, Numbers, is
conspicuously omitted. According to Fletcher, such omissions are extremely important:
“The silences in allegory mean as much as the filled-in spaces, because by bridging the
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silent gaps between oddly unrelated images we reach the sunken understructure of thought
[...]” (107). In Petrolle’s understanding, such “negative signifying” is close to the technique
of negative theology, which reaches for the unrepresentable by trying to negate it (Petrolle
100). Thus, this particular instance of omission accords the Book of Numbers crucial
importance both due to its exclusion and to the gap formed between Numbers and the rest
of the subtly belittled Pentateuch. This negating opposition triggers a constellation of
images as understood by Benjamin (Tambling 121; see also section 2.4.3), which,
employing palimpsest, invokes a number of concepts central to the omitted Numbers and
translates them into the allegorical message of the novel, which I will examine in detail
next.
The Pentateuch covers the period from the creation of man to the death of Moses and
the end of the Jewish Wanderings after the Egyptian slavery, which brings the Jews to the
border of the Land of Canaan (Blenkinsopp 31-33). The occupation has not taken place
yet, but the Jews already have laws regulating their secular life and religious behaviour as
well as their God’s promise to make their endeavour a success in case they remain faithful
to him (Blenkinsopp 31-33). Stopping short of entering the Promised Land is important for
the development of the novel because thus the corresponding biblical narrative lacks ‘the
happy ending,’ which makes it ambiguous and opens a possibility for different palimpsest
readings of and conclusions to this part of the Torah to the best of the postmodern tradition.
Indeed, unhappy endings for the Chosen People are quite probable, with the biblical
narrative itself providing one: after the events of the Pentateuch and the claiming of the
land, “the Hebrew children slowly lost their dominance and vainly sought to defend
themselves from slavery, death, and destruction” (Hughes 35). Another potential – and
unfulfilled – reading is recorded in the prophetic visions criticizing the warlike nature of
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the Jews and calling for justice and peaceful coexistence: as Hughes puts it, the prophets of
the eighth century BCE
raised serious questions about the viability, even the legitimacy, of waging war.
They argued that neither violent warfare, nor military alliances, nor fortified cities
had the power to save Israel and Judah from their enemies […] that only one path
would save Israel from destruction, and that was the path of economic justice,
especially for the poor who so often were the objects of abuse and exploitation.
(35)
Notably, the father of this peace-propagating vision was the already mentioned prophet
Samuel (see section 3.1), who voiced it at the very birth of the Jewish state and about four
hundred years earlier than the eighth-century prophets (Hughes 33-35). However, his
vision was forgotten in both Ancient Israel and the contemporary United States. In the
novel this is insinuated by foregrounding the fact that the stone Samuel had set to
commemorate one of the occupational victories is remembered and honoured by giving its
name to people, but the prophet himself is not even mentioned.
To further support the importance of the above-mentioned omission of the Book of
Numbers in the enumeration of the Pentateuch, it is useful to analyse the meaning of its
original title. It translates from Hebrew as “in the wilderness [of]” and reflects the
narrative’s content much better than its English counterpart (Ashley 1). This book tells the
story of Israel being counted by its elders before the occupation of Canaan (Ashley 1). In
the process the people show repeated “disbelief and disobedience,” the strongest evidence
of which is their refusal to fight the inhabitants of Canaan: on arrival at the borders of the
land the Israelites are stricken with despair over the number of the enemies they have to
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overcome in order for the promise to be fulfilled, and refuse to attack the Canaanites
(Ashley 1). In punishment God pronounces that “every person over the age of twenty
would wander and die in the wilderness without coming into the possession of Canaan.
They would wander for forty years, until the whole generation was dead […]” (Ashley 1).
The chief reason for Cheever’s late introduction and intentional omission of
Numbers is to make the reader revaluate the whole content of the novel. Indeed, once the
comparison with Moses numbering his people in preparation for the occupation is drawn,
the importance of numbering in Falconer acquires a new meaning. Convicts often referred
to by their prison numbers instead of names, their presentation as an indefinite line of
“chickens” throughout the novel, the new arrivals at the gates of Falconer with the hero
“manacled  to  nine  other  men”  (Cheever  9)  –  all  these  point  at  the  symbolic  rendering  of
Americans as a post-colonial nation who are confined to the Promised Land as if it were a
prison, where they are forced into wanderings indefinite in length and purpose. Thus, the
reader  is  confronted  with  a  promise  which  has  turned  into  a  curse:  “[…] if  we  […] shall
fall to embrace this present world and prosecute our carnal intentions, seeking great things
for  ourselves  and  our  posterity,  the  Lord  will  surely  break  out  in  wrath  against  us  […]”
(Winthrop online 8-9). This is a nightmare scenario foretold by a formative nation-identity
builder, John Winthrop, who warned the first settlers of the Massachusetts Bay against the
moral decline caused by their excessive “lust of wealth and power” (Herbert 29). In
Cheever’s interpretation, God’s wrath at contemporary America is stronger than that
experienced by the Jews of the Torah: while for the latter it resulted in the death of a
generation, for the Americans of Falconer the constant pursuit of wealth at any cost causes
a symbolic spiritual death of the nation with the prospect of utter extinction due to the fact
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that now the younger generation, as exemplified by Eben’s children, is either to die by their
own hand or be imprisoned for not conforming to their parents’ values (Cheever 141-142).
The particularly American fixation on the truncated rhetoric of the Pentateuch is the
key to understanding another theme of Falconer related to Numbers, namely, that of
cleansing. While Numbers underlines the ever-present possibility of regaining spirituality
via  the  cleansing  process  (Ashley  8),  in  the  context  of  the  novel  this  possibility  invites  a
non-optimistic interpretation. Thus, of all the wanderers the only character who
experiences catharsis is Farragut, which is in itself quite little, considering Cheever’s
habitual use of narrative parallelism to emphasize an important point (Morace 507). In
addition to this, despite the reward of the hero’s symbolic escape, his cleansing is not
voluntary, for it is the state that has first plunged him into his drug addiction during his
army years and then cured him from it (Cheever 36, 136). Ironically, the motives of the
state in healing the protagonist are promptly compromised by the mandatory distribution of
cannabis to dull the hero’s newly cured mind yet again when its agility might threaten the
administration during the riot at the Amana prison (Cheever 128-129).
To further emphasize the dubiousness of the result of the cleansing, the protagonist
himself begrudges the authorities the outcome of his methadone treatment:
Farragut’s singular smallness of mind was illustrated by the fact that he resented
that the Department of Correction had been successful where the three blue-
ribbon drug cures he had taken had failed. The Department of Correction could
not be right. He could not congratulate himself on having mastered his addiction,
since he had not been aware of it. (Cheever 136)
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This is where my interpretation of the protagonist’s cleansing radically differs from
Johnson’s, who argues that it is Farragut’s second major achievement that ultimately leads
him to salvation (158-159). However, this state-induced conundrum of cause and effect
both undermines the result of the purgation and raises concerns as to whether it will hold,
with the issue at stake being nothing less than agency. Indeed, as Collins suggests, as if in
protest,  as  soon  as  the  hero  has  the  opportunity,  he  leaves  the  monastic  environment  of
prison  (9)  “to  take  his  rightful  place  in  the  things  as  he  saw  them”  (Cheever  147).  This
vague goal provides no clues whatsoever as to what Farragut’s post-cathartic set of values
is, if it has changed at all. In my interpretation, this implies that he is prone to reject the
results of the forced cleansing because it has completely undermined his agency.
In consequence of this subversion, an important part of the hero’s quest is stalled,
namely, the acceptance of his prophetic duty, which is solely based on executing his
agency. Importantly, the mutually excluding opposition between drugs and duty was
exemplified  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  novel,  where  Farragut’s  refusal  to  follow  his
vocation as a teacher was contrasted with his choice of rather using drugs, which, in turn,
has ultimately led to the fratricide: “[…] as a professor, distinguished by the
responsibilities of intellectual and moral leadership, you have chosen to commit the
heinous crime of fratricide while under the influence of dangerous drugs” (Cheever 13).
Crucial as it was in choosing crime over obligation, agency remains essential for the
opposite choice, too. Therefore, robbing the protagonist of this part of the quest by
administering the methadone treatment surreptitiously orients him toward spiritual
regression.  Consistent  with  this  reading,  the  hero  continues  his  wanderings  after  the
escape, and his answer to the already partially quoted invitation of the stranger sounds both
ambiguous and ominous:
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‘They have some beautiful places on the south side, places with views of the river.
You wouldn't want to share a place with me, would you, if I found something
beautiful?’
‘Maybe,’ said Farragut. (Cheever 152)
This polite rebuttal of the proposal to share the land demonstrates the protagonist’s
reluctance to execute his agency in an important aspect of societal organization, namely,
forming a close-knit community that is obliged to peacefully coexist with its neighbours.
This rejection considerably spoils his prospects of a fulfilled new life at a social level,
generically undermining this possibility even for the WASPish population of the USA.
Importantly, the idea of sharing forms the chief message of the Book of Numbers
(Douglas 39, 41). In the context of the protagonist’s reluctance to share identified at the
end of the narrative, this concept seems to be another reason as to why this particular book
is omitted in the enumeration. In the field of biblical studies the Pentateuch is considered to
be a “corpus ending with the death of Moses impl[ying] the designation of the Mosaic age
as a constitutive and normative narrative to the exclusion of what follows” (Blenkinsopp
51). The overall separatist message of the Torah reflects the political context of the 8th -7th
centuries BCE, when the Jews propagated themselves as the only pure people, with their
God  as  the  only  true  God  to  distance  themselves  from  the  other  inhabitants  of  Canaan
(Douglas 35). While this stand became dominant and later led to the pariah status of the
Ancient  Jews,  Numbers  did  not  support  this  policy  (Douglas  38).  Instead,  it  promoted
sharing and openness, at least with regard to the internal strifes between the rival Jewish
factions (Douglas 39-41). This idea of sharing is excluded from the religious corpus
accepted within the reality of the novel to demonstrate the rigidity and backwardness of the
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Christianity  of  the  United  States.  This  effect  is  achieved  with  the  help  of  the  palimpsest
reconstruction of the omitted narrative of Numbers, which is to be performed by the reader.
The truncated version of the Torah represented in the novel as the canon officially
adopted by the USA is a covert reference to the hypocrisy of what some scholars call
“America's  ‘civil  religion’”  (Bellah  qtd.  in  Hughes  11)  or  “the  ceremonial  and  cultural
establishment of Christianity in the United States” (Hughes 11). The degrading results of
the consistent implementation of this ‘religion’ are exposed with the help of the allegory of
the Jewish Wanderings, with their never-ending longing for the happy, albeit illusory
Promised Land. Instead of finding in it the promised happiness and contentment, the cost
and consequence of its subjugation is that the eternal wanderers of Falconer are confined
to the Valley of Hinnom,19 which seems to be the intended allegorical image behind
Farragut’s vision of his motherland immediately after his escape:
He saw a three-legged washing machine and the husk of a car. His response to this
was deep and intuitive, as if the dump were some reminder of his haunted country.
He deeply inhaled the air of the dump although it was no more than the bitterness
of an extinguished fire. (Cheever 151)
One of the tasks of the animalistic epithets describing the contemporary artefacts
abandoned at this garbage lot as well as the burning smell is to create a tangible link
between the dump of ancient Jerusalem, with its history of child sacrifice practices, its
smell of rot and constant fires, and the contemporary allegorical city, the outskirts of which
19 Valley of Hinnom, or Gehenna, was a place near Jerusalem where idolatrous sacrifices of children took
place and which was used as a dump for both animal carcasses and dead human bodies. To fight the smell
and the danger of infection constant fires were burned there. Valley of Hinnom became a synonym of hell.
(Jenks 54, 172.)
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Farragut roams. As a result, the supposedly optimistic personal escape of the hero is
negated by placing the newly born escapee into the midst of a dump with hellish
connotations.
Another function of the above-quoted description of artificial carcasses, by way of
the earlier established association of the hero with the prophet Ezekiel and the palimpsest
reference to the skeletons of machines, is to evoke the prophet’s vision of the Valley of the
Dry Bones. This palimpsest vision aims at the same pessimistic conclusion of defining the
hero’s escape as rather a punishment than a reward. Thus, in his prophecy Ezekiel
perceives Israel as a vast army of the dead, confronted with God’s renewed promise to
clothe them in flesh and lead into the Promised Land (Ezek. 37-1:14). The iron ‘bones’
perceived by Farragut as one of the first images on his escape turns this promise into a
prophetic threat, avowing another cycle of death in the ever-lasting quest for the un-
attainable. To support this interpretation, there are numerous references sweepingly
portraying the novel’s characters as dead or nearly dead (Cheever 26, 41-42, 69, 118, 140,
152). These comparisons, providing another instance of Cheever’s narrative parallelism,
culminate  in  the  speech  of  the  stranger  that  binds  them  into  a  dispiriting  vision  of
contemporary America:
My landlady is one of those smelly old widows – they’re widows even when they
got a husband drinking beer in the kitchen – one of those smelly old widows who
can’t stand life in any form, fashion or flavor. I’m being evicted because I’m alive
and healthy. (Cheever 152)
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Crucially, this vision, enhanced by the palimpsest allusion to the Valley of the Dry Bones,
assumes  its  full  form  on  the  last  pages  of  the  novel,  thus  further  compromising  the
optimistic narrative of individual escape.
This  allows  to  correct  the  complaint  of  Cheever’s  early  criticism  about  the
improbability of any kind of imaginable future for the protagonist (Towers 152).
Definitely, it is extremely difficult to imagine an optimistic future consistent with the
climax of Farragut’s personal escape. However, within the allegory of the Jewish
Wanderings, a pessimistic future is not only quite apprehensible but also most probable.
Toward the end of the novel it crystallizes into a new typological allegory gradually
constructed by the author, namely, the image of the same ceaseless and aimless meandering
through time and space that is the fate of both the dead and the living of this allegorical
country. Therefore, in view of another inevitable cycle of wanderings in the land described
as  a  dump  and  alluded  to  as  a  death  valley  only  two  pages  earlier  (Cheever  151),  the
novel’s twice repeated concluding exhortation to “rejoice!” sounds truly bitter (153). This
bitterness arises from the prophetic force of the new typological allegory created by the
author to substitute for the negated optimistic rhetoric of American exceptionalism: the
Jewish Wanderings, aimless and ceaseless within the borders of the Promised Land that has
turned into a prison, and promoting universal unhappiness, become a new prophecy for the
nation.
Both the poignant irony and the main message of this palimpsest allegorical reading
converge in the understanding that by embracing the truncated Pentateuch and rejecting the
subsequent biblical narratives of both the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament,
particularly the prophetic tradition which culminated in the teachings of Christ, as well as
their kernels rooted in the Book of Numbers (Hughes 35-36, 37-38; Ashley 8; Douglas 39,
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41), America rejects the very essence of Christianity, which leads to the spiritual death of
the nation. As a result, the allegory of the Jewish Wandering becomes a national allegory
pondering on and exposing the contrast between the societally optimistic and religiously
worded rhetoric of American exceptionalism, with the Promised Land as both the
conquerors’ enjoyable right and chief prize, and the deep inner unhappiness of individual
members of the nation, including the privileged ones, who should have benefited from this
thinking paradigm either by right of birth or wealth. However, to support these claims with
conviction, it is insufficient to base my whole analysis on only two references identifying
the importance of the Jewish Wanderings in Falconer, their directing force for grasping the
narrative’s message notwithstanding. Therefore, I will next analyse other parts and images
of Cheever’s narrative responsible for its palimpsest nature and pertinent to the allegory of
the Jewish Wanderings.
I  begin  with  a  close  examination  of  the  wanderings  within  the  reality  of Falconer.
These wanderings can be divided into two types, both of which are essentially allegorical,
employed to demonstrate the pervasive homelessness and unhappiness of all the novel’s
characters. The first type, or ‘physical’ wanderings, involves an actual journey within the
reality of the narrative. Such journeys are described in flashbacks as consciously
experienced by many characters, including the protagonist himself, prior to their death or
imprisonment. To mention a few, the reader meets Michael, a drifting homosexual hustler
and prostitute; the Cuckold, one of the convicts who used to be a travelling salesman,
normally straight but at some point lonely enough to seek solace in an occasional
homosexual encounter; and, the last but not the least, the whole of Farragut’s family,
logically including his pilgrim ancestors, is described as wanderers (Cheever 83-88, 44-
47).
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Descendants of the first settlers and local celebrities due to the early date of their
kin’s arrival in the New World, 1672, Farragut’s parents have no solid spiritual or physical
dwelling place where they or their offspring could feel comfortable (Cheever 44-47). As a
result,  the  hero  defines  himself  as  “the  citizen,  the  product  of  some  border  principality,
such as Liechtenstein. His background lacked the mountainous scenery, but his passport
was fat with visas, he […] spoke four languages poorly and knew the words to four
national anthems” (Cheever 44). This tradition of changing place without reaching
happiness is inherited into his married life. As a couple, the Farraguts have drifted through
numerous apartments and houses, with the last one, located at Indian Hill, lost for the hero
as a prisoner forever (Cheever 24, 25). An old photograph of his wife and son he keeps in
jail as a treasured possession is a nostalgic piece of evidence of this constant movement: “I
took it when we had a house on the Vineyard” (Cheever 16), the protagonist says to his
wife, longing for the peace and love the picture represents but soon remembering a
prolonged quarrel that happened there, exposing both the peace and the love as
unachievable illusions (Cheever 19-22). When confronted anew with Tiny’s penetrating
question – “Why is you an addict?” – Farragut, to avoid answering, gives quite a
reasonable justification: it is exactly this spiritual homelessness which is at the root of his
addiction (Cheever 44).
To spread this nomadic character to the whole country, at the end of the novel the
author introduces the already mentioned stranger, whom Farragut meets when on the move
after his escape and who is a quintessential representation of the ‘Wandering American.’
They meet at a bus stop where a sign informs them that parking is forbidden there, which
symbolically urges them to wander on (Cheever 151). The stranger is seeking another
place to live after his landlady has “evicted” him from his apartment and, consequently, he
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has  to  spend the  night  at  his  sister’s  (Cheever  152).  The  hatred  between the  siblings  is  a
symbol of the belligerent nature of the tribes contesting the land of Canaan, and the
stranger’s words are an obvious reference to the Jewish Wanderings: “I hate my sister and
she hates my guts, but I’ll spend the night there and find a beautiful place in the morning.
They have some beautiful places on the south side, places with views of the river”
(Cheever 152). As already mentioned, in the context of the Old Testament “the south side”
refers to the land occupied by the Philistines, one of Israel’s adversaries in their battle for
the Promised Land (“Philistine” online; Hackett 202). The stranger’s tale, introduced at the
very end of the narrative, condensedly re-enacts the story of each wanderer of the novel
and skilfully conveys the gloomy sense of foreboding, where the ever-lasting hope of
reaching the Promised Land is to be eternally destroyed in the allegorical morning. To add
to this malaise, the two aspects made prominent in the encounter of the hero and the
stranger, namely, the damaged fraternity and the eternal wanderings, suggest a clear
parallel between the allegory of the Jewish Wanderings and that of Cain and Abel. This
affinity evokes the final role reversal of Farragut to Cain, who even after his escape
remains his brother’s killer and bears the mark and punishment of an eternal vagabond (see
section 3.1), which amplifies the petrifying sense of inescapable confinement that
permeates the novel.
The dispersed allegory of the physical wanderings discussed above is significantly
enhanced by the second type of wanderings, unconsciously endured in jail. Due to the
restriction of confinement that precludes any notable physical motion, these second-type
movements are difficult to identify as wanderings per se, which considerably increases
reader responsibility. However, once they are detected, it is easy to grasp their
pervasiveness in prison. The first mention of this symbolic motion without positive or
109
visible result occurs at the very beginning of the novel, when Farragut is escorted by Tiny
to  his  cellblock:  “They  went  up  a  sloping  tunnel  past  groups  of  men  who  hung  around
talking like men on the street” (Cheever 13). This is the route all the prisoners have to take
several times daily because it connects the cells with the prison canteen and administration
offices. This motif of the tunnel is a reinterpretation of Cheever’s bridge metaphor, which
is widely used in his fiction to bind past and present together (Morace 503-504) and to
“[…] symbolize the missing and necessary link between the fragmented elements of the
characters’ chaotic lives and the wholeness for which they earn” (504). However, in
Falconer, by transforming this metaphor into a tunnel that his characters have to cross
daily in both directions, the repeated motion that leads them nowhere, the author, instead of
conveying the characters’ yearning for wholeness and progression, foregrounds the sense
of timeless futility and regression. This timelessness, achieved by the endless repetition,
adds to creating the broad temporal context of the narrative, which I have already
demonstrated to encompass the biblical context of the Old Testament. I argue that the motif
of going back and forth through the tunnel as a mode of perpetual incarcerated motion is
highly important in the narrative, binding it together by allegorically representing the
characters’ movements as the Jewish Wanderings of the Old Testament.
Easy to remain unnoticed at the first or second instance of its usage, the insistent
repetition of the word “tunnel,” which is rather conspicuous in the context of a prison, is
bound to draw the reader’s attention to the kind of passage thus described. In my case such
close attention has led to the analysis of Cheever’s strategy of using this particular word.
Overall, there are fourteen direct mentions of the tunnel in the novel, which is a high figure
considering the shortness of the work, further reduced by the number of pages rendering
flashbacks into non-prison life, and the fact that eleven out of these fourteen references
110
cluster in the last third of the novel, occasionally twice on a single page (Cheever 13, 15,
82, 93, 94, 101, 104, 107, 115, 118, 122, 148). I interpret this distribution as deliberately
postponing the readers’ understanding of the importance the author accords to this
symbolic motion and this particular image. Indeed, two of the three references to this
passage in the first third of the narrative are unspecified. The second mention describes the
end of Marcia’s first visit, after which Farragut “jogged out of the visitor’s room and up the
stairs to cellblock F” (Cheever 26). The third, which depicts the protagonist’s increasing
internalization of prison routines, connects jogging with freedom: “He palmed three slices
of bread for his cat and jogged up to cellblock F. Jogging gave him the illusion of freedom”
(Cheever 30). The tunnel is implicitly present in both episodes due to the mention of the
motion upward (cf. Cheever 13). I argue that the Pentateuch image encoded in Cheever’s
tunnel is that of the Jews crossing the Red Sea to reach Canaan. This can be compared to
the Old Testament description of this passage, which bears an obvious resemblance to a
tunnel made in the water: “So the children of Israel went into the midst of the sea on the
dry ground, and the waters were a wall to them on their right hand and on their left” (Exod.
14:22; emphasis original). The importance of this rite of passage is softly emphasized at
the very beginning of the novel, when on the page following the first mention of the tunnel
Chicken Number Two pronounces: “There has to be something good at the end of every
journey […]” (Cheever 14), thus foreshadowing the following narrative as an exploration
of  whether  the  allegorical  wanderings  of Falconer amass  to  anything  good  for  its
characters.
The constant overlapping of the two types of wanderings analysed above intensifies
the dispiriting effect of both, focusing the reader’s attention on their futility. This is
accomplished with the help of the Cheeveresque narrative parallelism technique, where
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both types of movement echo each other throughout the novel and elucidate the same
message by a constant polyphony of incremental repetition (Morace 507). For example,
viewed chronologically, Farragut’s wanderings start as an extension of his pilgrim
ancestors’, continue with those of his parents’ and his own as a married man, and end in the
prison impasse with his daily pseudo-motions in the tunnel. Within the imagery of the
Jewish Wanderings, these movements cumulatively reflect the false progress of the
protagonist and generically symbolize the same regression of any American. Indeed, the
Chosen Land was subdued long ago, but the ironical result is that the Chosen People has
itself become confined. This is confirmed by the words of a hilarious episodic character,
the Commissioner of the Department of Correction, who in his speech on the occasion of
the cardinal’s visit answers his own rhetorical question of “where is home?” with the
enthusiastic verdict “Home is prison!” (Cheever 96-97).
The address of Farragut's former home, Indian Hill, which as a prisoner he has to
give up (Cheever 25), is a marker of the initial stage of this generic regressive movement,
namely, the occupation of the lands of Native Americans, which tacitly compromises the
myth of the Chosen People. This address is also a clear palimpsest reference to the City on
a Hill metaphor. The latter, according to John Winthrop, Americans as a God-chosen nation
are supposed to build – on Indian hills – to be judged and marvelled at by all other nations
and peoples, who, in turn, are to model their own state organization after that of America
(Winthrop online 9; Herbert 29). However, the narrative’s only functional densely
populated  institution  to  compare  with  a  city  or  a  model  of  a  state  is  that  of  a  prison.
Importantly, the route through the tunnel to the cellblocks of the Falconer prison goes
upward, so that, to reach their cells, the inmates daily repeat the movement comparable to
that  of  ascending  a  hill  slope  (Cheever  13).  In  addition  to  and  in  connection  with  this
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image of moving upward, Cheever twice explicitly compares Falconer to a city at the very
beginning of the novel:  the inmates seen by the hero while walking the tunnel to his cell
for the first time “hung around talking like men on the street” (Cheever 13), and the noise
of the radios heard on having reached the designated cellblock “sounded like any city street
at closing time or later” (Cheever 14). These small but potent details identify the prison as
an  allegorical  city.  Conceived  as  such,  the  constant  motion  of  its  citizens,  reminiscent  of
the passage of the ancient Jews through the waters of the Red Sea, but infinitely repeated,
becomes even more dramatic because now it is elevated onto the level of the whole state
and conveys the critique of its organizational principles.
Cheever’s representation of prison as an organizational principle of the state provides
an obvious link to the famous Panopticon metaphor by Michel Foucault. To remind,
Foucault describes society based on the internalized fear of ceaseless surveillance, which
transforms prisoners into willing collaborators and, ultimately, agents of the power
structure, with no border between the power and the oppressed (200-203; see also section
2.4.2). In Falconer,  Cheever’s  representation  of  some  of  the  prison  staff  as  “reliably
benign” human beings (Davis 136) not that different from the inmates and capable of
friendship with the latter supports this reading of the narrative’s prison metaphor. Even
more illustrative are some of Falconer’s internal organisational principles, such as the
constant self-imposition of the demanded order via the internalized segregation,
institutionalized and steadily promoted hypocrisy, and institutionalized violence, which is a
constant threat to everybody who dares to break the rules and the walls of this
metaphorical surveillance tower at any level.
To begin a closer examination of the above-mentioned principles, I  start  with
segregation, which is both enforced and self-imposed. The former manifests itself in the
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dividing rule of management of this prison-city: the inmates are forbidden to communicate
at  meals  and  in  the  shower  (Cheever  12,  66),  which  impedes  their  forming  close
relationships at the personal level, thereby decreasing the chances of forming close
communities. The latter, leading to the same result, casts the allegorical geography of
Falconer as strictly divided at the racial level and, therefore, characteristically tribal:
“Silence was enforced by the administration, but they [the prisoners] had themselves
enforced a segregation that put the blacks in the north, the whites in the south, with a
middle ground for the men who spoke Spanish” (Cheever 12). This division is an apparent
reference to the country’s history, both real and allegorical. The real historical reference
derives from the opposition between the Whites and the Blacks, dating back to the period
of slavery and evoking the American Civil War between northern and southern states. The
allegorical reference, which has no direct geographical correspondence, is created by
adding the speakers of Spanish as a third ethnicity to this segregated community. The
increased number of segregated groups is now more substantial and allegorically refers to
the multiple relentlessly rivalling tribes contesting the Promised Land (Deut.  7:1-6).  Both
interpretations converge in a palimpsest image of the United States as a country organized
on a tribal principle that persists in spite of the three centuries of the nation’s historical
development. This emphasizes the fact that since its foundation, the USA has transformed
into an allegorical prison for any group, including that of the descendants of its pilgrim
glory, which bodes the question whether being so Chosen is a blessing or, indeed, a curse.
Supporting the latter as a more plausible answer to this question, Falconer is
represented as a mocking contrast to the idealistic City on a Hill in other respects, too. For
instance, it is filled with horrendous institutionalized violence to man and beast. To give an
example of both, once half of the prison cats are massacred to punish the whole species for
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a warden’s single stolen dinner (Cheever 32-35); another time a threesome of bored
administration officers delay Farragut’s methadone in order to watch “a withdrawal show”
(Cheever 43), which the highest in rank completes by beating the protagonist when, driven
to near insanity by the symptoms, he tries to rush out of his cell to receive the prescribed
drug substitute (Cheever 42-43). The inhumane behaviour of both occasions entails no
consequences for the prison administration. More than that, in case of Farragut, his attempt
to seek justice with the help of a lawyer is curtailed by the latter, who, threatening further
violence, tries to blackmail the protagonist into signing the document that describes the
incident as his attempted escape, which might lengthen his sentence by another seven years
(Cheever  52).  This  plot  line  is  a  good  illustration  of  the  impunity  for  violence  the
authorities of the allegorical prison-city enjoy by default.
To further illustrate the pervasiveness of violence, the earlier-mentioned grotesque
cat massacre is at the end of the narrative paralleled by that of quenching the riot at the
Amana prison, also known as The Wall (Cheever 102, 129-130). The suppression results in
at least fifty dead convicts and about the same number mortally wounded, with an added
large group of inmates temporarily incapacitated with tear gas (Cheever 102, 129-130).
This  retaliation  has  been  provoked  by  the  rioters’  demand  of  general  amnesty  for  two
thousand convicts at the threat of executing the twenty eight hostages they have taken from
the prison staff (Cheever 104). Analysed at the literal level, such a deadlock is highly
improbable to end peacefully, which implies an excuse for this instance of institutionalized
violence. However, read allegorically, these events suggest that the City on a Hill lives
under a perpetual threat of violent retribution to those who want to break the wall of the
nation’s imprisonment. To confirm this interpretation, the preventive distribution of
cannabis among the inmates of Falconer, which occurs exactly at the time of the
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suppression of the riot at The Wall (Cheever 128-129), is described as providing the
prisoners  with  “the  true,  the  precious  amnesty  of  the  drug”  (Cheever  129)  with  the
implication that this is the only freedom granted in a world organized as this anti-utopian
city. If other means of reaching for liberty are tested, the guards that used to be friends with
the convicts turn against them until the status quo is restored, as in the already discussed
Foucault’s Panopticon, where everyone becomes the agent of power and reinforces the
demanded order (200-203).
The  prison-city  of Falconer is also filled with hypocrisy. A good example is the
Pharisean visit of the cardinal, who performs a PR-motivated religious ceremony to bless
the graduates of a prison banking course for having learned what Jody sums up as the
essence of hustling (Cheever 72-73, 75). Disparaging the curriculum of the course,
Farragut’s lover, a convict with a four-decade sentence without possibility of parole for
twelve years (Cheever 67, 73), proposes to judge the effectiveness of this kind of “Charm
School, Success School, Elite School” (Cheever 72) against the evident fiasco of his own
life:
Shit, man, any hustler knows that. That’s my life, that’s the story of my life. I’ve
been  doing  all  this  ever  since  I  was  a  little  kid  and  look  where  it  got  me.  Look
where my knowledge of the essence of charm and success and banking dumped
me. (Cheever 72-73)
This justified rant exposes Jody’s life as similar to that of Farragut, i.e., likewise filled with
unhappy wanderings. The only difference between the two is that of motivation: while
Farragut has spent his pre-prison life hiding the denial of his prophetic identity behind a
vague  search  for  love,  Jody’s  roving  from  school  to  school  has  been  openly  aimed  at
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upward social mobility, which is cynically equated with mastering legitimate means of
hustling in order to make more money (Cheever 19, 36-37, 40, 67-68). All the same, Jody’s
wanderings, as futile as the hero’s, also lead him to jail, where the young man repeats the
circle of perfecting the same hustling techniques that have, in his own assessment, already
cost him his freedom (Cheever 72-73). Ultimately, Jody understands the pernicious impact
of this hypocrisy and quits the course, whereas Farragut disapproves of his decision
(Cheever 71-72, 73). This disapproval once more betrays him as a willing collaborator of
the state system, the fact that has been earlier exemplified in his love of the army (Cheever
17) and “the blessed paradigm, the beauty of the establishment, the glory of organized
society” (Cheever 142). This hypocritical doggedness in accepting the foundational flaws
of  the  state,  which  persists  even  when  the  hero  is  alone  with  his  beloved,  once  again
exposes the conformist denial of his prophetic duty.
Notably, the fate of less conformist characters who, unlike Jody or Eben, veer from
the path of the amassing of wealth carved for the nation, is the same as of those who stick
to it: the former are also inevitably forced into unhappy wanderings. The above-mentioned
stranger whom Farragut meets on his escape is a case in point. As already stated, his
function at the end of the narrative is to crystallize the wanderings of other characters into
a generic pattern which transgresses the novel’s length. Importantly, the stranger has
enough money to make him seem a conformist American: “Money I got. Money’s one
thing  I  don’t  have  to  worry  about.  I  got  plenty  of  money”  (Cheever  152).  However,  this
triple invocation does not spare him from his neighbours’ and his own sister’s hatred
(Cheever 152). This animosity is a sharp and sad contrast to the ideal brotherly
relationships of the City on a Hill, much the worse for the WASP identity of the stranger,
his sister, his landlady, and, doubtless, his neighbours – the group who, according to
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Winthrop, by definition are supposed to exude mutual love (Cheever 152, Winthrop online
1-9). Instead, their reciprocal enmity, emphatically expressed on the penultimate page of
the novel, raises the mutual hatred of the most privileged members of American society to
a generic level equalling that of Cain and Abel in its archetypal force and encompassing
the  whole  country.  It  is  this  hatred  that  ultimately  sends  the  stranger  onto  the  path  of  his
involuntary wanderings.
An argument to support this statement comes from the stranger’s first words: “What
you see here is a man who is been evicted […] I been evicted because I’m a human being
[…]” (Cheever 152). The stranger then proceeds to complain that he has been forced from
his home for merely being an ordinary person who has lived his ordinary life but,
ironically, has been accused of being “a disturber of the peace” (Cheever 152). Combined
with  Indian  Hill  as  the  protagonist’s  lost  home,  generic  due  to  its  name  (Cheever  25),
which is a clear reminder of the American occupation of the lands of the indigenous
population, the stranger’s predicament of losing his abode and transporting his possessions
to another, unwanted dwelling place, brings to mind the Indian Removal Act of 1830. This
decree forced a large number of American Indians from their lands, which killed thousands
on  the  way  to  a  new  destination  and  destroyed  the  traditional  way  of  life  of  those  who
managed to stay alive (Newcomb xxiii; Henderson 329-330). The gist of the ironical
substitution achieved by invoking this palimpsest image is that, having applied eviction
policies to indigenous peoples, the white population has acquired this habit to the extent of
spreading it onto itself, including its affluent, which is to say its most privileged members.
The shift of this initially external tribal hatred onto itself is another extension of the
palimpsest allegory of the Jewish Wanderings, where the belligerent attitude to fellow
human beings is impossible to contain within a particular group, which ultimately leads to
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homelessness and endless wanderings within the nominally conquered Promised Land. The
underlying message of this allegorical substitution of the object of hatred is the same as
that of Nina Menkes’s Bloody Child, namely, that violence against indigenous populations
damages not only them, but is universally destructive to the group imposing this violence
(Petrolle 118-120).
The  echo  of  the  already  distant  but  still  quite  significant  occupation  of  the  lands  of
Native Americans is reinforced in the narrative by a strong presence of an on-going
military conflict. The latter resurfaces either as the protagonist’s flashbacks to his own four
years in the army or is alluded to via the younger generation’s protests against the
belligerent state policy, presumably in Vietnam (Cheever 31-32, 141). Importantly,
references to particular wars are rather or absolutely vague. For example, the first
identification of the Second World War, which Farragut has participated in, as “the long-
ago war with Germany and Japan” (Cheever 31-32) is soon followed by another, extremely
unspecified reference to the same military conflict: “[Farragut] had been introduced to
drugs during a war on some island where the weather was suffocating, the jungle rot of his
hairy parts was suppurating and the enemy were murderers” (Cheever 36; emphasis added).
The cruelty and the extreme conditions of the island fighting suggest that the military
operation referred to may be the 1942-1943 battle of Guadalcanal, which lasted for six
month and where the USA and Japan fought over dominance in the Pacific on several  of
the  southern  Solomon  Islands,  then  part  of  the  British  Protectorate  (Jersey  xiii-xiv,  402).
Jersey provides an account of the conditions of this campaign which are quite close to that
of Farragut:
For the Americans, Guadalcanal was a hell-hole. Many men were close to
starvation. All lost body weight, and almost everyone had malaria or some sort of
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fever, though even with the temperature of 100° F., men were considered fit for
ground combat or for flying. Most had the intestinal problems […] Jungle rot was
rampant; many troops had worn-out, eaten-away shoes and no socks. The men
slept on the ground, and they were always wet; each new day brought another
burst of rain or soaking drizzle, usually at unpredictable times. Every foxhole was
a swamp, jungle-hot, with suffocating temperatures and oppressive humidity.
(403)
Assuming that the identification of the conflict is correct, the occupation of a foreign
territory  first  by  Britain,  then  by  Japan  and  the  USA,  three  major  imperial  powers  of  the
day, with none of them paying any attention to the indigenous population, not only easily
resonates with the occupation of North America, but coalesces with the biblical story of the
battle over the Promised Land. Thus, this specific military conflict is encompassed into the
created palimpsest allegory of the Jewish Wanderings.
At the same time, although hinting at an identifiable military operation, Cheever’s
deliberate generalization of both the location and the character of the adversary refracts the
global conflict of WWII into numerous local wars. This means that the protagonist, instead
of successfully pursuing one patriotic endeavour, has instead participated in several brutal
massacres, where the enemy’s alleged ferociousness clearly embodies for the reader the
justifiable force with which the hero had to retaliate. This vague reference to Farragut’s
military past, placed at the beginning of the narrative, is paralleled by another vague but
identifiable allusion at the end of the novel, i.e., the reason for the incarceration of Eben’s
son, convicted “for his part in some peace demonstration against some war” (Cheever 141,
emphasis added). Given the year of the novel’s publication, 1977, the most obvious anti-
war protests that could be implied here are those against the 1954-1975 Vietnam War (See
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Spector online). However, as with the previous references, the context is intentionally
obscured to create the sense of consistency and continuation between the military
engagements of the protagonist and those of the next generation. As a result, the reader is
prompted to view the history of the USA as an ever-lasting battle against strange peoples in
strange lands to which Americans have virtually no claims, which represents the country as
tacitly and ceaselessly re-enacting the biblical occupation of the Promised Land.
This generic background of a war that persists in spite of the generation change is a
strategy similar to that employed by Nina Menkes in Bloody Child, where the director
explores the global consequences of violence for all the participants of a conflict “at the
level  of  the  unconscious,  or  iconic”  (Petrolle  118).  However,  Cheever,  although  also
examining  his  country  on  a  large  scale  spatially,  temporally,  and  spiritually,  employs  the
background of an ever-lasting war to a more specific purpose. Namely, extrapolating the
Old Testament occupation of Canaan onto his motherland and exploring the consequences
thereof, he uses the allegory of the Jewish Wanderings to portray the United States toward
the end of the twentieth century as a self-ruined spiritual landscape where “[h]ome is
prison!” to numerous involuntary wanderers (Cheever 97). It is not by chance that Marcia,
the protagonist’s wife, states during her first prison visit that “[t]he army must have been a
good preparation for this experience” (Cheever 17). Farragut, who, as we also learn from
his wife, has genuinely loved his army years, does not contradict her (Cheever 17), which
subtly implies the cause-and-effect relation between his conscious succumbing to the
institutionalized violence and his subsequent incarceration. Thus, the political violence of
the state,  as it  washes over the protagonist,  simultaneously plunging him into a stream of
conscious-altering substances to make him pliable enough not to question the state’s
agenda, ultimately leads the hero into a cage where he will be kept when his use of drugs is
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no more justified because it has ceased to support him in his function of being a promoter
of the state agenda. This marionette role that Farragut willingly endures throughout his life
is  in  ironic  contrast  with  the  high  calling  of  a  prophet  both  he  and  the  state  comply  in
making sure that he rejects. Thus, overall, the allegory of incarceration through violence
shadows the protagonist’s psychomachia by diminishing his chances of success.
To allow some relief, in accordance with Cheever’s belief in the intrinsic spirituality
of man, which he defines as “very near botanical” (qtd. in Bailey 661), this pessimistic
picture of American society is slightly alleviated by the personal escape of the protagonist,
which indicates that his psychomachia has at least partially been a success. Indeed, as has
been shown in the previously reviewed allegorical reading of the novel by Johnson, the
hero has learned to love and, certainly improved spiritually, is worthy of a miraculous
reward (158-162; see also Introduction). This reward implies that gaining mastery of
selfless love can serve as a suggested solution for the alleviation of the universal suffering
described in the narrative. However, selfless love per se is not enough to change the
foundations of society and, therefore, constitutes only part of the hero’s quest. The other
part, namely, his duty to society as a prophet, examined in the previous section, remains
unfulfilled. After the murderous confrontation with his brother, never again during his
allegorical wanderings does the hero make a new attempt to assume this duty. Instead, he
persists in clinging to his addiction even after having been cured (Cheever 136). This
obstinacy suggests that he rejects clear thinking, which could ultimately push him towards
accepting his societal role of a watchman over the nation. This stubborn denial has a
profound import on the fate of the society as a whole.  Namely, by way of co-opting with
the state rather than challenging its tribal principles, Farragut betrays his nation as a
prophet, which leaves it in the same circle of a half-dead existence full of both literary and
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metaphorical drugs to keep the occasional brave soul from disturbing the peace of the
spiritually dead. Therefore, the ultimate solution that would allow American society to
overcome these problems lies with the protagonist’s, and, in the most optimistic outcome,
some conscientious readers’, finally accepting this prophetic role to initiate societal change
in the direction of true, not tribal, Christianity.
This section has demonstrated the palimpsest use of the allegory of the Jewish
Wanderings in Falconer to provide it with a coherent structure and to explore the nature of
and reasons for suffering in the contemporary USA. Contrary to the happy Promised Land
of American exceptionalism, the country is represented as a prison, which turns Cheever’s
narrative into a national allegory of confinement. This effect is achieved by deconstructing
and negating the typological myths of the Promised Land and the Chosen People within the
frame  of  the  allegory  of  the  Jewish  Wanderings,  which  the  author  turns  into  a  new
typological image, namely, that of an endless cycle of eternal pseudo-movement within the
borders of the Chosen Land that has become a prison to its nation. Viewed through the
prism of these regressive wanderings, American tribal typology is exposed as pernicious to
the national identity by causing pervasive suffering even among the most privileged
members of society. To overcome this circle of suffering and achieve salvation, Cheever
suggests  as  a  possible  solution  the  acquisition  of  agency  on  the  societal  level,  which
corresponds to the protagonist’s acceptance of his prophetic role in order to trigger societal
change.
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4. Conclusion
Understandably, due to the complex nature of allegory, which incorporates
multilayeredness as its structural feature, no particular interpretation of any narrative can
be considered exhaustive. However, assuming the constructive-postmodern perspective in
reading John Cheever’s Falconer, so far mostly reviewed as lacking coherent structure,
allows to demonstrate the coherence of this narrative. This is achieved by reading the novel
as a religious allegory that explores questions of suffering and salvation in the
contemporary USA, with a particular focus on extratextual concerns, with the help of the
traditional techniques of Christian typology, negative theology, and two popular
postmodern techniques, intertextuality and palimpsest. The combination of both traditional
and postmodern conventions results in a multifaceted religious meditation effectively
looking for the meaning of life and a way to improve the human condition in the age of the
unreliability of meaning due to its relativization, thereby undeniably demonstrating the
viability of allegory in postmodernism.
The structural level of allegory is examined in the second chapter of the work, which
is a theoretical exploration of the development of the trope from antiquity to
postmodernism, highlighting the most important phases of this process, the suitability of
allegory for religious search, and its continuous application for this purpose since antiquity.
Forming the theoretical framework for the analysis, this chapter provides the pertinent
definitions of myth, allegory, and psychomachia, and discusses John Bunyan’s The
Pilgrim’s Progress as a prototype example of a Christian religious allegory. The analytical
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part of this thesis examines allegory at the thematic level, which comprises Cheever’s use
of two biblical allegories, those of Cain and Abel and the Jewish Wanderings, with the help
of close reading. Employed in the third chapter, this method analyses the author’s use of
the pertinent parts of biblical narrative as a palimpsest, gradually constructing a critical
account of the destructive consequences of the deeply acquired American identity-building
myths of the Promised Land and the Chosen People. As a result, parallel to the optimistic
narrative of the protagonist’s individual escape, there arises a vision of Americans as a
nation suffering an eternal confinement to aimless wanderings within the borders of their
Promised Land, which has turned into a prison.
The allegory of Cain and Abel is demonstrated to have been used for three primary
goals. First, the negation of its typologically determined labelling of Farragut as an
unambiguous Cain focuses the reader on the protagonist’s psychomachia, where he and his
brother become doppelgängers representing conflicting parts of a single psyche, whose
struggle, resulting in a symbolic suicide, marks the starting point of the hero’s
psychomachia, which is left unresolved in the novel. Second, this allegory introduces the
Old Testament as a frame of reference for the novel’s critical representation of American
society, which allows for a re-examination of its religious rhetoric of exceptionalism.
Third, the final role reversal of the protagonist back to Cain, marked as a wanderer
immediately after his escape from prison at the end of the narrative, reinforces the allegory
of the Jewish Wanderings, developed in parallel, as essentially pessimistic regarding the
possibility of breaking this circle of wanderings. The palimpsest nature of this synchronic
bringing  of  parts  of  biblical  narrative  together  with  the  history  and  problems  of  the
contemporary United States sets the scene for the critique of the rhetoric of American
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exceptionalism, which is achieved mainly through the examination of the allegory of the
Jewish Wanderings.
The latter, using the palimpsest more explicitly than the previously discussed
allegory, concentrates on the nature of and reasons for suffering in the USA, becoming a
national allegory of imprisonment. This interpretation is constructed by negating the
rigidly typological myths of the Promised Land and the Chosen People with the help of a
new typological image gradually created by Cheever throughout the narrative. This new
typological allegory combines the familiar rhetorical elements in a new, sublime way: the
Chosen People, having generically acquired the brotherly hatred of Cain and Abel, is
confined to eternal wanderings within the Promised Land, which is represented as hell. The
inherent prophetic character of this trope, which, to remind, is a subgroup of prophetic and
situational allegory (MacQueen 23; see also section 2.3.2), defines the force of impact of
this authorial typological interpretation. This new typology negates the tribal rhetoric of the
American identity building by replacing it with a new, essentially pessimistic prophesy for
the nation. At the same time, the recurrent image of the nation confined to eternal
regressive wanderings within what it habitually perceives as its Promised Land creates an
indefinitely repeated cycle, affording the novel a coherent structure. Exploring within this
structure the questions of national suffering and salvation from a societal perspective, the
author suggests that the way to alleviate suffering and achieve salvation lies in the
execution of agency, i.e., in the protagonist’s acceptance of the prophetic role of a watcher
over his nation, which can trigger societal change. To implement this change, Americans
must abandon the tribal rhetoric of their identity building and find a new, non-destructive
substitution. The latter is easy to be found in the teachings of both the Jewish prophets and
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Christ, which stand in sharp contrast with the tribal rhetoric of the Pentateuch, accepted as
the foundation of American identity.
As I have demonstrated in my thesis, assuming the perspective of constructive
postmodernism allows one to read postmodern narratives with an emphasis on their search
for meaning instead of concentrating on its indeterminacy and unattainability, argued by
deconstructive postmodernism. Religious allegory remains a consistently viable tool for
this search by reason of its capacity to cope with the multivalency of postmodern meaning.
Instead of viewing this multifacetedness as an insurmountable obstacle, constructive-
postmodernist perspective accepts it as the norm and assumes the attitude of negative
theology, which considers the endeavour of approaching God and the truth a human moral
obligation in spite of realizing the ultimate unfeasibility of the intention. The justification
of this seemingly futile practice is that it is the process of the moral search that matters,
with its meaningfulness consisting in its extratextual concerns, which has the age-old
“emendation of life” (Cassian qtd. in Turner 72) as its ultimate goal. This approach can be
used to meaningfully reread other American postmodern narratives which, like Falconer,
resist interpretation when analysed with the help of other methodologies.
As  already  stated,  my  analysis  of Falconer is not exhaustive and, therefore, this
narrative can also be reread, assuming the same perspective of a postmodern religious
allegory, but with a shift of focus. There remain a number of topics to explore in detail,
closely related to the allegories I have examined in my thesis. For example, one of them is
the  ambiguity  of  the  concept  of  God  in  the  narrative,  which  for  the  majority  of  the
characters is either Yahweh or the God of money, both sharply contrasted with the
Christian God as understood in the Gospels. The fate of children in Falconer is  also  a
viable topic worth of its own exploration, with the young generation systematically
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doomed to war, prison, death or self-murder, which resembles the sacrificial practices of
some of the non-Jewish tribes populating Canaan and represented in the Pentateuch as
barbarians. Another related topic is the contrast between the institutionalized, civil religion
of the USA and the inner, true religion the protagonist seems to have reached his partial
salvation with. Still other topic is the metaphor of the USA as a wasteland, which is
constructed on the final pages of the novel and which can be explored in relation with the
prophetic activity of Ezekiel. A topic related to that of wasteland is wilderness as a site of
cleansing and reclaiming of agency, with a particular focus on the rewards for this process,
exemplified in quite different outcomes after the prison break for Farragut and his lover
Jody. The topic of drugs,  which I  have not exhausted in my analysis,  allows for a further
exploration of real and metaphorical stimulants, the latter represented as a systematic
injection of the novel’s characters with a dose of consumer goods that clouds human
psyche as effectively as Farragut’s heroin. To conclude the list, a broad topic of the
representation of the United States as an empire similar to that of Rome in early
Christianity can also be successfully pursued from the perspective of constructive
postmodernism. The proposed variety of topics for further research, all of them imbued
with a strong societal dimension, demonstrates that Falconer is a novel that, when read
with the right methodology, is much richer in its scope than a restrictive interpretation of
the narrative as an optimistic story of individual escape.
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